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Interdisciplinarity in higher education is a widely used but poorly understood term. There 
is a wealth of literature about the topic, but beneath the surface details very little of it 
agrees. Further, what attempts have been made to engage with pedagogies of 
interdisciplinarity in the undergraduate curriculum often suggest dubious programmes of 
‘minimal understanding’ or ‘adequacy’. These are consistent only in their inconsistency 
and lack of standard qualifications, and are often short lived. This thesis explores why 
there is no consensus on interdisciplinarity, and why there is no consistently effective 
undergraduate curriculum to develop it, and seeks to resolve both questions via a range of 
empirical evidence from fields which have not heretofore been applied to 
interdisciplinarity research. 
 
Three problems are identified in the current research: self-contradictory pedagogic models; 
a general lack of reliable evidence for theories; and a lack of engagement with relevant 
educational and psychological research. Taking a pragmatic approach to evidence I review 
the existing educational research on disciplinarity and the psychological research on 
expertise, knowledge transfer, collaborative cognition and categorisation to see if these can 
yield more consistent and empirical foundations for an understanding of interdisciplinarity. 
The culmination of this research soundly undermines several of the persistent but ill-
evidenced models of interdisciplinarity in the literature, namely pluralism, disciplinary 
essentialism, and competency-based models, and establishes a more coherent approach to 
interdisciplinary curricula.  
 
Taking the view that a model is not complete without connection to practice, I have also 
interviewed current academics in the ‘interdisciplinary’ field of Medieval Studies to 
correlate the psychological evidence with praxis. Ultimately, interdisciplinarity as a ‘thing’ 
or a stable academic identity is refuted in favour of interdisciplinarity as a particular focus 
of skills-based curriculum. This focus should ideally be developed concurrently with 
matching skills in a disciplinary context in order to balance breadth and depth of learning. 
This thesis ends with some forward-thinking considerations of curriculum models which 
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"A serious lack of discipline in the use of terminology has hampered progress in analysing the Sociology of 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary organizations. There is no agreement on what a discipline is, let 
alone what distinguishes terms such as inter-, multi- or crossdisciplinary from each other" (Rustrum 1979: 
169). 
 
“This is one in a long series of efforts of governments to constantly recreate the conditions of innovation, and 
in that context has very short-term goals. My position is that anything that gets hyped up in this way needs 
critical attention…[Interdisciplinarity is] a perversion of something that could be valuable” (Strathern 
2005: 134). 
 
These quotes suggest that a general understanding of interdisciplinarity, its value, or even 
its existence is hardly a foregone conclusion; in fact the situation may be getting worse 




There are two primary research questions this thesis seeks to answer: 
 
• What is interdisciplinarity best defined as, in terms that are consistent in practical 
application and learning and teaching? 
• What types of undergraduate curricula can best develop interdisciplinarity? 
 
These questions necessitate a sub-question, which this thesis will also seek to answer: 
 
• What is a discipline, in terms that allow for a clear and useful understanding of 
interdisciplinarity? 
 
This thesis aims to return to the foundations of interdisciplinary theory and research to 
enable the identification of a solid but highly flexible structure to develop 
interdisciplinarity  in the undergraduate curriculum without sacrificing disciplinary 
expertise. This will be achieved through critical review of the gaps in existing models, 
analysis of heretofore underexplored research in psychology on constraints of learning, and 
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triangulation of these with interview-based analysis of current practice in the field of 
Medieval Studies.  
 
The focus on the nature of interdisciplinarity was not the original goal of this thesis. It 
began with a narrower goal, one specifically derived from my undergraduate and Masters 
work in Scottish Medieval Studies. I was interested to know why serious interdisciplinary 
discussion seemed not to begin until the postgraduate level, while there appeared to be far 
more time to teach such apparently foundational things during the longer undergraduate 
period. The chief reason that I deviated from this plan was that in looking for a model of 
interdisciplinarity to adopt for the project I was struck not only by how little coherent 
agreement on the term there was, but that what agreement there was came through 
rhetorical and uncritical applications of a few select authors (whose work often appeared 
problematic and less than compelling). It seemed necessary and useful then to take the 
concept of interdisciplinarity back to first principles.  
 
Though I enter into this thesis from personal experience which suggests interdisciplinarity 
to be real and valuable, I regard this as a hypothesis to be tested, not a fact to be explained. 
Therefore in the review that follows I have not presumed that any account of the nature of 
interdisciplinarity is valid beyond what evidence is provided. This has led to a 
problematising of much of scholarship on the subject to date, and the realisation that I am 
not alone in coming to this conclusion (Lattuca 2001; Nikitina 2005; Spelt et al. 2009; 
Huutoniemi 2012). My review revealed both some welcome and unsettling trends, and 
established not only why it is necessary to try yet again to develop an understanding of 
interdisciplinarity, but what elements may need to be addressed most.  
 
I will consider below several different traditions of research on interdisciplinarity. Within 
these, many definitions of interdisciplinarity have been given over the past 40 years, and 
aside from a few surface similarities there has been little consistency or commensurability 
between them. Definitions which have shared some limited consensus seem to have done 
so by evolving over several decades to become increasingly long, vague, and with more ad 
hoc clauses, until it is not clear that they define anything (Apostel 1972; Newell and Green 
1982; Thompson-Klein 1990, 1996, 2010b; Lattuca 2001; Newell 2001; Rowland 2006; 
Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007). One of the most regularly cited definitions of 




“the capacity to integrate knowledge and modes of thinking in two or more 
disciplines or established areas of expertise to produce a cognitive 
advancement – such as explaining a phenomenon, solving a problem, or 
creating a product – in ways that would have been impossible or unlikely 
through single disciplinary means” (Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007: 219).  
 
In addition to being broad enough to encompass a suspiciously large range of activities, the 
separate elements of this definition are themselves ill-defined and open to considerable 
debate.  
 
Rather than proceed with an assumed definition of interdisciplinarity, I will look at what 
has been claimed as interdisciplinarity in the literature, whether or not it is defined directly, 
in the hope that a better definition will become clear. I take as my starting point two core 
questions, which directly challenge most (but not all) of the existing literature on 
interdisciplinarity: 
 
• What if none (or very few) of the historical cases of interdisciplinarity frequently 
used in the literature to define interdisciplinarity actually are so? 
  
• What if academics within the disciplines who claim to do be doing interdisciplinary 
work are not reliable sources for knowing whether they are or are not?  
 
If the answer to each of these were true, which is often the case, it suggests that 
interdisciplinarity may be a chimera, a mythical creation of the modern era of education 
theory: I could end this thesis now by suggesting that there is simply no interdisciplinarity, 
and some have done just that (Fish 1989; Dogan and Pahre 1990). However, there is 
sufficient evidence in the literature on interdisciplinarity to suggest that something is 
consistently happening in practice which transcends, undercuts, sidesteps or blurs what is 
typically presumed to be disciplinary activity. Whether interdisciplinarity is the best term 
for this is debatable, but it is the term we are offered. I am sceptical of much of the 
evidence given to validate interdisciplinary theory, but also the too-easy response that it 
just doesn’t exist. My research agenda then has been to locate and evaluate an alternate 
source of defining interdisciplinarity and developing a practical undergraduate curriculum 
for it, ideally a source which is situated or focused outside of disciplinary and 





As we will see many, if not most, of the reliable aspects of defining interdisciplinarity are 
fairly straight-forward, and have indeed been tacitly ‘floating around’ in the literature in 
some form for many years. However, the tacit or common sense nature of these ideas is 
often the problem. Because there has been limited focus on reliable evidence over rhetoric 
in the literature, claims that are sensible have typically stood on equal or lesser footing 
with claims which are less sensible or even detrimental. My interest is in uncovering what 
claims can be justified and in problematising those which cannot, in the hope that this will 
lead to a more reliable, applicable and sustainable concept of disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. 
 
Before looking further at the structure of the thesis, it is important to elaborate on two key 






Underdetermination is a core theme of this thesis. This is a term devised within the 
pragmatic epistemological tradition for the idea that a theory may fit all of the evidence at 
hand, but may not resolve whether it is the only, the best, or even a good solution (Quine 
1969; Stanford 2013). This can be because the justification for the theory itself is not 
explored (such that it is considered self-evident or that it has transactional value), but more 
often it is because the comparative value of the theory is not considered next to other 
theories which also fit the same evidence.  
 
I identify two types of underdetermination, one which is essential to all knowledge and 
cannot reasonably be eliminated, which I refer to as ‘justified’, and one which can 
reasonably be eliminated or reduced, which I refer to as ‘unjustified’.1 The first type states 
that we can never be entirely certain that there cannot be a better theory which we are 
simply unaware of yet. This type presumes that every reasonable effort to look for such a 
theory has been exhausted using present abilities. The second type, unjustified 
underdetermination, occurs when the second condition of justified underdetermination is 
not met, i.e. when alternate theories or evidence are reasonably available but are not 
engaged with. That these alternate theories or evidence must be reasonably available 
                                                 
1
 I use ‘justified’ here in the sense that epistemological knowledge is most commonly referred to as ‘justified 
true belief’  
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suggests that this cannot be an absolute judgement; what is reasonable from one 
perspective may not be so from another. As such, simple epistemological tricks of 
contrariness such as stating ‘this only applies in the cases you have seen’ are not sufficient 
to call a theory unjustifiably underdetermined; one must present a compelling argument 
that the underdetermination in question could be reasonably reduced. One of the key 
arguments of this thesis is that alternate theories and evidence about interdisciplinarity 
have been reasonably available for some time, and have not been engaged with, making 
much of the current state of interdisciplinary theory unjustifiably underdetermined. This in 
turn has a direct impact on effective curriculum models for interdisciplinarity, or the lack 
thereof. 
 
One other key point is that unjustifiably underdetermined theories are not presumed to be 
incorrect merely by virtue of this, just open to substantial doubt. Any number of ‘correct’ 
theories may still be unjustifiably underdetermined.  
 
Adbuction 
Abduction (also sometimes referred to as Bayesian inference) is an approach to evidence 
and data developed by pragmatists in the early 20th century (Douven 2011). An adbuctive 
approach to research regards small or isolated units of data on a larger or very complex 
subject as typically insufficient to develop theories from without considerable triangulation, 
because the data otherwise leaves too much of a theory open to question and alternate 
models. Early pragmatists Charles Sanders-Pierce and William James argued that 
abduction represented a new and different approach to knowledge production, but it is 
effectively nothing more than a foregrounding of the hypothetical nature of much evidence 
and reasoning (Douven 2011). An adbuctive approach then foregrounds an awareness that 
the individual elements of evidence gathered are insufficient to make a theory which is not 
unjustifiably underdetermined. These must then be triangulated or further tested with other 
evidence until enough is present to make a compelling theory. As with underdetermination, 
this is dependent on what degree of evidence is considered acceptable or necessary in a 
given situation. In an academic setting it is typical to consider the bar quite high.  
 
A final note on use of terms, throughout this thesis the terms discipline and field will be 
contested notions, and the nature of each will be dissected and remade. An early attempt to 
use a different generic term to refer to academic groupings (structure) proved to be more 
distracting than any aid it provided to precision of terminology. I will therefore, be using 
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‘field’ and ‘discipline’ in the colloquial sense for readability, but will specify when and 
where a more technical meaning is preferred. 
 
Thesis Structure 
Psychology of Interdisciplinarity 
Research on disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity has been almost exclusively 
sociological/anthropological in nature for several decades (with a few notable exceptions). 
Although many practical and effective insights have come from this approach, the 
continued lack of consensus on the nature of, or curriculum approaches for, 
interdisciplinarity suggest that something external may be missing. What is not addressed 
in the sociocultural analyses is whether there are empirical limits or constraints of 
individual human capacity which may help bound our understanding of interdisciplinarity, 
or whether there may be non-sociocultural sources which may help determine what the 
best model of interdisciplinary curriculum is. “The world that the student then enters is not, 
however, fixed once and for all by the nature of the environment, on the one hand, and of 
science, on the other. Rather it is determined jointly by the environment and the particular 
normal-scientific tradition that the student has been trained to pursue” (Kuhn 1996: 111–
12). This does not seem to suggest total social construction, but rather a partial social 
construction, with social factors as one element and environmental constraints as the other.  
 
The type of evidence needed is within the realm of psychology, and there are in fact 
several well-developed specialisations of psychology which directly relate to the questions 
of interdisciplinarity: the psychology of expertise, knowledge transfer, collaboration and 
distributed cognition, and categorisation. But although there is a well-developed and 
thriving specialisation within Educational Studies devoted to educational psychology, none 
of these other fields have been substantially applied to the studies of disciplinarity or 
interdisciplinarity.  
 
It is important to note that by taking an empirical psychological approach to 
interdisciplinarity, I am not refuting the value and findings of sociocultural research itself, 
except where any psychological evidence may do so directly. My view is that Sociology 
and Psychology (also History and Anthropology) cannot be excluded from each other if a 
comprehensive understanding of any human endeavour is the goal. My research therefore 
is complementary to much of the existing research, providing a foundation/framework on 
which some compelling but less grounded sociocultural notions can rest, as well as to lay 
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to rest more permanently some notions which appear to disregard strong psychological 
evidence against them. More detail on this approach will be covered in chapter 4 on 
research of disciplinarity.  
 
Applied Theory & Medieval Studies  
The primary focus of this thesis is on developing a theory of interdisciplinarity which can 
be related directly to undergraduate curricula in a reliable and consistent way. I am aware 
that theory, and even empirical studies, can often end up quite far removed from the 
community/practice which they are meant to address (a common complaint in education 
reform/theory). To help close this gap I have interviewed seventeen lecturers and 
researchers from my former ‘home’ field of Medieval Studies, along with reviewing the 
literature in the field.  
 
My purpose with the interviews has not been to develop a new model of interdisciplinarity 
directly from the perceptions of disciplinary practitioners, as they may not be valid experts 
on interdisciplinarity. Rather I have approached the use of interviews abductively as one 
piece of evidence to be triangulated. My interest with the interviews then is in comparing 
the perception of practitioners to each other to other similar interview datasets, and the 
evidence from the other empirical fields to look for consistency and inconsistency between 
them. From this hopefully a better curricular approach to interdisciplinarity will emerge.  
 
Undergraduate Curriculum 
Beyond attempting to better define interdisciplinarity, this thesis is focused on developing 
a curriculum toolkit for undergraduate interdisciplinarity. This focus is more directed at 
generic pedagogic structures and interdisciplinarity in the curriculum than with the 
specifics of module by module interdisciplinary teaching practice. This does not mean that 
nothing will be said of specific practices where this is relevant to the bigger picture. The 
choice to limit consideration to the undergraduate is for three reasons. First, this was the 
original focus of my proposal based on the notion that there should be more time to 
develop interdisciplinarity in the undergraduate years. Second, because considerable 
evidence in the review of the literature on interdisciplinary research suggested that training 
prior to postgraduate levels would be useful. The last reason is simply the scope of the 
project, extending the analysis to encompass postgraduate or professional study in 




Further, a conclusion which applies to the full spectrum of undergraduate students is the 
goal. That is, the focus is on teaching any student to be interdisciplinary, rather than to 
selectively cultivate those who show talent or interest of their own accord. The latter has 
been the focus of several prominent examples of interdisciplinary curricula and 
programmes (Newell 2006; University of Melbourne 2010). The undergraduate focus also 
clearly restricts the time-frame. This is a critically important restriction, because it means 
that models of interdisciplinarity which would require more time to apply than a standard 
undergraduate career are unacceptable here. This restriction does permit that additional 
training in a professional or academic setting will take place after the undergraduate period, 
however, but that is not the focus of this study.  
 
Although I will be considering an approach to interdisciplinarity and and the curriculum 
which is ideally broadly generic, I will base discussion of specifics around the Scottish 
higher education system as the example. This means that the interdisciplinarity which can 
be taught (if it can be taught) within four years must meet a commensurate Scottish Credit 
and Qualifications Framework (SCQF) level of national standards for the degree achieved 
(level 10).2  
 
Lastly, there are at least two substantial aspects of interdisciplinarity in the curriculum 
which I will not be addressing, assessment of interdisciplinarity and administration of 
interdisciplinary staff. Each of these would be essential to a final implementation of a 
practical curriculum of interdisciplinarity; they are not addressed here solely due to the 
scope of doing so as each could easily be a thesis unto itself. 
 
Triangulation of Evidence 
My approach to this work is a synthesis of many disparate fields, ideas, and evidence types. 
The current state of understanding and practice of interdisciplinarity strongly suggests that 
it is looking wider, not more deeply, that is most needed to bring many concepts into better 
focus.3 Such an approach clearly means that the level of particulate detail which might be 
expected in a more narrowly focused thesis will not be found here, nor is it the goal. This is 
not to suggest that rigour has slackened, but that evidence has been approached from a 
                                                 
2
 See Appendix II 
3
 It is perhaps ironic that the study of interdisciplinarity suffers from a critical lack of interdisciplinarity. 
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different perspective, and that this necessitates a degree of trade off between rigour as 
depth and rigour as critical breadth and triangulation.4  
 
Such an approach is not uncommon in educational research, where many different interests 
and fields typically converge, as others have noted: 
 
“This mix of multiple data sources, to improve external validity of 
inferences made from evaluation data, is espoused by many writers (e.g. 
Kreber and Brook, 2001; Hanbury et al., 2008; Smith, 2008; Bamber et al., 
2012). It is particularly pertinent in the case of educational development, 
where self-reporting could be open to accusations of self-interest” (Bamber 
2013: 40).  
 
Bamber continues to describe the ‘evidence triangle’ conjoining three stages of 
development to a completely formed conclusion: 
 
• Research: alignment with theory, 
journal papers and the grey literature. 
• Evaluation: outcomes of 
consultations and evaluative data. 
• Practice Wisdom: changes to policy, 
anecdotes and testimonies, changes to 
practices, and student outcomes 
(Bamber 2013: 40).  
                              
         Figure I.1 Triangulation of Evidence (Bamber 2013: 40) 
 
The approach to evidence in this thesis follows this format, but specifically what 
constitutes each part is slightly different (as it is likely to be in every specific case). The 
‘research’ aspect is straightforward in the form of critical literature reviews of existing 
theory and research on interdisciplinarity (chapter 1) and disciplinarity (chapter 4). The 
‘evaluation’ section consists of several critical literature reviews/research analysis of 
heretofore un-reviewed, under-reviewed, or superficially applied specialist subjects in 
psychology which chapters 1 and 4 indicate a need to engage with. These include a review 
of the research on the psychology of expertise development, knowledge transfer, and 
collaborative cognition (chapter 5) and on the psychology of categorisation (chapter 6). 
                                                 
4
 In fact a critical approach to the concept of breadth versus depth forms a substantial theme of this thesis, as 












Finally the ‘practice wisdom’ aspect is supplied by triangulating the existing theory and the 
empirical research with interviews of practice in the field of Medieval Studies (chapter 7). 
Such a case study is acknowledged to only supply a small portion of the wider ‘practice 
wisdom’ that would be desired ultimately, but as we shall see a number of comparable 
studies have already been done in other fields.5 The interviews have had the simultaneous 
goals of testing current theories of interdisciplinarity for coherence with a subset of 
practice, looking for disciplinary and/or field-based trends in thinking about knowledge, 
and connecting all of the other research to actual teaching and curriculum practice. 
 
There is a further chapter devoted to the epistemological issues around interdisciplinary 
theory and academic knowledge (chapter 2) which is also more aligned to the ‘evaluation’ 
part of the evidence triangle, but which better fits between the literature reviews on 
interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity to provide context for these. The deep consideration of 
epistemological questions about the nature of academic knowledge is essential to the 
consideration of interdisciplinarity, i.e. it is evidence to be analysed. Epistemological 
differences between the disciplines are frequently cited as hindrance to interdisciplinarity 
(Snow 1961; Becher 1989; Thompson-Klein 1990, 1996; Repko 2008). It is important then 
to address the claim of epistemological dissonance directly. I am not convinced that the 
alleged epistemological differences are as essential or incommensurable as they are often 
depicted, or if they are, that they need to remain so. 
 
 
Research Assumptions  
I prefer not to regard any knowledge or concepts as ‘self-evident’ in any capacity, for 
reasons which will be made clear in my discussion of epistemology in chapter 2. However, 
to avoid the thesis digressing into a purely philosophical discussion, I am compelled to 
make three assertions, which I perceive to be reasonably uncontroversial within the field of 
educational research:  
 
1. I presume that the goal of any category, system, model, theory etc. is to approach an 
optimal balance between usefulness and usability, efficiency and effectiveness, or 
simplicity and utility. This is a very general concept, and clearly different individuals can 
have very different, even diametrically opposed, concepts of what achieves this goal. I only 
take that it is a general and uncontroversial consensus that the goal is not to create more 
                                                 
5
 It is understood that the approach to the practice wisdom aspect of this thesis can only be partial at this 
stage. Until the conclusions of this thesis are made, there is no new model to apply to practice directly. As 
such the interviews constitute only the first phase of that aspect of the research triangle. 
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complexity and/or less utility for their own sake, regardless of whether a model or theory 
achieves this anyway. This is an important assertion, because it presumes that if the 
opposite of this goal is indeed achieved we can safely assume it is an unintentional 
consequence. I do not take this as absolute though; nothing fundamental prevents a person 
from intentionally violating it. 
 
2. I presume that it is reasonably uncontentious when one is required to work with others 
that being able to reliably trust in their abilities is a desirable condition, while being 
uncertain of their abilities is undesirable. This is an important presumption when looking at 
qualification standards and interdisciplinarity.  
 
3. I presume that a ‘correct’ or ‘effective’ solution reached by inconsistent, inaccurate or 
unreliable means can be more problematic than simply an incorrect solution.6 In the former 
case this can, and often does, appear to validate the poor methods and reasoning used to 
find the solution, which can quite easily progress to uncritical use of the same for other 
applications where the results may not be as effective or could even be detrimental or 




                                                 
6
 In this assertion I differ from some mainstream applications of pragmatic epistemology. For more on this 
see chapter 2. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review - Interdisciplinarity 
Introduction 
A review of the literature on interdisciplinarity is a perhaps Sisyphean effort. In addition to 
a vast and far ranging literature on interdisciplinarity specifically, there is an even wider 
and more diverse literature on interdisciplinarity within particular disciplines, as well as 
considerable literature about effectively the same concepts without using the term 
interdisciplinary. Further, there is literature on the other ‘x-disciplinarity’ classifications: 
multidisciplinarity, cross-disciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, pluridisciplinarity. Fortunately 
for a review of interdisciplinarity research, these seldom appear in the literature except 
alongside interdisciplinarity, with the exception of some accounts of transdisciplinarity. 
Time, space and coherency of focus have required me to be selective with my sources, 
though I have endeavoured to do so with a critical mind to both the depth and breadth of 
what the literature has to offer. I have also endeavoured to avoid any ‘straw-man’ accounts 
of interdisciplinarity. By this I mean I have not focused my attention on arguments or 
studies which are clearly weak and easily picked apart, are not well known, or are 
excessively old and obsolete. I will, however, not avoid arguments or studies which I 
consider weak and/or obsolete, but which remain popular or influential.  
 
In the sections below I will review the development of the idea of interdisciplinarity as a 
theoretical concept and a practical endeavour. It is important to note that this is different 
from a history of interdisciplinary practice. My focus is on the nature of interdisciplinarity, 
including the history of research done to define/describe what interdisciplinarity is. A 
history of interdisciplinary practice assumes that a definition is already established, or 
seeks to develop this definition from self-identified historical practice itself. There is, 
however, no agreed term to refer specifically to the type of study I am doing. 
‘Interdisciplinary research’ or ‘interdisciplinary studies’ are too ambiguous, as each 
already refers to specific interdisciplinary practices. I believe that adding ‘-ity’ to either 
term (‘interdisciplinarity research’) would still lead to confusion. I will refer then to the 
study of the nature of interdisciplinarity, how it works and how to do it, to include the 
history of other efforts to this end, as Research of Interdisciplinarity (RoI).  
 
The RoI literature can be seen as historically and thematically divided into various 
‘naturally occurring’ camps or research traditions of similar interests, backgrounds, 
geographies and/or epistemologies. Each of these comes to the questions of 
 22 
 
interdisciplinarity with a different core purpose and different prior knowledge and 
assumptions about it. The traditions of RoI that I differentiate are:  
 
• Historio-Theoretical Research of Interdisciplinarity (HTRoI) which is chiefly 
focused on the question of ‘what is interdisciplinarity’,  
• Scholarship of Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning (SoITL), which is 
concerned with the processes, methods and outcomes of specific cases of 
interdisciplinary teaching and learning, 
• Research of Interdisciplinary Research (RoIR), which is concerned with the 
processes, methods and outcomes of interdisciplinary research, 
• Educational Research of Interdisciplinarity (ERoI), which is concerned with 
how interdisciplinarity fits within the curriculum and the wider learning and 
teaching discussion.  
 
The first three traditions arose concurrently for the most part since 1972, though with only 
limited exchange between them. In 1972 a large-scale report on interdisciplinarity across 
several nations, Interdisciplinarity: problems of teaching and learning in universities, was 
published by OECD/CERI (1972). There was certainly interdisciplinarity and discussion of 
interdisciplinarity before this, but this publication stands out as a landmark which has since 
been viewed as an ‘origin’ of research of interdisciplinarity by most subsequent researchers, 
and after which there was a substantial difference in the amount and focus of RoI 
(Thompson-Klein 1990; Lattuca 2001; Chettiparamb 2007). ERoI, as a recognisable 
community of inquiry, has developed more recently, since approximately 2007.  
 
This functional division of research approaches has been a major factor in the lack of clear 
consensus on interdisciplinarity. For example, most of the work in the first three traditions 
has not been done by educationalists, but rather by humanities scholars or practitioners in 
the disciplines themselves. This has led to a substantial lack of engagement between most 
RoI and the wider field of educational research until very recently. This lack of consensus 
has been further helped by the historical condition that many of the core theoretical studies 
on interdisciplinarity have come from post-structural humanities-centric starting points.7 In 
a very general sense these have called into question notions of structure, hegemony, 
reliability, consensus or unity in academic work, which has made the emergence of 
focused community of study or a coordinated definition appear undesirable or difficult to 
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justify. Although the other traditions of RoI have not had these same ontological and 
epistemological origins, they have also been relatively a-theoretical and have often adopted 
from this existing HTRoI theory base as it stands. Some recent research has blurred the 
lines between HTRoI and ERoI by focusing on the broader curriculum in terms of what 
interdisciplinarity is. This thesis falls into that bracket as well. 
 
Notably, my categories are contingent and pragmatic - not essential, conclusive or 
exclusive. I make no claims to the certainty or any incommensurability of them. They 
serve instrumentally to allow certain similarities and differences to be focused on, while 
self-consciously occluding other traits or possible connections in order to do this.8 Simply 
because a particular theory or approach to interdisciplinarity is presented here in one 
category does not at all mean there are not properties of it that fit in others. There has also 
been increasing overlap between all of the traditions since the appearance of ERoI, and it is 
conceivable that this tradition may unify or overtake the others. Several of the most 
compelling recent analyses of interdisciplinarity have in fact been very difficult to classify 
into the categories above. Whether this represents the beginning of the end of a Kuhnian 
paradigm revolution, or merely a poor choice of categories by myself, remains to be seen, 
but I suspect this is a positive change either way.  
 
These categories were also originally meant as heuristic working categories for my own 
use, but I have retained them because after dividing by these criteria, other significant 
patterns emerged, such as that the HTRoI literature almost universally does not engage 
with the literature on learning and teaching or disciplinarity, or that RoIR, SoITL and ERoI 
does not engage significantly with the nature of interdisciplinarity independently, relying 
instead on the received wisdom of the HTRoI tradition. The categories themselves did not 
suggest that there would be so little overlap in this regard. In fact I had originally expected 
there to be quite a lot. Another way to describe this pattern might be a split between theory 
and application, and the observation that has driven my work is that there appears to be an 
unhealthy disconnect between the two, especially in terms of evidence.  
 
Although there has recently been some growing recognition of this state of affairs, what 
has not occurred is a direct engagement with several problematic aspects of the received 
wisdom from the HTRoI literature. This has, I believe, allowed this problematic wisdom to 
continue being received in some quarters even while new empirical work is being 
                                                 
8 For more on this see chapter 6 on categorisation research. 
 24 
 
conducted elsewhere. There remain many examples of uncritical acceptance of the chief 
metaphors and themes of the HTRoI work done in the 1990s and 2000s, particularly as a 
base for curriculum and policy reform, as well as in discussion of interdisciplinarity within 
the disciplines themselves. Because I believe there are fundamental problems with much of 
this received wisdom which appear to be limiting or occluding both the quality and uptake 
of newer research (especially in terms of practical curriculum models), I will spend a 
considerable part of this chapter attempting to draw these out before presenting the 
approaches and findings of the other traditions.  
 
HTRoI (Historio-Theoretical Research of Interdisciplinarity)  
Historio-theoretical research of interdisciplinarity is defined by a primary focus on the core 
question of what interdisciplinarity is. Some accounts move on from this into suggesting 
curricula or pedagogies, especially in the past few years where the effects of ERoI 
literature appear to be shifting the focus of the field more generally. The term historio-
theoretical refers to a general reliance on historical, rationalist and rhetorical forms of 
evidence to develop models of interdisciplinarity from, typically to the exclusion of more 
empirical forms of evidence. Until recently the HTRoI literature has exhibited something 
of a hegemony over the other traditions. This is not because it was first chronologically, 
but, it seems, because it was the first to cohere as a focused effort of practitioners. Early 
RoIR and SoITL efforts were typically scattered throughout the disciplines or in the case of 
the former in government research reviews, without substantial efforts to relate ideas 
between them or to develop a theoretical framework that combined the findings of the 
disparate studies. In fact, HTRoI appears to have developed as this very effort, first 
intermittently in the 1980s, and then much more coherently and in greater volume from the 
1990s onward.  
 
An early focal point of the emerging community was the Association of Integrative Studies 
(AIS), founded in 1979 by William Newell.9 The AIS was specifically focused on a type of 
interdisciplinarity called Interdisciplinary Studies (IDS), which I will discuss more below. 
The journal of the AIS, Issues in Integrative Studies, though small, was for many years the 
only coordinated source of studies on the nature of interdisciplinarity in higher education. 
Over 35 years of publication, the journal has remained substantially dominated by scholars 
from the humanities, and forms a strong backbone of the HTRoI tradition, though there is a 
                                                 
9
 Recently re-branded the Association for Interdisciplinary Studies. 
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great deal of publication in the tradition outside of the AIS as well, largely in the form of 
monographs. 
 
A critical review of the HTRoI literature reveals many concerns and many compelling 
insights, but what I will focus on here is what I believe to be the three largest problems 
with our understanding interdisciplinarity originating from HTRoI, which continue to 
hinder efforts to develop a practical interdisciplinary approach to the undergraduate (or 
postgraduate) curriculum:  
 
• Pluralism 
• Disciplinary essentialism  
• Competency interdisciplinarity 
 
The specific manifestations of these problems take on a few regular forms in the literature, 
some explicit and some implicit. The notion of pluralism in interdisciplinarity suggests that 
there are in fact many interdisciplinarities, all equally or near equally valid. This can be 
traced back to a chapter by Heinz Heckhuasen in the 1972 OECD report, which still 
receives considerable citations today, and to several other pluralistic models of 
interdisciplinarity since, but the strongest sustained influence in this regard is Julie 
Thompson-Klein (Heckhausen 1972; Thompson-Klein 1990, 1996, 2010b, 2010a). 
Disciplinary essentialism, the notion that the disciplines are in some way fixed 
points/cultures around which interdisciplinarity exists, is more subtle and implicit in the 
literature. It is implicit to such an extent than in many accounts the notion is openly refuted 
(Thompson-Klein 1996: 46–52; Newell 1992; Repko 2008; Moran 2010). However, in the 
practice of developing and justifying theories of interdisciplinarity, disciplinary 
essentialism seems to silently reappear in order to validate many claims. The last problem 
that I will consider is something which has been referred to positively in some of the 
literature as ‘minimal understanding’ or ‘adequacy’ (Repko 2008: 189). This is the notion 
that mastery or expertise is not necessary in order to do good interdisciplinary work, and 
that a breadth instead of depth approach is justified. This has been the target of much 
controversy over the years around questions of rigour and reliability. The obvious 
questions here become: what is expertise and how can we know how much is enough; what 
is ‘good’ interdisciplinarity and how can we know it; is this approach justified for any 
application or only some, and how do we know? These are questions which the HTRoI 
literature has almost universally not addressed, though recently a few attempts have been 
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made (Repko 2008, 2012). Before I consider these in detail, I will briefly look at several 
issues of evidential validity and reliability, which the HTRoI literature consistently 
struggles with in a broader sense.  
 
Evidential Issues of HTRoI 
I refer to this tradition as historical in addition to theoretical because there is a considerable 
focus on historically based development of definitions of interdisciplinarity, an approach 
which I suggest derives from three sources: the prevalence of self-identified claims to 
interdisciplinarity in early RoIR and SoITL which could be drawn on as ‘evidence’, the 
strong centre of this tradition in the humanities and therefore with historical thinking, and, 
itself deriving from the first two, the legacy of Julie Thompson-Klein’s highly influential 
1990 historical development of the nature of interdisciplinarity, Interdisciplinarity: History, 
Theory, & Practice. An historical approach used in this manner though, is both circular 
and underdetermined. In the former sense the interdisciplinarity of the examples is pre-
assumed, and therefore so is a pre-existing tacit definition of interdisciplinarity, but these 
are then used to define interdisciplinarity. In the latter sense, most of the examples can be 
explained in ways other than interdisciplinarity, often simpler ways, and no clear reason is 
offered why the explanation given is preferred (Peters 1999; Spivak 2003; Thompson-
Klein 1990, 2010b; Moran 2010; Brack et al. 2010). As noted in the introduction, one of 
my chief points of departure from previous work is to ask, ‘what if none (or very few) of 
the historical cases of interdisciplinarity frequently used in the literature to define 
interdisciplinarity actually are so?’ 
 
Reliability is a concern for much of the literature in this tradition in other ways as well. It 
is problematic in the sense that what is claimed is often not actually what the evidence 
offered indicates or is capable of indicating, such as reliance on interviews with 
disciplinary practitioners without a clear indication that they possess adequate knowledge 
of interdisciplinarity.10 It is only clear, for example, that a historian or a physicist has 
expertise in their own discipline and knowledge of their own experience of what they 
perceive as interdisciplinarity. It is not clear that either has expertise in defining 
interdisciplinarity in a general sense or that their experience is generalizable.  
 
Elsbeth Spelt et al. (2009: 370) noted that surveys and interviews were among the main 
methods used by the few empirical studies of interdisciplinary curriculum or pedagogy. 
                                                 
10
 Notably this is a problem which has carried on into the ERoI literature 
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While this surely produces good knowledge of some kind, and indeed my own interviews 
have covered much of the same ground, it is not a sufficient method independently to 
establish a definition of interdisciplinarity. The more this is actually attempted the more 
different and contradictory answers we seem to get, although there are certainly some 
patterns if the data is viewed more from an abstracted distance. This lack of singular focus 
has been taken as evidence of a plurality of valid definitions; I think rather that this is 
evidence that this is not reliable evidence (on its own). What these results are actually 
showing, repeatedly and across many disciplines, is strong empirical evidence that the 
various theoretical models of interdisciplinarity offered over the past several decades have 
failed to achieve any coherency on the ground (Lattuca 2001; Nikitina 2002; Lattuca et al. 
2004; Moran 2010). As we shall see in chapter 7, this is especially true if we ask the same 
academics to define both disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity separately, something that 
has not appeared in the literature thus far, but which was a key component of my 
interviews with ‘interdisciplinary’ medievalists. 
 
The existence of this problem was noted by Marcel Boisot in the 1972 OECD report, and 
was given as the reason there was no agreed definition for interdisciplinarity at that point, 
“Each definition put forward by scientists seems to result from an analysis of individual 
experiences which involve mechanisms and procedures that are too restrictive for general 
application” (Boisot 1972: 90). It is clear from citations that most HTRoI researchers are 
familiar with the wider OECD 1972 source, but Boisot’s warning has not been repeated.   
 
A further trend in much HTRoI research is a tendency to overstate what the evidence 
shows, especially in terms of the benefits or value of interdisciplinarity. There is a 
consistent claim of ‘betterness’ for interdisciplinarity as a solution to climate change, broad 
social issues or major scientific problems under the presumption that these issues are too 
big for a single disciplinary approach (Thompson-Klein 1990, 1996, 2010a; Newell 2001, 
2010; Meek 2001; Repko 2012). But evidence of the actual impact of interdisciplinary 
projects, especially compared to non-interdisciplinary projects is absent. This should be 
essential if a claim to being ‘better’ is being made. Some have suggested that 
interdisciplinary research can be evaluated by looking at the quality, novelty and degree of 
integration, but this clearly only assesses the act of being interdisciplinary, not the actual 
work produced (Newell 2006; Huutoniemi 2010: 313). At least one attempt has been made 
to directly answer this question, however, the results were far from conclusive (Lattuca et 
al. 2004). Given only the HTRoI literature, it would be impossible to argue from an 
evidential base that interdisciplinarity was preferable to the alternatives; alternatives which 
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are often less expensive and time-consuming as well. I do not believe this is true, but one 
could not demonstrate this from the literature in this tradition alone.  
 
The summation of these issues suggests a general problem of underdetermination for the 
majority of the theories and models within this tradition. Many theories presented in the 
HTRoI literature could indeed be correct or useful, in whole or in parts, but the evidence 
supplied is typically unreliable to such a degree that we simply cannot justify accepting 
them. I will now look in more detail at three of the most persistently problematic 
approaches to interdisciplinarity found in the HTRoI literature which continue to pervade 
policy and practice. 
 
Pluralism 
The principle of pluralism is that interdisciplinarity is not one but many distinct categories 
of different activities/things related to an underlying core or umbrella concept of 
interdisciplinarity. Arguably the progenitor of most pluralistic approaches to 
interdisciplinarity was Heinz Heckhausen in 1972. There are though, a number of issues 
with the generalizability of Heckhausen’s report. Heckhausen defined ‘the disciplines’ as 
only the sciences, excluding any ‘pure’ disciplines, even Maths. Psychology occupied a 
strange position of being a discipline but not being able to be referred to like the others. He 
also referred to interdisciplinarity as a ‘fad’ (Heckhausen 1972: 83). His model of 
interdisciplinarity was built on top of his model of seven ‘epistemological’ criteria which 
make up a discipline. These criteria were based on positivistic concepts of disciplinary 
knowledge and subject matter, a notion which was already falling out of favour then and 
has far more so since, especially in the postmodern-centric HTRoI literature. Based on 
these Heckhausen developed six types of interdisciplinarity, several of which were not 














Indiscriminate Superficial and over-generalised ‘encyclopaedic’ combinations of 
disciplines (not actual interdisciplinarity) 
Pseudo- Sharing of analytic tools (not actual interdisciplinarity) 
Auxillary Borrowing of methods between disciplines 
Composite Problem-based large scale endeavours such as city planning in a 
broad sense 
Supplementary On-going partial overlaps of close disciplines 
Unifying Creation of new hybrid disciplines 
 
 
Regardless of the abandonment in the HTRoI literature of his model of disciplinarity on 
which it was built, Heckhausen’s model of interdisciplinarity continues to reappear as a 
basic foundation of it some of the most influential HTRoI literature (Thompson-Klein 1990; 
Chettiparamb 2007; Davies and Devlin 2010). 
 
Since Heckhausen there has been proliferation of ‘interdisciplinarities’, with dozens of 
separate authors each suggesting a different taxonomy of as little as two to potentially 
more than 100 classifications and sub-classifications of interdisciplinary interactions, 
activities and motivations (Thompson-Klein 1996; 2010b; Lattuca 2001; Nikitina 2002; 
Aram 2004; Huutoniemi 2012). A literature review of RoI in 2007 presented at least 59 
different categories from multiple authors, and was still not as comprehensive as it could 
have been (Chettiparamb 2007). Another recent pluralistic project has attempted to provide 
a stronger empirical rationale for a specific taxonomy, and also attempted to reduce the 
overall complexity by correlating the categories with some earlier taxonomies (Huutoniemi 
et al. 2010). This, however, still has 42 possible combinations of three aspects and several 
sub-aspects of interdisciplinarity. 
 
The chart below was offered by Huutoniemi et al. (2010: 81) to list just some of the 
taxonomies. The apparent simplicity is misleading in some cases, as there are often sub-
classifications, correspondent relationships or conditions not listed here: 
 
  
Figure 1.1 Types of Interdisciplinarity 
(Heckhausen 1972: 86-89) 
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Focus of interest  Author(s)  What produces categories?   Categories 
Degrees of disciplinary integration 
OECD (1972)  Development of scientific knowledge  Multidisciplinarity, pluridisciplinarity, 
interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity 
Heckhausen (1972)  Maturation of interdisciplines   Indiscriminate ID, pseudo-ID, auxiliary ID, 
composite ID, supplementary ID, unified ID 
Miller (1982)  Degree of conceptual order   Topical focus, professional preparation, life 
experience perspective, shared components, 
cross-cutting organizing principles, hybrids, 
grand synthesis 
Stember (1991)  Responses to dissatisfaction with Intradisciplinarity, cross-disciplinarity, 
Disciplines   multidisciplinarity, interdisciplinarity, 
transdisciplinarity 
Boden (1999)  Strength of ID    Encyclopedic ID, contextualizing ID, shared  
ID,co-operative ID, generalizing ID, 
integrative ID 
Karlqvist (1999)  Distance between fields   Unification of knowledge, accumulation of 
knowledge, doing different things, doing 
things differently, thinking differently 
Interdisciplinary practices  
Rossini and Porter  Socio-cognitive frameworks  Common group learning, modeling,  
(1979)   for integration   negotiation among experts, integration by  
leader 
Lenoir et al. (2000)  Social representations of ID   Eclectism, pseudo-ID, hegemony, holism 
Lattuca (2001)  Research questions    Informed disciplinarity, synthetic ID, 
transdisciplinarity, conceptual ID 
Palmer (2001)  Cognitive strategies for ID   Team leader, collaborator, generalist 
Bruun et al. (2005b)  Knowledge networking   Coordination, translation, pioneering 
Bruun et al. (2005a)  Interactions between fields   Encyclopedic MD, contextualizing MD,  
Composite MD, empirical ID, methodological 
ID, theoretical ID 
Lengwiler (2006)  Organizational practices   Methodological ID, charismatic ID, heuristic  
ID, pragmatic ID 
Pohl et al. (2008)  Forms of collaboration   (Two-dimensional matrix of the possible 
+means of integration  combinations of the latter) 
Rationales of Interdisciplinarity 
OECD (1982)  Demands for ID    Endogenous ID, exogenous ID 
Thompson-Klein (1985), Salter and Hearn (1996)   
Motives for ID    Instrumental ID, conceptual ID 
Bruun et al. (2005a)  Type of research goals   Epistemological ID, instrumental ID, mixed  
goals 
Boix Mansilla (2006)  Epistemological approaches to ID  Conceptual-bridging, comprehensive,  
pragmatic 
Barry et al. (2008)  Logics that guide ID    Accountability, innovation, ontological  
change 
Figure 1.2 Pluralistic Interdisciplinarity Models 
 
Ultimately, it is not feasible to attempt to ‘disprove’ any pluralistic account of 
interdisciplinarity. This would require individually assessing each category of each model. 
Further, it is perfectly likely that there are compelling arguments in favour of some, even 
many individual classifications when considered in isolation. My position at this stage is 
not to suggest that interdisciplinarity cannot be pluralistic (though I do not think it is best 
described this way). Rather I would raise the question of the utility or benefit such systems 
can have when there are so many continuously being produced over such a long time, and 
with little correlation or evidential base among them. The purpose of such models is surely 
to develop a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the many ways in which 
interdisciplinarity appears to manifest in real practice, but the result of this effort seems to 
defy the basic tenets of definitional or classificatory systems: to reduce complexity and/or 
increase utility. Chettibaramb (2007: 19) has suggested that, “These classifications lend 
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conceptual clarity to the notion [of interdisciplinarity]”, but how this is achieved, 
especially at the level of curriculum design, is uncertain and I would suggest highly 
questionable. The pluralistic models of interdisciplinarity as they stand are highly 
underdetermined, and do not offer any means to determine which, if any, model is more 
effective, whether some are compatible and some are not, or more importantly what basis 
in empirical evidence or practical application for learning and teaching they have. Further, 
they are descriptive in nature, and therefore do not offer a means to develop new 
interdisciplinarities, only to classify after the fact. 
 
Some have suggested that pluralism in interdisciplinarity is unavoidable:  
 
“Multiple ‘interdisciplinarities’ exist, as Thompson-Klein (Thompson-Klein, 
1996, p.153) portrays, “from simple borrowings and methodological 
thickening to theoretical enrichment, converging sites, and a general shift . . 
. to new ‘cross-’, ‘counter-’, and ‘antidisciplinary’ positions that front the 
problem of how meaning is produced, maintained, and deconstructed”. 
Interdisciplinarity is thus best understood not as one thing but as a variety of 
different ways of bridging and confronting the prevailing disciplinary 
approaches” (Huutoniemi et al. 2010: 80). 
 
Instead, I question whether these widely varied manifestations of interdisciplinarity 
genuinely represent the same overall practice, or if in fact a range of quite dissimilar 
activities are being ineffectively categorised together, producing an inability to find a 
cohesive definition for interdisciplinarity that would encompass them. Equally possible is 
that it is correct to see these activities all as interdisciplinarity, but that the perspective on 
interdisciplinarity being applied does not adequately address the commonalities that make 
each practice so. My hypothesis is that an answer to these questions lies (in part) in more 
deeply considering the nature of human categorisation itself, to see if empirical research in 
that field can illuminate questions about optimal categories, types of categorisation, and 
what best constitutes a category (i.e. are some categories empirically better than others?) 
(chapter 6).  
 
Although pluralism is something of a norm in the HTRoI literature, it is not without its 
opponents. William Newell, long time collaborator with Thompson-Klein, takes a very 
different approach, and also suggests that there is debate on the matter:  
 
“These epistemological issues have led to vigorous debates within AIS 
[Association for Interdisciplinary Studies] itself. There has always been a 
vocal faction of members who caution against definitional closure for 
interdisciplinarity on the grounds that settling on any definition excludes as 
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well as includes; they prefer to let a thousand flowers bloom. Arrayed on the 
other side of the debate have been members seeking credibility for 
interdisciplinary study through conceptual clarity and, ultimately, through 
standards for judging its quality” (Newell 2001: 6).  
 
I would align myself then with the second camp, and ask what use it is to let a 
thousand flowers bloom if they are obscured among one hundred thousand weeds? 
 
Disciplinary Essentialism 
Essentialism refers to the idea that there is a foundational and reasonably unchanging 
reality to the disciplines themselves, either a socially constructed fundamental reality, or an 
ontologically grounded one (in terms of subject matter). It is not typically a very clearly 
defined concept, and in fact the term itself is seldom used. As I use it here, it refers to the 
notion that disciplines, often only certain ones, simply are and always will be, that they are 
either natural categories which will always reassert themselves, or they are such stable 
social realities that they will not be undone without great effort. The unspoken assumption 
then is that whatever is not one of these must be interdisciplinary. Indeed, this is how many 
historical definitions of interdisciplinarity have identified interdisciplinary examples 
(Thompson-Klein 1990; 2000, 2008; Repko 2008; Welch IV 2009, 2011). The notions of 
ownership and interdisciplinary identity are also intrinsically linked to disciplinary 
essentialism in much of the literature, though not often explicitly so.  
 
The presence of the notion of disciplinary essentialism in the HTRoI literature is difficult 
to show unequivocally. It is typically implicit in the logical necessities of models and 
metaphors of interdisciplinarity, such that these could only work if the disciplines were 
viewed as static, while the same notion is openly refuted in order to develop other aspects 
of the same theory or to correspond with evidence (Thompson-Klein 1996: 38, 2010b). 
Often the nature of the disciplines themselves are not extensively explored, the definitions 
resting on tacit presumptions or rationalised models with limited recourse to empirical 
evaluation and which focus on perceived limitations  (McArthur 2010: 303). There has also 
been no significant engagement with existing research on disciplinarity.11  
 
                                                 
11
 The only two sources of discussion of the nature of the disciplines, which are not focused first on 
interdisciplinarity, that were cited in any of the sources I reviewed were Anthony Becher’s landmark 
ethnography of the disciplines Academic Tribes and Territories: intellectual inquiry and the cultures of the 
disciplines (1989), and Ellen Messer-Davidow, et al.s’ Disciplinary Ways of Knowing (1993). The former is 
only cited briefly in a very few HTRoI sources, while the latter neither cites nor is cited by any other sources 
on disciplinarity that I am aware of (in fact it denies that such exist). Notably, both accounts are strongly 
social-constructivist in nature. 
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Even in accounts which promote the idea that interdisciplinarity creates new disciplines, 
this tacit dividing line seems to underlie the discussion (Moran 2010; MacKinnon, Hine, 
and Barnard 2013). One notable early view to the contrary was that of Jean Piaget in the 
OECD 1972 report. Piaget here suggested that all disciplines have always been 
interdisciplinary, and always will be, and that none have arisen except through 
fragmentation or combination of other structures before them (Piaget 1972: 136). Piaget’s 
account has received no significant attention since, however, similar notions have appeared 
independently from time to time (Rowland 2006: 96; Weingart 2010: 12). 
 
Disciplinary ownership in the HTRoI literature is closely related to essentialism. The 
popular metaphor of interdisciplinarity as an act of borrowing, usually of concepts, 
methods, perspectives, or technology, is the best example of this (Thompson-Klein 1990, 
1996; Bromme 2000; Davies and Devlin 2010). Earlier accounts, especially those centred 
around the sciences in the 1972 OECD report, were unambiguous about disciplinary 
ownership. Boisot describes this as when, “a crude phenomenon belonging to one 
discipline…is legalised by a law…belonging to [discipline 1], we shall say that there is 
linear interdisciplinarity in the sense that law [x] is borrowed and adapted by [discipline 
2]…” (Boisot 1972: 92). More often the role of ownership is implicit in that in order for 
theories, methods, laws or other aspects of a discipline to be borrowed by ‘interdisciplinary’ 
activities, the disciplines must be perceived as entities which have the capacity to be 
borrowed from.  
 
Although borrowing appears to be a common sense metaphor for interdisciplinary 
activities, if what the metaphor requires or implies is examined more closely it becomes 
clear that it is fraught with internal contradictions:12 
 
• Borrowing tacitly assumes that the disciplines have both the right and ability to 
claim ownership of various methods, concepts, tools, techniques and perspectives, 
though there is no recognised authority to adjudicate this, or consensus on the 
matter. 
• Borrowing presumes the return (or intention to return) of the borrowed element in 
the condition it was given, but this contradicts the transformative or integrative core 
typically assigned to interdisciplinarity.  
• Borrowing presumes that permission has been or can be given, but there is no 
structure to either ask for or give such permission in the disciplinary system. 
 
                                                 
12
 As the utility of a metaphor is to relate a complex situation to a more understandable one, I assume here 
that ‘borrowing’ is to be read in a ‘common usage’ manner. 
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Notably, the borrowing metaphor does not appear to have the strong currency it once had, 
though it is far from gone in the more recent literature.  
 
Both essentialism and ownership in most accounts are regarded as strongly situated social 
constructions, not deterministic truths. But when these concepts are applied to develop 
models of interdisciplinarity, the distinction between social construction and determinism 
becomes less clear. This creates the paradox wherein many HTRoI models of 
interdisciplinarity rely on the explicit discussion of the breakdown of disciplinary cores 
and ownership either as facilitating or necessitating interdisciplinarity, while also relying 
on the implicit stability of these same notions as a feature of how interdisciplinarity 
functions in practice. In at least one case, Thompson-Klein appears to tangentially 
undermine the notion of disciplinary ownership by stating that disciplinarians cannot be 
presumed as homogenous, “Generalizing about how “the lawyer” or “the anthropologist” 
would behave in a collaborative situation is dangerous in this or any other case, since there 
is no single model of either disciplinarian” (Thompson-Klein 1990: 185). It is conceivable, 
even likely, that both features are active concurrently within the same disciplines: the 
progressive and the traditional in concert. If so, then it would clearly serve the 
understanding of interdisciplinarity better to examine this dichotomy in detail, and from as 
many empirical sources of evidence as possible, but this has not has been done so far. 
 
The presence of disciplinary essentialism has another face in the HTRoI literature, as the 
‘other’ that defines ‘us’. “Interdisciplinary activities are located across an expanse of 
physical and social situations. Because disciplinarity has been the dominant system over 
the course of the twentieth century, they have had to establish an identity and place…” 
(Thompson-Klein 1996: 19). The HTRoI tradition has a strong base in the humanities 
scholarship of the 1980s and 90s, and this includes emancipatory perceptions of 
interdisciplinarity as an escape from a positivistic, often neo-liberal, disciplinary regime 
which supresses the ‘better’ and more ‘real-world’ solutions to larger social problems that 
interdisciplinarity can allegedly provide (Thompson-Klein and Doty 1994; 2012; Mackey 
2001; Bailis 2001; Spivak 2003; Repko 2006b; Ellis 2009; Moran 2010; Beilin and Bender 
2010; Bhaskar 2010). In some accounts the disciplines are seen as the direct agents of this 
suppression, either passively through blind tradition or actively through a desire to control 
knowledge production (Messer-Davidow et al. 1993; Keller, E. 1993; Lenoir 1993; 
Amariglio et al. 1993; Bernstein 2000). In other accounts both the disciplines and 
interdisciplinarity are victims of consumerist or neo-liberal controls from university 
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administrations, funding councils, professional investors or governments (Bernstein 2000; 
Wheelahan 2012).  
 
In order to develop a sense of emancipatory identity for interdisciplinary scholarship, it is 
created as a ‘thing’ which is different from the disciplines; it becomes an academic identity 
unto itself, defined as ‘not disciplinary’. For this to happen the disciplines, or at least the 
administrations and funding bodies, need to be seen as able to assert definition and 
ownership to the things that are being withheld, those things which interdisciplinarity is 
not. This line of reasoning is consistent across much of the HTRoI literature to greater or 
lesser degrees, but nowhere is it more clear than in Thompson-Klein’s Creating 
Interdisciplinary Campus Cultures, wherein it is suggested that interdisciplinary scholars 
must protect their status by developing institutes and centres which are constantly vigilant 
against being absorbed into the disciplines or dissolved by administrations (Thompson-
Klein 2010b: chapter four).  
 
Others, however, have noted that interdisciplinarity proceeds regardless of apparent 
administrative and disciplinary blockages, and that many disciplinary practitioners have 
suggested that there was not much of a problem (Lattuca 2001). “Moore (2011) proceeds 
to argue that interdisciplinarity actually works (and, generally, always has worked) ‘on the 
ground’ with the disciplines in a manner that is stable, productive, and complementary” 
(Barrett 2012: 100). It would seem premature to say no blockages exist, though. Where 
such forces may indeed be blocking efforts, we might ask whether these are a check not to 
allow borrowing or interdisciplinary efforts be too shallow or over-reach themselves, and 
therefore lose reliability or rigour. That this could be the case, and may indeed be quite 
necessary or desirable as an integral aspect of interdisciplinarity, is almost never suggested 
in the HTRoI literature. It was, however, a recurrent theme in the interviews I conducted 
with ‘interdisciplinary’ practitioners in Medieval Studies, as well as the stories of other 
people practicing in that field (chapter 7). 
 
Another manifestation of the need for discrete identity can be seen in the notion of 
interdisciplinarity as ‘greater than the sum of the parts’ (Newell 2001; Thompson-Klein 
2004; Boix Mansilla 2006; Huutoniemi et al. 2010: 83). This suggests that an 
interdisciplinary action or solution is inherently ‘more’ than the separate elements which 
create it, such that it is an irreducible whole which cannot be merely sub-divided into 
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disciplinary parts.13 More on this notion will be explored in chapter 2 on epistemology and 
holism. 
 
Another expression of the notion that interdisciplinarity is a standalone entity is that it does 
not lead to the creation of new disciplines (Fish 1989; Thompson-Klein 1996, 2010b; 
Moran 2010; Wexler 2012). Thompson-Klein is one of the strongest opponents of the 
notion of interdisciplinarity leading to new disciplines, “One of the myths about 
interdisciplinarity is that the ‘inter-discipline’ of today is the ‘discipline’ of tomorrow” 
(Thompson-Klein 2010a: 22).14 Thompson-Klein offers this as a truism though. The 
identity-based resistance to classification as a discipline that this promotes is most clear in 
proliferation of another type of pluralism: the development of an array of classifications 
such as ‘interdisciplines’, hybrid disciplines, studies, fields and cross-disciplinary 
specialisations.  
 
But what actually are each of these sub-types, in terms that not only distinguish each from 
a discipline, but also from specialisms, other interdisciplinary activity, and each other? 
Definitions are seldom offered; more often these categories are regarded as tacit and 
‘understood’. If definitions are given, they do not compellingly meet these criteria (Davies 
and Devlin 2010: 5). Like the pluralism of interdisciplinary activities and motivations 
discussed above, there seems little to recommend these new categories in terms of 
promoting clarity or added functionality.  
 
“The challenge of interdisciplinarity…is one of strategic positioning. All 
interdisciplinary fields, by extension, need to establish relations to their 
objects of study, define relations to other disciplines, assert their own 
boundaries and mission, and questions the self-understanding of disciplines 
as coherent and unified entities” (Jassanoff 2010 cited in Thompson-Klein 
2010b: 160).  
 
It is unclear in this example how this differs from a discipline, and it is often only by 
asserting an essentialist rigidity to the disciplines that such a distinction is upheld.  
 
I wish to be clear that it is not the development of new areas or topics of study that I am 
questioning the utility of, only the assignation of these to an array of new non-disciplinary 
yet discipline-like titles. It has also been noted by Tony Becher that the pressing need to 
find a research niche in which to publish may be involved in this process as well 
                                                 
13
 This is typically the definition given for multi-disciplinarity, that the irreducibility of integration has not 
been achieved. 
14
 In recent years Thompson-Klein has accepted that interdisciplinary may sometimes lead to new disciplines 
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(1989: 52–55). If this is the case then creating these new types could be seen as prohibiting 
interdisciplinarity by developing new levels of isolationism, if it even has anything to do 
with interdisciplinarity at all. 
 
One recent account which presents a good example of this concept is a discussion of the 
‘interdisciplinary’ field of Biotechnology by Brack et al. (2010).15  The paper discusses the 
need to develop interdisciplinary skills early in two undergraduate Biotechnology 
programmes in order to help students engage with the ethics of the field, professional 
applications, critical thinking, collaboration, peer and self assessment or inquiry-based 
learning. The status of this as a recommendation is something I will return to in later 
chapters, but what is of interest here is the authors’ approach to the status of Biotechnology 
itself. Biotechnology is regarded in the article as a clear example of an interdisciplinary 
field. However, since 1990 there are more than 30 undergraduate programmes in the field 
in Australia alone. The authors refer to the inquiry-based teaching approaches of these as 
being offered “within a real Biotechnology framework” (Brack et al. 2010: 250). But does 
it make sense to refer to a ‘real framework’ for a field which is functioning as a dependant 
hybrid of other disciplines? A field with so many dedicated undergraduate programmes 
seems hard pressed to make a case of being subordinate to other disciplines. Further, there 
is no indication that students learn any discipline specific knowledge or skills outwith the 
Biotechnology courses which are not already integrated strongly into a Biotechnology 
context.  
 
The rationale for the claim to interdisciplinarity here is that several aspects of the field are 
also studied in greater detail in the parent disciplines. But if this greater detail is not 
required for qualified expertise in Biotechnology graduates, then it is unclear how this is 
germane to Biotechnology as a programme. Certainly a major change in one of the parent 
fields will have effects on Biotechnology as well, but this is could be argued for most 
disciplines to greater or lesser degrees: that a significant change in one ripples through 
many others over time. This would imply that either all disciplines are interdisciplinary (as 
Piaget and some others have suggested), none of them are, or that there is an arbitrary but 
specific degree of influence/proximity that indicates one or the other. The implication is 
typically that the latter is true, but there is no indication of how this is determined or what 
the criteria may be. 
                                                 
15
 This work is one of a small number of recent accounts of interdisciplinarity which was difficult to 
categorise. This, along with another chapter by Mackinnon in the same year, is equally representative of 





Another prominent approach to interdisciplinarity in the HTRoI literature is what I refer to 
in a broad sense as ‘competency interdisciplinarity’. Competency interdisciplinarity 
focuses on a breadth instead of depth model, promoting in one way or another that students 
should learn about many disciplines (usually at least three) which are often only loosely 
related instead of focusing on expertise in a specific area. Competency models are almost 
exclusively focused on undergraduate study, and unlike most other HTRoI approaches 
competency models often have an applied output in the form of a vast array of  
Interdisciplinary Studies (IDS) programmes and university curriculum restructuring over 
the past few decades. This makes the fact that such models are typically based on very 
questionable evidence all the more troubling.  
 
Notably, competency models are far from uncontested, even in the HTRoI literature. At 
least as many publications in HTRoI, and more in the other RoI traditions, come down 
hard in favour of disciplinary mastery and expertise prior to interdisciplinarity being at all 
viable. In RoIR at least, this can be attributed to the strong science-centric base of the 
tradition, and the typical assumption that interdisciplinarity is a collaborative and 
postgraduate issue. This opposition has not, however, prevented the competency model 
from being directly employed as policy in universities through IDS programmes, other 
‘interdisciplinary’ degrees or thematic restructuring, or taught as a methodology for 
interdisciplinary work (University of Uppsala 2013).   
 
IDS, as one type of competency interdisciplinarity, has been and continues to be widely 
promoted as a viable curriculum option by the AIS.The AIS promotes IDS chiefly in the 
US, but increasingly worldwide, as a model of undergraduate learning which culminates in 
the graduate being an ‘interdisciplinarian’, which is considered to be a profession unto 
itself (Newell 1994, 2010). Another type of competency interdisciplinarity is found in non-
disciplinary or thematic university restructuring. There is something of a tradition of this in 
Australia, though it is not isolated to there. Previous attempts to develop a non-disciplinary 
university structure include Murdoch University (Marshall 2010). More recently (2008) the 
University of Melbourne has attracted international attention by restructuring to a thematic, 
socially focused curriculum model which featured students taking substantial portions of 
their coursework as mandatory breadth options (Golding 2009; University of Melbourne 
2010). The Melbourne model is particularly worthy of attention because it has been an 
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inspiration for similar restructuring in several other elite universities around the world (e.g. 
Harvard, Aberdeen, Hong Kong) (Fiksdal 2013). 
 
There are a few consistent features of both IDS and thematic restructuring:  
 
• each promotes the notion that ‘being interdisciplinary’ is the goal of study;  
• each promotes that this goal is more critically and socially conscious and/or 
employable outside of university;  
• examples of each bear little or no resemblance from programme to programme in 
terms of structure, range of disciplines covered, learning outcomes, or 
qualifications;  
• most in practice cater to very small numbers of especially elite and self-motivated 
students, not the wider student community; 
• each promotes the notion that interdisciplinarity is something to be performed by an 
individual, and that this can be effectively completed in a standard undergraduate 
timeframe. 
 
The first two elements are typically the focus of discussion in the literature on IDS and 
restructuring, relying often on the same ‘betterness’ rhetoric as many essentialism 
arguments. The first two elements are also not terribly contentious; in a broad sense they 
appear to be good goals of education in general. It is the other three elements that present 
substantial problems for this popular approach to interdisciplinary curricula. 
 
The third element opens difficult questions about the transferability of qualifications and 
the degree of trust such programmes engender in the skills of graduates. This has been a 
general criticism of interdisciplinary programmes for many years, that they lack coherency 
or rigour (Rowland 2006: 95). It has also been a rallying cry of ‘us versus them’ within the 
HTRoI literature, involving claims that academic standards are a hindrance to education 
(Davis 2011; Wexler 2012). But what is lacking is evidence one way or the other (Rowland 
2006; Wexler 2012). The lack of a coherent core of structure, range of disciplines or 
learning outcomes makes generating benchmarks, qualifications and trustworthy standards 
for graduates inconceivable (and may be why some proponents have sought to attack the 
concept of standards). It is entirely likely that many such programmes offer excellent 
teaching, well crafted degree structures and cater to motivated and forward-thinking 
students. This has no clear value to the outside observer, particularly a potential employer, 
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though, if there is no way to identify what the graduate has learned from one programme of 
the same name to the next.  
 
Alternatively, the Melbourne model promoted confident flexibility, collaborative 
understanding and disciplinary specialisation, but the disciplinary aspect in practice 
appears to have been swept under the carpet to make room for interdisciplinary options, 
broad themes of current social issues, and mandated breadth throughout the programme. 
What resulted was a compellingly researched and presented programme which did not 
ultimately produce a recognisable qualification, regardless of greater compatibility with 
international curriculum standards being the stated goal (University of Melbourne 2010). 
Shortly after implementation the Melbourne model came under criticism (and also praise, 
to be fair). In response proponents have suggested that postgraduate study should be the 
new location for disciplinarity, suggesting that specialisation should not be the focus of 
undergraduate training (Davis 2011).16 Effectively the argument suggests that 
qualifications should not be something undergraduate study is designed for, similar to the 
responses against qualifications by IDS proponents. The importance of such subject 
qualifications for employability, academic trust and reliability will be explored in more 
detail in chapter 5. 
 
The elite or isolated status of both IDS programmes and thematic universities is explicit in 
a number of reports, most of which are intended to demonstrate the broader value of the 
approach. Proponents of the Melbourne model have responded to falling enrolment since 
the restructure with the notion that the programme is meant to attract the ‘best and the 
brightest’(Davis 2011). A similar demographic was found in the IDS Western College 
programme at Miami University, Ohio, one of the early flagship programmes created by 
AIS founder William Newell. Students on the interdisciplinarity programme made up only 
8% of the 'honours' level students, while only representing the top 1% of the total student 
body (Newell 2006: 91). This trend has even occurred in the field of Medieval Studies in 
Scotland, as my interviews highlighted. The University of St Andrews has an 
undergraduate Medieval Studies programme, but each year only two to three students enrol, 
and these are noted as self-driven and exceptional within the student body: St Andrews 
being already an elite research intensive university. Each of these cases suggest that what 
limited success IDS and thematic restructuring have had are only in terms of a very small 
                                                 
16
 While this may be a compelling argument as part of a larger discussion on tertiary education as generic and 




percentage of already exceptional students, not a representative sample of the wider 
university enrolment.  
 
The final unifying factor of competency interdisciplinarity models is that interdisciplinarity 
is taught from start to finish as something performed by individuals, as a solitary 
professional act (Newell 1994, 2006; Repko 2008; Szostak 2008; Thompson-Klein 2005b, 
2010a; Mackey 2002). The presumption that interdisciplinarity can be credibly approached 
as a solitary act at the undergraduate level is problematic. I will examine this in more depth 
in chapter 4 concerning expert teams and transactive memory. 
 
To make room in the curriculum for so much broad study by an individual student, the 
competency model also leaves little space for engagement with the primary sources of any 
discipline. In IDS and thematic programmes some limited engagement presumably takes 
place, though when and to what degree is highly questionable. For example, in the popular 
process proposed by Alan Repko it is explicit that working with primary sources is not 
involved at all (Repko 2008: chapter 8). Interdisciplinarity then becomes data mining, and 
not very proficient data mining at that. There is no recourse to primary data creation, nor 
the development of the skill to do so, and it is the latter aspect which makes the ability to 
credibly analyse even secondary sources suspect. A more recent middle ground appears to 
exist in the form of Huutoniemi, et al.’s suggestion that, “While mastery of the 
participating disciplines is not required, it is still acknowledged that interdisciplinary study 
should build explicitly and directly upon the work of disciplines” (Huutoniemi 2010: 314). 
But while this seems more reasonable, it, in essence, still says that only recourse to 
secondary sources is required, and without clear evidence of the mastery to effectively 
analyse these.  
 
The solitary ‘interdisciplinarian’ notion is best exemplified by a form of argument for 
competency interdisciplinarity which continues to enjoy considerable popularity in 
publication and interdisciplinary curriculum design: the notion of ‘adequacy’ or ‘minimal 
understanding’ as a programme learning objective. This is the explicit claim that 
disciplinary mastery is not necessary for good interdisciplinary work.17 Allen Repko is 
perhaps the most widely recognised recent proponent of the competency model; 
                                                 
17
 Such an explicit claim is made in the Melbourne model, though it specifically applies to 1st and 2nd year 
courses (Golding 2009: 5). Melbourne’s dilemma appears to have been not succeeding in achieving 
disciplinary expertise, as opposed to explicitly refuting it. 
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consideration of his approach, however, leads back through several justifications by other 
prominent authors. 
 
Repko states that ‘minimum understanding’ or ‘adequacy’ is sufficient for good 
interdisciplinary knowledge and research, and that even undergraduates can learn most of 
what they need to know about using tools and concepts of other disciplines quickly and 
easily, and without the need for expertise in them. “Once students have identified the 
disciplines that are the most relevant to the problem, they must develop adequacy in each 
of these disciplines” (Repko 2008: 192). The notion of ‘adequacy’ is in part justified by the 
work of William Newell: 
 
“if the problem can be illuminated adequately using a handful of introductory-level 
concepts and theories from each discipline, and modest information readily and 
simply acquired, then a solo interdisciplinary researcher or even a first year 
undergraduate student can handle it. Luckily, one can get some useful initial 
understanding of most complex problems using a small number of relatively basic 
concepts from each discipline” (Newell 2007: 253 cited in Repko 2008: 192). 
 
The problems here are three-fold. The first is simply that Newell does not provide evidence 
to support this statement. The second is that it promotes unjustified underdetermination as 
a positive learning objective. It is not actually possible to determine how much disciplinary 
expertise is or is not required to answer a given problem without already possessing the 
necessary expertise to make such an evaluation; we cannot assess the value of something 
we do not understand. While it is true that even experts have this limitation, in that case 
there is no reasonable recourse but to make an educated guess, making this a matter of 
justified underdetermination. Yet it seems irresponsible in the extreme to be aware that 
greater expertise is reasonably available, but to judge that this is not needed without 
possessing the necessary skill to make this evaluation. More important here, however, is 
that Newell’s original quote began with “But” and was preceded by a section discussing 
the need for expertise and expert collaboration in cases not identified as this simple by 
experts. Newell was addressing the special case of undergraduate teaching, in which expert 
instructors are on hand to compensate for the lack of student ability to know what is or is 
not a simple problem, and he was clear that this analysis only should apply in such cases; 
Repko’s analysis mentions none of this (Newell 2007: 253). Repko does suggest that the 
problem can be overcome in a more general sense, only if deemed necessary by the 
‘adequate’ researcher first, by consulting disciplinary experts about it. At this point, 
however, this is no longer a solitary or minimal understanding approach, but is 




The notion of ‘minimal understanding’ Repko derives from Thompson-Klein (2005 though 
originally (Thompson-Klein 1990: 53)).  
 
“Borrowing from another discipline requires assuming what Janice Lauer called the 
‘burden of comprehension.’ A minimal understanding of its cognitive map is needed, 
including basic concepts, modes of inquiry, terms, observational categories, 
representational techniques, standards of proof, and types of explanation. Learning a 
discipline in order to practice it, though, is different than using it for an 
interdisciplinary purpose. Disciplinary mastery connotes complete knowledge, 
interdisciplinary work requires adequacy” (Thompson-Klein 2005a: 68). 
 
These claims are contrary to considerable evidence on the nature of expert versus 
competence level knowledge (Chi et al. 1988; Ericsson n.d.). Also it is unclear what 
‘minimal understanding’ means if it must encompass all of the features listed here, and yet 
be more simple to master than disciplinary expertise itself. More importantly though, 
Janice Lauer’s original statement on this matter was quite different:  
 
“But the field pays a high price for multimodality. As Ranken cautions, anyone who 
borrows work from another field must not only acquire an accurate and thorough 
grasp of the work itself, but also must understand its context, history and the status it 
enjoys in its parent field. Without such accurate understanding, a scholar risks 
building an elaborate edifice on sand. The burden of thorough comprehension also 
falls on the rest of the members of the discipline who receive and assess such work. 
And as multidisciplinary scholarship accumulates and begins achieving the status of 
received tradition in the field or written discourse, it must be mastered by those 
entering the field” (Lauer 1984: 26). 
 
All references to ‘thorough’ and ‘accurate’ were subsequently dropped from Thompson-
Klein’s paraphrase, as was any indication that the point of the statement was to assert the 
absolute need for disciplinary levels of expertise in borrowing ideas, as well as the 
extension of responsibility to the entire borrowing discipline to check the results. What 
Lauer said and Thompson-Klein’s interpretation could not be more contradictory. 
 
Unlike pluralism or essentialism, this issue also presents substantial potential for harmful 
effects beyond the academy. The model is specifically engineered to produce maximum 
decision making confidence at the same time as minimal expertise in the relevant field. 
The proponents of these models view this as a desirable trait, but I cannot see how this can 




Much of the rhetoric surrounding IDS programmes and thematic curricula like that at the 
University of Melbourne is compelling in terms of student development and the practical 
utility of knowledge in the wider world, and the models appear on the surface to offer 
quality instruction on interesting topics, and with considerable freedom for students to 
choose their own paths. Nevertheless, the past several years have seen a growing string of 
closures, retractions and returns to disciplinary models of even some of the most high 
profile and well regarded programmes, such as William Newell and Julie Thompson-
Klein’s flagship IDS programmes, Melbourne University’s format, and Murdoch 
university (Henry 2005; Thompson-Klein 2010b; Marshall 2010; Newell 2010; Davis 2011; 
Wexler 2012). Why do such programmes often founder? My hypothesis is that there is an 
under studied disconnect between these high goals and the actual ways in which humans 
develop and identify expertise, transfer and categorise knowledge, and collaborate; that 
there are constraints on these which have more to do with psychology than the 
traditionalism or commercial interests or neo-liberal agendas that are often implicated as 
the cause of failure (Wexler 2012). Further, I believe that a curriculum developed with 
focus on these constraints can help reach the grand goals of interdisciplinary higher 
education, likely a bit slower, but in a more sustainable way.  
 
SoITL (Scholarship of Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning)  
The Scholarship of Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning is characterised by what Diana 
Laurillard calls ‘teaching as a design science’; that is, research about teaching gathered by 
doing it and then reporting on the process/results (Laurillard 2012: 21–23). SoITL studies 
are typically heavy on data in the form of examples of practice, while notably light on 
theory of interdisciplinarity. Often what theory is present cites prominent work in HTRoI, 
and is not the focus of the study. This approach has no clear regional or institutional centre. 
Previously there was considerable focus in the USA, with the AIS holding an annual 
conference on SoITL, but recently there has been a considerable amount from Australia 
and the UK. It is difficult to get an accurate idea of how much of this research truly exists, 
however, because much of it is not published in the literature on education, but within the 
literature of the disciplines in which the teaching takes place. There may yet be many 
excellent examples of research on interdisciplinary teaching which have gone unnoticed by 
the education community.  
 
Studies in this area provide case studies of alleged interdisciplinary learning and teaching 
in practice, often focusing on the success or failure of particular methods in particular 
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settings (Lattuca et al. 2004; Peters 1999; Beilin and Bender 2010; Marshall 2010). Case 
studies such as these can be incredibly useful for a number of reasons, but it must also be 
considered that no single case, or even small number of cases studies, are sufficient to 
develop or to validate a generic model of interdisciplinarity that would span all disciplines 
and all universities, or even most. To do so invokes the individualistic fallacy; that of 
drawing conclusions about a collective from data gathered only about individuals. Case 
studies of interdisciplinarity are problematic as a source of evidence due to their highly 
situated nature, as well as due to the typically borrowed or assumed definitions of 
interdisciplinarity that they use. There is little coherency from one study to the next 
concerning which notions of interdisciplinarity are being reviewed or applied. This makes 
any attempt to generalize about interdisciplinarity from the evidence of this tradition 
unlikely, nor has doing so typically been the goal.  
 
Aside from being part of a long academic tradition of sharing good practice, and which is 
surely a good thing in its own right, what research of this tradition does best is to provide 
valuable tests of different models of interdisciplinarity. In terms of defining 
interdisciplinarity though, it is not an effective tradition to draw from. To develop or 
corroborate a general approach to interdisciplinarity from SoITL sources would require a 
major undertaking of aggregation of results, interpretation of similarities, and critical 
review of methods in each case. Such an operation would not be unhelpful to 
understanding interdisciplinarity, especially in practice, but it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
 
RoIR (Research of Interdisciplinary Research) 
There is a long tradition of post-project reviews of large ‘interdisciplinary’ projects. This 
area of RoI actually pre-dates much of the HTRoI work, but it has typically lacked a 
coherent or active theoretical aspect, borrowing from HTRoI in most cases.18 Historically 
RoIR studies have been almost entirely within the Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Medicine (STEM) disciplines, where large expensive collaborations across many specialist 
subjects and professions have been typical for several decades (Thompson-Klein 1990). 
There is no clear geographical centre for these studies, though several notable recent ones 
have come from the UK and Europe. The format of the studies is very similar in each case. 
One or more large scale ‘interdisciplinary’ research projects are selected, and the process 
                                                 
18
 A few notable recent efforts have resisted this trend (Bruce et al., 2004; Griffin et al., 2006) 
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of doing the interdisciplinary work is charted and evaluated throughout, largely through 
interviews and focus groups with the participants.  
 
RoIR studies offer a wealth of empirical data for not only evaluating the processes used in 
specific settings, but for developing an evidence-based definition and model of 
interdisciplinarity itself. This has not been how they have been applied, however. Rather 
the work in this area has relied on mostly existing HTRoI accounts in abbreviated forms, 
typically in the introduction to the studies, and typically with limited critical assessment 
(e.g. Lyall and Tait 2001; Kandiko and Blackmore 2010; Modo and Kinchin 2011; Bruce 
et al. 2004). One of the chief hypotheses of my thesis is that we could work in the opposite 
direction, using the data from these studies as one source of evidence for development of a 
model of interdisciplinarity.  
 
Because the subject of most RoIR studies is projects with set goals and timeframes, many 
are able to discuss not only the inception and process, but typically also whether the 
outcomes are integrated or multidisciplinary, and whether the processes used are ultimately 
successful and to what degree (thereby completing the ‘research triangle’). This aspect 
offers a substantial advantage over HTRoI and most ERoI literature, which often fall short 
of much needed justification for the extra expense of interdisciplinary processes without 
this information. 
 
Like SoITL, much of the work here can be characterised as case studies. Case studies of 
interdisciplinary research, however, are significantly more generalizable due to several 
factors. There is much more coherency across each study. Although the particular projects 
and disciplines involved change in each case, and approaches to interdisciplinarity also 
vary to some degree, certain uniformities of the research project environment in a generic 
sense make comparison across RoIR studies much more defensible. Each project presumes 
that interdisciplinarity is: 
 
• being performed collaboratively,  
• in a research setting,  
• with the purpose of reaching a pre-set goal or solving a given problem,  
• within a specific frame of time,  
• within a specific budget,  




RoIR studies also typically employ cases studies as a broad research design rather than a 
narrow research method (as in SoITL). This means that within a single case study there are 
typically a range of interviews, surveys, document analyses, focus groups and participant 
observations. The final aspect that suggests RoIR literature to be more generalizable is that 
much of the results of RoIR studies correlate well with the results of other RoIR studies. 
 
Although studies in this category offer considerable benefits to research of 
interdisciplinarity, they are also relatively less common, presumably due to the size, 
complexity, cost and timeframe involved in each. There have also been a few recent 
studies which blur the line between RoIR and ERoI by reviewing the interdisciplinary 
conditions around research proposals. Proposals are more readily available for review in 
large numbers, allowing for consideration of the interdisciplinary nature of research within 
a much smaller timeframe and project size. But these also suffer from a considerable lack 
of the supporting interview and process related evidence of the larger RoIR studies, as well 
as the obvious fact that these cannot consider the results of the interdisciplinary projects as 
they have not been completed. I have reviewed two of the most recent large scale RoIR 
studies conducted within the UK: 
 
• Interdisciplinary integration in Europe: the case of the Fifth Framework programme 
(Bruce et al. 2004). 
 
This project compared six case studies of large collaborative and allegedly 
interdisciplinary research projects. The study included discussions, workshops, 
surveys, detailed case studies of the process in each project, and post-project meetings 
in each case to review the quality of results, whether integration had been achieved, 
and what lessons could be learned. 
 
The researchers developed a chart of ideal qualities of an interdisciplinary researcher: 
 
• “Curiosity about, and willingness to learn from other disciplines 
• Flexibility and adaptability 
• An open mind to ideas coming from other disciplines and experiences 
• Creativity 
• Good communication and listening skills 
• Ability to absorb information and its implications rapidly 




Although these skills/traits were derived almost entirely from projects in the STEM 
disciplines, we will see later that when Medieval Studies researchers are asked the 
same question the results are very similar (chapter7). These also appear to be ‘traits’ 
more than skills (also a trend in some of my interviews). This may necessitate a 
curriculum of interdisciplinarity which can account for, and perhaps develop these. 
Whether these are truly ‘traits’, or can be approached as skills will be examined in the 
following chapters. Further they found that the best teams already knew each other, 
and had grown out of conferences and contacts, but that there were issues doing this 
because building a team was slow and difficult, and could be wasted time if a proposal 
was not funded (463-4). The concept of ‘building a better team’ through 
undergraduate curriculum models will be examined in chapter 5.  
 
One interesting supplementary finding of the report was that self-identification of 
projects as interdisciplinary was highly unreliable in terms of actual interdisciplinary 
process or outcome. 
 
• Interdisciplinarity in Interdisciplinary Research Programmes in the UK (Griffin et al. 
2006). 
 
This project was composed more heavily of interviews than Bruce et al. Although this 
approach to understanding interdisciplinarity can be problematic if applied too 
holistically, the approach here was largely abductive, that is the interview data was 
used to isolate trends in responses and to formulate a broad hypothesis of patterns, 
rather than to form a comprehensive definition of interdisciplinarity from an 
insufficient sample. This represents a more reflective and self-aware application of 
interview data. 
 
This project was also unique in its focus on ‘broad’ interdisciplinarity. Each project, at 
least to some degree, combined arts and humanities subjects with social science and 
science subjects. The two research projects evaluated were co-funded by the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) in one case, and the AHRC and the Engineering an Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) in the other.  
 
The researchers concluded with a list of 29 trends which emerged from their 
interviews. Although all of these offer useful insights into actual perceptions and 
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practice of interdisciplinary work, I have only listed here the most salient for this 
thesis.I have kept the numbering as it appears in the original report: 
 
1. Interdisciplinarity is not clearly defined either by the research councils or 
by the research programmes; instead, the term tends to be used in a 
declarative manner, often interchangeably with multi-disciplinarity. Both 
among researchers and among the research councils it was common to talk 
about ‘crossing disciplinary boundaries’, and neither ‘trans-‘ nor ‘post’-
disciplinarity were much in use. 
2. Interdisciplinary research was closely linked to collaborative research. 
3. The research councils in the UK are organized around knowledge domains 
(eg arts and humanities; economic and social sciences etc) which impact 
on the research for which they consider themselves accountable, and on 
how they assess research. 
6. The research councils operationalize interdisciplinarity through thematic 
priorities which are closely aligned to international research agendas such 
as those of the European Commission, thus indicating the impact of the 
building of the European Research Area networks on national research 
agendas. 
7. The consideration of users, the issue of raising public awareness and of 
engaging with wider society are viewed as part of the new 
(interdisciplinary) research regimes.  
8. Post-award auditing of research projects, particularly for their 
interdisciplinary dimension, is not yet developed by the research councils, 
thus making the demand for interdisciplinarity a matter of researcher 
preference and potentially nothing but a paper exercise. 
10. The researchers experienced the programmes as fostering 
interdisciplinarity but it was also clear to both researchers and programme 
directors that the take-up of what the programmes had to offer was a 
matter of individual researcher disposition, enthusiastically embraced by 
some and rejected by others. 
11. A lack of coordination of synergy between programmes and projects, 
even within single research councils, was noted as leading to researchers’ 
reinventing the wheel or working in parallel rather than collaborating. 
12. The researchers indicated that interdisciplinary work did not supersede 
but ran in parallel with their home-discipline-based research. 
13. The researchers could be divided between those who saw themselves as 
working in a new interdisciplinary field such as Human-Computer-
Interaction (HCI) and those who did interdisciplinary research in addition 
to being in a traditional discipline.  
14. The desire to work in an interdisciplinary way with others occurred in the 
following four contexts which were not necessarily mutually exclusive: 
within interdisciplinary disciplines; in adjacent disciplines; due to affective 
affinities; and due to ideological affinities. 
15. Prior working relationships were in most cases key to the establishment of 
interdisciplinary research teams.  
16. Those who undertook interdisciplinary research were characterized by: 
careers that had involved moving across disciplines; an open disposition 
towards other disciplines, their terminologies, methods, and ways of 
thinking; previous histories of interdisciplinary collaboration; locations 
that enabled cross-disciplinary working; having networks across a range of 
disciplines; a willingness to communicate across disciplinary divides; a 
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certain independence from career-oriented thinking and working (e.g. not 
having to use the research for RAE purposes); being more senior in their 
fields. 
19. Interdisciplinary research was viewed by all as not conducive to one’s 
academic career – academic careers required uncompromising embedding 
in a single discipline. 
21. The attempt to conduct interdisciplinary research within research 
structures that are predominantly disciplinary, led to strategic divisions of 
labour within interdisciplinary research projects which frequently meant 
that researchers stayed in their disciplinary niche, worked in parallel, and 
published separately. Here interdisciplinarity never went beyond sharing 
knowledge and methods. 
23. Interdisciplinary research was viewed by many as lacking scientific 
credibility and therefore being seen as undesirable. 
24. To conduct interdisciplinary research effectively, researchers were 
thought to need good interpersonal skills, good communication skills, 
openness towards others’ methods and terminology, a willingness to work 
towards developing a common language. 
25. Interdisciplinary research requires more time than discipline-based 
research and a greater degree of process as opposed to product orientation.  
26. The researchers in the projects saw interdisciplinarity as important for 
future research but recognized that institutional research structures, 
funding and assessment will have to change significantly to enable 
effective interdisciplinary research. 
27. Researchers were divided regarding the need for a top-down approach to 
interdisciplinarity as opposed to a bottom-up one. They were clearer about 
the detrimental effects of current research infrastructures for 
interdisciplinary research than they were about how changes to those 
infrastructures might actually facilitate such research. 
28. The researchers recognized that research methods cement researchers into 
disciplinary dispositions and that these can be overcome by a greater 
understanding of a range of research methods” (74-76). 
 
What seems to emerge from this list is that the range of ideas about or approaches to 
interdisciplinarity in practice, which have been taken as justification for pluralism by 
some, may be more effectively viewed as a range of factors for developing a singular 
interdisciplinary practice. Pluralism only makes sense if each factor were considered 
separately as a different type of interdisciplinarity, but it is clear that the participants 
have all been referring to the same projects and activities. Of special importance is 
conclusion 11, because this effectively restates what the purpose of my thesis is, to 
develop curricula which can, hopefully, eliminate or greatly reduce this issue.  
 
ERoI (Educational Research of Interdisciplinarity) 
In the wake of relative silence on interdisciplinarity from within the Educational Studies 
community itself for most of the span of since 1972, there has been an apparent explosion 
of publication. Since 2007 there have been at least three edited collections within 
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Educational Studies concerning interdisciplinarity (or moving beyond disciplinarity), as 
well as a substantial renaissance of other curriculum focused research on the subject. Of 
the publications in these three collections several are by design SoITL. Of the remaining 
works several can be described as surface considerations of interdisciplinarity in relation to 
the author’s regular area of educational research, such as research-teaching linkages, 
academic ethics, threshold concepts, new programme assessment, etc. (Illingsworth 2009; 
Littlejohn and Nicol 2009; Lorenzo-Zamorano 2009; Van der Velden 2009; Irving 2009; 
DeZure 2010; Casey 2010; Pfirman and Martin 2010; Newell 2010). These studies discuss 
interdisciplinarity in relation to these specific topics, but do not engage significantly with 
wider learning and teaching issues of curriculum design. There are also a few notable early 
precursors to the recent rise in ERoI literature, the most well known being William Newell 
(Newell and Green 1982; Newell 1994). Newell’s work has consistently returned to the 
place of interdisciplinarity in the curriculum, but has also not engaged with the wider 
literature on learning and teaching.  
 
To put the recent increase in ERoI publications in the context of the wider higher education 
research community, I reviewed the collected SRHE (Society for Research into Higher 
Education) abstracts for 2013 (Visser-Wijnveen 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). The SRHE 
abstracts collection compiles the abstracts of approximately 750 publications in higher 
education research across 134 journals in chiefly the UK, Australia and Europe, and some 
of Asia (notably only publications in English).19 My analysis was based first on the topic 
index, simply looking for ‘interdisciplinarity’ and its common correlates ‘multi-
disciplinarity’, transdisciplinarity’ and ‘cross-disciplinarity’. In order to be generous with 
the use of terms, I also searched for abstracts discussing disciplinarity in a way that 
suggested transcending or questioning it, as well as discussions of knowledge transfer, 




                                                 
19
 There is a separate compilation of a similar nature which is focused on American publications which I did 
not review, but in which I would anticipate slightly more presence of interdisciplinarity due to the long 




Topic Heading Journal Author Title 
Interdisciplinarity Higher Education Research & 
Development 
Ryan, et al. Developing research capacity among 
graduate students in an interdisciplinary 
environment 
 London Review of Education Kandiko Leadership and creativity in higher education: 
the role of interdisciplinarity 
 British Journal of Educational Studies Thomas Disciplinarity and the organisation of 
scholarly writing in educational studies in the 
UK: 1970-2010 
 Higher Education Research & 
Development 
MacKinnon, et al. Interdisciplinary science research and 
education 
Interprofessionalism Journal of Interprofessional Care Zorek & Raehl Interprofessional education accreditation 
standard in the USA: a comparative analysis 
Multidisciplinarity Learning and Instruction Noroozi, et al. Scripting for construction of a transactive 
memory system in multidisciplinary CSCL 
environments 
 Teaching in Higher Education Wollf, et al. Integrating multidisciplinary engineering 
knowledge 
Transdisciplinarity Higher Education Felt, et al. Growing into what? The (un)-disciplined 
socialisation of early stage researchers in 
transdisciplinary research 
Collaboration Higher Education Policy Duysburgh, et al. Collaboration in a multidisciplinary, 
distributed research organization: a case 
study 
 Higher Education Lewis, et al. The how and why of academic collaboration: 
disciplinary differences and policy 
implications 
 Journal of Interprofessional Care Aase, et al. Teaching interprofessional teamwork in 
medical and nursing education in Norway: a 
content analysis 
Figure 1.3 Abstracts of Interdisciplinarity 
 
This was not meant to be a definitive analysis, but the results are fairly clear, there was not 
much publication dealing with interdisciplinarity or related topics: only 0.015% of the total 
contributions. For comparison, there were nearly three times as many articles about 
‘discourse analysis’ (11) and nearly four times as many about ‘first year students’ (14) as 
there were on ‘interdisciplinarity’ specifically (4). The apparent explosion of ERoI 
literature may in fact be deceptive in a broader sense, even though it is substantial in terms 
of RoI literature itself. 
 
Legacy of HTRoI 
The new wave of educational research on interdisciplinarity, though evidence-based, 
practice oriented and in general quality research, is often still beholden to tacit ideas about 
interdisciplinarity and the disciplines that have carried over from the previous HTRoI work. 
One consistent indication of HTRoI received wisdom is the use of uncritical or marginally 
critical citation of these sources to define interdisciplinarity (Aram 2004; Chettiparamb 
2007; Spelt et al. 2009; Littlejohn and Nicol 2009; Lorenzo-Zamorano 2009; Illingsworth 
2009; Irving 2009; Van der Velden 2009; Blackmore and Kandiko 2010; Brack, Schmidt, 
and MacKinnon 2010; Casey 2010; DeZure 2010; Pfirman and Martin 2010; Davies and 
Devlin 2010; MacKinnon, Hine, and Barnard 2013). Thompson-Klein in particular is cited 
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in many ERoI accounts, and in very few is this critical. This legacy is not uncontested, 
however. Some ERoI accounts directly call into question the assumptions of the HTRoI 
studies (Weingart 2000; Rowland 2006; Greaves and Grant 2010; MacKinnon et al. 2010; 
Bamber 2012a; Trowler 2012b). Although a strong legacy of the HTRoI theory continues 
in much of the ERoI literature, there is also a growing resistance and possibly the 
beginning of a new core focus in the understanding of disciplinarity.   
 
Pluralistic approaches to interdisciplinarity appear to be somewhat less frequent in ERoI, 
but are still present in several widely cited examples (Lattuca 2001; Van der Velden 2009; 
Davies and Devlin 2010). In much of the ERoI literature though, pluralism of 
interdisciplinarity has not been part of the discussion at all. This may suggest a refutation 
by omission; that such pluralistic models may seem less appealing when curriculum or 
pedagogy are the focus of discussion. 
 
The competency approach to interdisciplinarity has also not been as prominent in ERoI, 
but just as with pluralism, it has not been absent entirely. The continued promotion of 
Interdisciplinary Studies programmes and broad thematic restructuring of curricula are the 
most prominent examples (Newell 2006, 2010; MacKinnon et al. 2010: 35; Golding 2009; 
Wexler 2012; Fiksdal 2013). Breadth without depth has been strongly contested within 
much of the theory-based ERoI literature though:  
 
“Highly competent proficiency in a single discipline is the only acceptable 
basis for interdisciplinary success” (OECD 1998: 18 cited in Huutoniemi 
2010: 311).  
 
“A basic premise of quality interdisciplinary work is that it satisfies quality 
standards arising from the disciplines involved” (Boix Mansilla 2006: 75).  
 
“Also central to the proposed definition is the upholding of disciplinary 
standards in interdisciplinary work. Disciplinary understanding builds on 
knowledge and modes of thinking that have survived the scrutiny of expert 
communities using commonly agreed upon methods and validation standards” 
(Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007: 219).  
 
“The danger, however, is that in seeking to avoid interdisciplinary 
contestation transdisciplinarity can lead to a collapse or denial of the forms 
of critique that characterize the disciplines. It is as if the lowest common 
denominator is sought in order to reach consensus, rather than facing the 
challenges of disciplinary difference” (Rowland 2006: 95). 
 
Disciplinary essentialism maintains a strong tacit presence in ERoI (Spelt et al. 2009; 
Casey 2010; Pfirman and Martin 2010; MacKinnon et al. 2010; Brack et al. 2010). 
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However, in the case where essentialism is explicitly challenged in ERoI it tends not to 
present the sort of internal contradictions with which the HTRoI literature has had 
problems (Rowland 2006: 95; Bamber 2012a; Trowler 2012b). For example, Stephen 
Rowland (2006) defined interdisciplinarity by viewing it a site of contestation between and 
of the disciplines, which could be seen as an essentialist approach, but Rowland also 
regarded the disciplines as sites of contestation of themselves as part of the same 
definition. Echoing Piaget (1972), Rowland states, “Thus interdisciplinarity is nothing 
new. It reminds us of the contested nature of knowledge and the continual need to 
challenge one’s own assumptions and to be aware of how one’s standpoint might be 
viewed by those who do not share it” (Rowland 2006: 96). He suggests that there can often 
be more in common between Marxian theorists across several disciplines than any of these 
have with other theorists in their ‘home’ disciplines. Whether bridging disciplinary divides 
via such overarching theoretical structures as Marxism or Feminist Theory really 
constitutes interdisciplinarity or something else entirely remains an open question (and one 
there is not the space to tackle here). 
 
Several of the most coherent ERoI works in recent years have been critiques of 
disciplinarity, particularly of disciplinary essentialism. The 2012 collection Tribes and 
Territories in the 21st Century: Rethinking the significance of disciplines in higher 
education is one example. While focused notionally on the disciplines, a merging into 
notions of interdisciplinarity was explicit in several chapters, and implicit in others. In the 
same vein Jan McArthur (2010) offers a cogent critical view of interdisciplinarity as an 
‘emancipation’ from the disciplines by suggesting that the disciplines themselves are both 
critical and emancipatory. It remains to be seen what and how much effect such a 
problematising of the core of disciplinarity will have on subsequent RoI.  
 
Approaches to Interdisciplinarity in Curriculum  
Interdisciplinary curricula take on a variety of forms in the literature. There are some 
uniformities though, the most prevalent being a call for explicit teaching of 
interdisciplinarity at some point, and the development of a set of interdisciplinary skills 
which are to be part of this teaching. This pattern is present not only in the ERoI literature, 
where curriculum and pedagogy are the focus, but also in a growing amount of the HTRoI 
literature, further blurring the lines between the categories. Spelt et al. take a learning 
outcomes approach, as do several of the reports from Harvard’s widely cited ‘Project Zero’ 
project on interdisciplinarity in practice (Nikitina 2005; Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007; 
Spelt et al. 2009). Supporters of IDS programmes have proposed or developed discreet 
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introductory or capstone courses to teach interdisciplinary skills (Newell 2006: 45; Repko 
2008). MacKinnon et al. (2010: 243) call for all students to be taught interdisciplinary 
thinking and awareness of broader subjects as undergraduates, before too much 
disciplinary thinking sets in (this is a concept which I will return to in the discussion of 
expertise and ‘cognitive entrenchment’ in chapter 5). Kate Chanock (2010) promotes a 
skills based learning of interdisciplinary generic writing skills, embedded within each 
discipline, thereby promoting interdisciplinary learning through redundancy.  
 
There is not as much consensus among these studies, however, about how or when 
interdisciplinarity should be taught. Moreover, many of the skill sets listed for 
interdisciplinary thinking or practice are derived from HTRoI sources or from common 
sense assumptions. There is little indication, for example, that any identified sets of 
interdisciplinary skills are derived from the empirical studies in the RoIR or SoITL 
literature, or any other empirical source. A recent analysis of the literature on 
interdisciplinarity by Elsbeth Spelt et al. counted only ten studies out of 309 surveyed that 
used empirical methods to develop learning and teaching strategies for ‘interdisciplinary 
thinking’, and I do not concur that even all of these qualify, though I would also add a few 
more to the list (Spelt et al. 2009). Spelt et al. describe the methods employed by these ten 
studies as typically, ‘surveys, interviews, observations, product appraisals, and reflections 
on experiences’, several  of which I have already identified above as problematic in terms 
of validity or reliability for defining interdisciplinarity (2009: 371).  
 
New Directions 
There have been a number of novel approaches to interdisciplinarity recently that fall 
around the margins of ERoI and HTRoI. These have at least in part been my inspiration for 
the directions I have looked in for further evidence about interdisciplinarity:  
 
Ray Land (2012) has proposed that interdisciplinarity can be seen as a special case of 
‘threshold concepts’. Succinctly, threshold concepts are important and also difficult to 
acquire aspects of knowledge or skill in a particular discipline, which often lead to an 
epiphany or advancement of understanding once they are finally reached. Meyer and Land 
(2005) proposed that within the disciplines these are relatively stable elements that each 
student must eventually master in order to progress to deeper understanding. In terms of 
interdisciplinarity Land suggests that grasping certain interdisciplinary linkages between 
disciplines is much the same. Land’s work appears to parallel much of the existing 
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empirical research on expertise, which is also concerned with qualitative distinctions 
between levels of understanding/skill.  
 
Justin Greaves and Wyn Grant (2010) have approached interdisciplinarity in Political 
Science and Biology as a question of a unity of academic knowledge, which they propose 
would allow better understanding across disciplines. A similar suggestion is made by 
Maura Borrego and Lynita Newswander (2010). Greaves and Grants’ argument is that 
there is no real qualitative distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences 
outside of consideration of the level of consensus likely to be achieved among practitioners. 
This is not a new idea, indeed Greaves and Grant attribute it to several other recent 
philosophers. It is, however, a contested and not terribly popular approach, especially when 
the humanities are also considered, which Greaves and Grant did not address. This has the 
potential to be a very strong argument for a generic concept of interdisciplinarity, but it 
would benefit from being extended to a broader scope and more solid foundations. It is 
also important to distinguish if and how this approach differs from a number of 
‘transdisciplinary’ theories of transcending the disciplines. This will be a chief focus of the 
chapter on epistemology.    
 
Svetlana Nikitina (2005) approached the subject in terms of language and cognition 
research by first problematising the existing understandings of interdisciplinarity as 
underdetermined (she did not use the term), and then asking whether cognitive analysis of 
the language of interdisciplinary interaction showed any discreet differences from ordinary 
dialogue. The study was compelling for a number of reasons. First, Nikitina’s hypothesis 
was that interdisciplinary cognition was no different from ordinary dialogic interaction, 
that it may not be something unique or special. She also relied on a very different source of 
external research, the linguistic and categorical studies of Bakhtin and Lakoff, moving the 
analysis of the nature of interdisciplinarity away from its humanities core. Nikitina’s 
account is also one of the only ones to openly acknowledge its own circular, and therefore 
less reliable, methodology of using self-identified interdisciplinary groups. Inspired by this 
work, I have also approached interdisciplinarity in terms of the psychology of 
categorisation (though less focused on language).  
 
The only other academic that I am aware of to substantially consider the psychology of 
interdisciplinarity is Rainer Bromme (2000). Bromme focused on the psychological factors 
of interdisciplinary skills, the psychological nuances of expertise, collaborative 
communication, and the categorisation concepts: in short, Bromme’s article presaged the 
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effective research agenda of this thesis, though in a less extensive format. Bromme did not 
problematise the prevailing HTRoI understanding of interdisciplinarity, however, and as 
such, his conclusions veered wide of where they might have gone otherwise. This thesis 
owes Bromme and Nikitina each substantial credit for helping set the course it has taken. 
Unfortunately neither work has been substantially integrated into subsequent RoI work, 
though each are cited from time to time.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
A Note on Transdisciplinarity 
The general implication of transdisciplinarity is of something beyond disciplinarity or even 
interdisciplinarity. However, it has been taken to have such a wide range of uses in 
different sectors of higher education and RoI, that it is effectively impossible to know 
which is being employed in any case where it is encountered. There is, however, one use of 
the term which is more consistent with regard to the specific focus of this thesis: 
development of new curricula in the general higher education context. This is 
transdisciplinarity as a complete or near complete breakdown of disciplinary divisions of 
knowledge, often tied to emancipatory notions of a unity of knowledge or undifferentiated 
options (Gibbons et al. 1994; Thompson-Klein 2005b, 2010a; Nicolescu 2012; MacKinnon 
et al. 2013). I refer to this approach as ‘radical transdisciplinarity’, and although it does not 
appear in the literature with great frequency, it is often boldly stated and influential when it 
does. One such example is the ‘mode 2’ knowledge of Gibbons et al. (1994).20  
 
Bringing it Together, Agreeing to Disagree 
A few concepts of interdisciplinarity do appear to share a significant degree of consensus 
across the traditions. Conclusions that interdisciplinarity is collaborative and skills-based, 
and that students should be trained in these, are perhaps the most consistent statements 
about the topic across ERoI, RoIR and even HTRoI in recent years. If there is consensus 
here across traditions though, why is there no consensus on a definition of or approach to 
interdisciplinarity in general? The answer appears to lie in the concurrent continuation of 
oppositional models and approaches which still challenge these conclusions, and also with 
                                                 
20
 Mode 2 knowledge suggests that a new way to view knowledge in the modern world is that it transcends 
disciplines and ‘pure’ academic study, moving to explicitly project-based and practice-centred application as 
the main form of activity. Although there are a number of compelling aspects of mode 2, it has been rightly 
criticised for being both not new and not empirically supported. It is the necessity of eliminating or 
transcending the disciplines that is of concern in this thesis. Examples of transcending the disciplines given in 
the text suffer largely the same historically and self-identified issues as the HTRoI literature, in that Gibbons 
et al. personally and seemingly arbitrarily determine which aspects of the examples given are disciplinary 
and which were transcendent. 
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the limited focus on curriculum design across all the traditions until very recently. The 
consensus is therefore tenuous and contested and has not been tested by praxis in many 
cases. Pluralistic, essentialist, and competency concepts of interdisciplinarity continue to 
share popular support alongside generic, collaborative and skills/mastery based 
approaches. In many cases these are even intertwined with or used to explain each other 
(Bromme 2000; Spelt et al. 2009; MacKinnon et al. 2010; Davies and Devlin 2010).  
 
The difficulties with much research in the ERoI tradition, as well as recent HTRoI and 
some RoIR, continues to be one of insufficient amounts of the right kind of evidence, 
leading again to underdetermination. For example, a recent article that looked at graduate 
approaches to interdisciplinarity in the sciences and engineering concluded that 
interdisciplinarity is in practice collaboration based, that there are particular skills that 
facilitate this, and that these should be taught to graduates (Modo and Kinchin 2011). 
Though coherent and compellingly argued, the basis for these conclusions was insights 
derived entirely from an array of HTRoI sources. Since the HTRoI sources have been 
called into question as reliable evidence, this would suggest that this article is compelling 
on grounds of common sense alone, not on the evidence offered to justify it. How then do 
we know if we should trust these conclusions?   
 
The need for expertise has been strongly supported, but also either tacitly or explicitly 
refuted. The concept of a single generic model of interdisciplinarity has been disputed by a 
plethora of pluralistic models. The open and flexible nature of the disciplines has been well 
established and largely agreed to, but not without tacit assumption of their rigidity 
operating in tandem. Empirical evidence exists within the literature, but is often limited in 
scope or is of questionable reliability. It must also be determined if and in what way 
anything interdisciplinary is not also a normal function of disciplinarity. Although many 
attempts have been made to describe what this may be, none seem both compelling and 
well evidenced at the same time. Further, accounts which suggest that interdisciplinarity is 
not something special or separate from normal disciplinarity continue to appear 
periodically, and are often very compellingly argued (Piaget 1972; Fish 1989; Weingart 
2000; Nikitina 2005; Rowland 2006; Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007) 
 
The nature and practical value of interdisciplinarity are both substantially underdetermined 
at this time; many theories appear to be equally justifiable given the available evidence. 
But this underdetermination appears to be of the unjustified variety, which means there 
should be ways to overcome it. In order to build a model of interdisciplinarity which can 
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work from theory, through evidence, and into practice, the tacit assumptions about these 
approaches needs to be stripped away and each needs to be examined from first principles, 
using evidence that is outside of the alleged practice itself. That is what I hope the 






Chapter 2: Epistemology & Academic Knowledge 
 
Introduction 
This chapter serves a dual purpose of establishing my own ontological and epistemological 
base from which my methods and analysis of studying interdisciplinarity derive, and also 
of establishing a deeper understanding of the underlying epistemological ideas which are 
critical to developing a model of interdisciplinarity. Concepts in the interdisciplinarity 
literature such as pluralism, disciplinary essentialism, the distinction between the 
humanities and the sciences, and interdisciplinarity as ‘greater than sum of parts’ can all be 
taken back to deeper epistemological roots. The nature of interdisciplinarity and the 
questions of epistemology are in many ways the same: both problematise how we define 
and structure knowledge and knowledge production, how we might view a single concept 
from several seemingly incommensurable perspectives, and whether communicating across 
these is really possible. Although the epistemological nature of interdisciplinarity is often 
discussed in an abstracted form in the literature, it is seldom analysed as epistemology, and 
I believe this is one cause of the continuing lack of consensus.  
 
The epistemological approach I take in this thesis is that of naturalised pragmatism. In this 
chapter I will explore what pragmatism is, how it relates to other epistemological stances, 
and what the naturalised version of pragmatism entails, paying attention to points where 
this ties into concepts of interdisciplinarity. Pragmatism is largely a critique of other 
epistemologies, notably postmodernism and positivism, and so in exploring pragmatism I 
will also consider other standpoints, and their application in the interdisciplinary literature. 
After looking at what pragmatism is, I will explore what it says about two epistemological 
problems of interdisciplinarity: the perceived split between science and the humanities 
often known by the metaphor of the ‘two cultures’, and the claim that interdisciplinarity 
solutions can be ‘greater than the sum of their parts’.  
 
One of the most substantial and long-lived divides in the academic world is that between 
the sciences and the humanities (with the social sciences usually falling to the humanities 
side), what C.P. Snow famously called the ‘two cultures’ in 1959 (Snow 1961; Trowler et 
al. 2012). The rationale for this divide is based on the perception of a discreet epistemic 
difference between humanistic knowledge and scientific knowledge, something Snow 
lamented, but which many others have regarded as valid or essential to academia (Messer-
 61 
 
Davidow et al. 1993; Moran 2010; Parker 2002, 2008). Hans-Georg Gadamer expressed 
this succinctly:  
 
“Hence the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie 
outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history 
itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated 
that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science” 
(Gadamer 2006: xx).  
 
The assertion relies on creating a separate identity for the humanities by placing 
essentialist restrictions on the methods ‘proper to science’, and excluding such methods 
from the humanities and social sciences. This is a process of ‘othering’ much the same as 
some HTRoI theorists have done with disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, and it has led to 
a similar ‘us versus them’ result that is apparent in the wealth of literature in recent 
decades about the ‘crisis in the humanities’ and the ‘science wars’, sparking some acerbic 
reactions such as the ‘Sokal affair’.21 All of this makes one of the most fundamental 
impediments to interdisciplinarity, communication across the science/humanities divide, an 
epistemological problem, and specifically one which needs to be addressed by examining 
what ‘scientific’ knowledge is. The divide is defended and maintained in a number of anti-
scientistic sentiments from postmodern approaches to knowledge, and to interdisciplinarity, 
which appear to be based on a poor historical understanding of the core nature of scientific 
thinking or method (Kuhn 1996: 205; Thompson-Klein 1996, 2010b; Peters 1999; 
Gadamer 2006: 442–443; Rossi 2006: 24–46; Moran 2010: 74). Examining this will 
require a brief foray into the history of the scientific method, but doing so will provide a 
stronger basis for challenging both disciplinary essentialism and pluralism in 
interdisciplinary theory.   
 
Interdisciplinarity is also often regarded as having intrinsic value by producing solutions 
which are ‘greater than the sum of their parts’ or addressing problems which are presumed 
to be irreducibly complex, such as climate change or social welfare that interdisciplinarity 
provides (the ‘betterness’ claims mentioned in the previous chapter). What these 
approaches to interdisciplinarity consistently do not do is demonstrate that any of the 
problems claimed as too big for a single discipline actually are so, or that the 
interdisciplinary solutions actually are better. Rather, this is taken as a self-evident (Newell 
2001; Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007; Thompson-Klein 2010). These concepts of 
                                                 
21
 The ‘Sokal affair’ was a controversial article published in the journal Social Text by physicist Alan Sokal. 
The article was intentionally circular and unsupported, containing many postmodern buzzwords and 
rhetorical statements. Sokal later publically admitted to the hoax, claiming that postmodernism was 
‘fashionable nonsense’ (Lezard 2010). For more on the ‘crisis in the humanities’ see Chapter 4. 
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irreducibility are called holism in epistemological terms, and are opposed to the notion of 
reductivism, which is the idea that anything can be reduced to its components parts, and 
can then be understood by how these combine to make the whole. Below I will consider 
one of the main arguments in favour of holism, and how this relates to ‘greater than the 
sum of parts’ arguments for the definition of interdisciplinarity. Further, the lack of 
demonstration of ‘betterness’ in application violates the most fundamental aspects of 
pragmatism, as we shall see below. 
 
Pragmatism & Naturalised Epistemology 
One of the main threads of epistemological and ontological development in the past 
century has been that of pragmatism. The movement is most commonly associated with 
Charles Sanders Pierce, William James, John Dewey as progenitors, and W.V.O. Quine, 
Thomas Kuhn, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty more recently (Stanford 2013; 
Truncellito, n.d.). Not all pragmatists self-identify as such though, nor are all who claim to 
be pragmatists clearly so in all cases. Kuhn did not self-identify as a pragmatist, though his 
theory of paradigms bears many core similarities to this tradition. Conversely, Richard 
Rorty is sometimes considered a postmodernist due to his arguably relativist stand on 
many issues (Grayling et al. 2005). Some of Michele Foucault’s work, specifically The 
Order of Things, can be read as distinctly pragmatic although he is typically considered a 
postmodernist. Pragmatism was chiefly developed in an American context, though there 
are certainly pragmatists elsewhere; Jurgen Habermas is typically considered a pragmatist 
for example (Bohman and Rehg 2011).  
 
The most core and most agreed on defining feature of pragmatism is the insistence on 
utility or usefulness of theories, models, solutions, or conclusions as the penultimate 
determiner of truth-value (Almeder 2007). For any pragmatist, what makes a conclusion 
‘true’ is ultimately defined by whether it can be demonstrated to be effective or useful. 
That same core focus is upheld in my approach to interdisciplinarity in the curriculum as a 
pragmatic process: concepts of interdisciplinarity which are not clearly effective or useful 
are therefore not acceptable as good definitions. Utility is not the only important aspect of 
pragmatism, however. Bruce Kimball lists six key features of pragmatism: 
 
1. “Pragmatists are fallabilists: they recognise that any possible assertion 
about what is true or right might well be in error. 
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2. They advocate the experimental method of inquiry, a method they take 
as having egalitarian implications since it is a method anyone can be 
taught to utilize. 
3. They understand judgements of truth or right to be intersubjective, 
assertions that are warranted by the judgement of a community of 
inquirers not by a single individual’s judgement. 
4. They argue that human beings are part of the natural order, organisms in 
dynamic interaction with their environment. 
5. They think that purpose is intrinsic to thought and inquiry: truth is a 
matter of habits that guide us successfully toward the attainment of our 
ends. 
6. They believe inquiry is inherently normative: thinking cannot be 
separated from preferring and choosing” (Kimball 1995: 29 cited in 
(Allan 2004: 128). 
 
Kimball’s list is a good starting point, though it is important to note that there are nuances 
within pragmatism regarding how usefulness or utility should be defined or verified.  
The list suggests that a key feature of pragmatism is the use of the experimental method, 
which strongly suggests that usefulness is tied to reliability via empirical modes of 
consensus and justification. This is most commonly how pragmatism seeks to reduce (but 
never eliminate) underdetermination, by relying on well-formed evidential structures to 
support that a proposed solution is not just useful, but is more useful than less justified 
variants. Some pragmatists, however, such as William James and Richard Rorty, have 
taken more relative or subjective views of this, allowing that what is useful, and therefore 
epistemically true, can be defined much more individualistically according to what each 
person or group decides is useful to them and using whatever means of determining this 
they find acceptable (Grayling et al. 2005).  
 
This approach effectively leads to epistemological anarchy and relativism, though. 
Although such an approach is potentially able to demonstrate pragmatic usefulness in 
narrow examples, it is unable to demonstrate reliable and useful pragmatic solutions that 
can address disparate groups and individuals facing the same situations. Further, such an 
approach does nothing to help with making useful predictions about the future or planning 
how things reliably should be approached, because any method is deemed acceptable and 
epistemologically equivalent and any viewpoint on utility equally valid. This is, in fact, the 
approach taken by many pluralistic approaches to interdisciplinarity, and these have 
similarly demonstrated a consistent lack of reliability, consistency, or actual usefulness in 




In this thesis I do not regard these views as good examples of the notion of pragmatism, 
but as extreme ideas which serve to demonstrate that usefulness/utility alone is not a 
sufficient definition of pragmatism. Rather, that a criteria for reliability and/or an active 
attempt to reduce underdetermination is also essential.  This is indeed the most common 
application of pragmatism, but the dependency on reliability as well as utility is not always 
clearly articulated. In the chapters to come there I have made an effort to consider 
alternative theories and evidence in order to directly address underdetermination (more 
will be said on this is in next chapter on Methodology).  
 
To re-iterate, underdetermination is the principle that in all cases there may be an equal or 
better theory to fit the same evidence. Although the term underdetermination is typically 
associated with W.VO. Quine in the 20th century, John Stuart Mill offered a good synopsis 
of the concept in his A System of Logic  
 
“...this evidence I can not regard as conclusive, because we can not have, in 
the case of such an hypothesis, the assurance that if the hypothesis be false it 
must lead to results at variance with the true facts. Most thinkers of any 
degree of sobriety allow, that an hypothesis such as this is not to be received 
as probably true because it accounts for all the known phenomena, since this 
is a condition sometimes fulfilled tolerably well by two conflicting 
hypotheses...while there are probably a thousand more which are equally 
possible, but which, for want of anything analogous in our experience, our 
minds are unfitted to conceive” (Mill 1882: 617).  
 
As noted, I distinguish here between justified and unjustified underdetermination, in order 
to differentiate between underdetermination that we must epistemologically acknowledge 
as the background of all claims, and underdetermination that does not incorporate all 
available resources and which should prompt us to look for better answers. 
Underdetermination must also be carefully distinguished from relativism. The former only 
suggests that there may be other theories which could explain the same evidence better or 
equally well, while the latter suggests that we have no reliable way to distinguish between 
which are better or worse among these. 
 
The concern with underdetermination is often rephrased in a more positive manner to say 
that the goal of pragmatism is to determine the best solution. ‘Best’ or ‘better’ in the case 
of this thesis should be taken as the approach to defining interdisciplinarity (and 
disciplinarity) which is more applicable to a wider range of HE environments and students, 
is more likely to be implementable in a practical manner, and which more reliably backed 




This is in contrast to the bulk of HTRoI approaches to interdisciplinarity, which 
consistently lack evidence of being a reliably preferable solution, rather than simply a 
solution. The methods used to explain and develop interdisciplinarity in the HTRoI 
tradition should not be viewed as incorrect from a pragmatic standpoint though because 
they are often built from unreliable types of evidence and reasoning, but because they 
consistently lead to conclusions that are demonstrably ineffective as a result of this. The 
fact that the sources of evidence in HTRoI are typically unreliable explains why they are 
pragmatically unacceptable, but they are not the reason that they are. 
 
A few other terms are essential to understanding pragmatism: transcendentalism and 
foundationalism. These refer to categories of philosophical theories, rather than individual 
theories themselves. Transcendental or foundational theories are those which claim to rely 
on some form of certain or irrefutable base knowledge, specifically knowledge that is 
either foundational to or that transcends empirical knowledge. Foundationalism is most 
often associated with positivism, which holds that we can have real and certain knowledge 
of the world around us via ‘analytic’ truths of logic or reason alone.23 Transcendental 
theories refer to the experience of subjective truths which exceed or ‘transcend’ what we 
can empirically study, and which presumably cannot be denied.24  This is most often 
associated with the philosophy of Emmanuel Kant, but also more recently with the 
transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and with various forms of postmodern 
relativism.25 The key similarity between foundationalism and transcendentalism is that 
both seek to establish a form of absolute knowledge from which all other knowledge can 
build, and which itself cannot be refuted.  
 
                                                 
23
 The most common example of this is the ‘possible worlds’ model, which regards something as an absolute 
logical truth if we can reason that it must be true in all possible theoretical worlds that we could imagine 
(Menzel 2013). 
24
 Kant’s example of this was that space and time could only be known subjectively, not as a definitely real 
thing beyond ourselves, but also could not be denied as an empirical reality of our subjective experience in 
which case it must be transcendentally certain, not empirically so (Kant 2012). Husserl’s example from 
Phenomenology was that our perception of an object is only certain to us at any time from one perspective as 
our own experience of it, but transcendentally we must know that the object is ‘real’ to us in our experience 
of it whether or not it is ‘real’ in other ways (Zahavi 2003: 116–119). 
25
 “This assumption has been questioned by phenomenologists. They have criticized the suggestion that 
science can provide us with a description from a view from nowhere as if science simply mirrors the way in 
which pre-existing and mind independent nature classifies itself. They have argued that a view from nowhere 
is unattainable, just as they would deny that it is possible to look at our experiences sideways on to see 
whether they match with reality. This is so, not because such views are incredibly hard to reach, but because 




One of the most controversial propositions of pragmatism is the stance that there is no 
justified or reliable means of proving any knowledge in an absolute sense, and further that 
by all reasonable accounts there never can be. This means that according to pragmatism it 
serves no useful purpose to investigate the deeper questions of metaphysics or ontology 
from a purely philosophical standpoint: these are useless questions to which there can be 
no reliable answer. Pragmatism rejects all foundational and transcendental philosophy as 
incoherent and underdetermined.  
 
Rather than being nihilistic though, pragmatism is effectively a ‘middle way’ epistemology 
which simultaneously refutes as underdetermined and yet also utilises as essential three 
other common epistemological standpoints, playing them against each other to develop a 
different approach: 
 
• Scepticism: the belief that we cannot reliably have any knowledge of the world 
• Positivism: the belief that we can have certain/absolute knowledge about the world 
• Relativism: the belief that we cannot adequately distinguish between better or 
worse knowledge of the world  
 
I refer to these as the ‘three foils’ of pragmatism, as together they work to foil foundational 
and transcendental claims and create a balanced centre. In place of any of these absolute 
claims, pragmatism focuses on developing knowledge by whether or not a theory makes 
effective statements: ‘does it work?’ and ‘can this be demonstrated?’26 Understanding how 
pragmatism approaches each of the ‘three foils’ will help to position pragmatism, as well 
as other epistemological models, in relation to different models of disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. 
 
Scepticism, Positivism & Relativism 
One philosophical problem which all approaches to knowledge must face is how to answer 
the sceptical dilemma, the philosophical stance that because any proof of knowledge can 
still be questioned, we therefore cannot have any reliable knowledge at all. This problem 
was first set down strongly by David Hume, and much of Western philosophy since this 
has been focused on answering Hume’s formidable arguments (Hume 2010, pt. 1.4). 
Actual scepticism is, however, as Noam Chomsky has succinctly noted, not possible in 
actual people (Chomsky 2013). It is not clear that any human actually could deny all 
                                                 
26
 This aspect of epistemology is sometimes called Reliablism, the standpoint that a value cannot ever be 
‘true’ but can only be more or less reliable. 
 67 
 
knowledge and still be conscious. Rather, it is a philosophical tool which can be used to 
test theories against (can the theory explain how we appear to have knowledge?). In this 
sense it is important to consider, even if it is practically impossible. In a general sense, 
pragmatism embraces scepticism without allowing it to encompass and dissolve knowledge, 
by suggesting that it is as much a problem to refute scepticism as it was to accept it entirely: 
that the practical impossibility of both certain knowledge and no knowledge is the solution.  
 
This balanced view of scepticism forms the core pragmatic refutation of the objective 
certainty of positivism, the stance that we can have certain knowledge of some things. If 
we must accept that in principle we can never absolutely prove anything, then positivism 
makes no sense. This includes all forms of transcendental and foundational philosophy and 
ultimately the entire field of metaphysics/ontology as terminally underdetermined or 
incoherent. Various pragmatists have promoted this aspect to different degrees, but in each 
case, save C.S. Pierce, this has been the fundamental defining feature of pragmatism: 
transcendental or foundational philosophy and the concept of irrefutable certainty of any 
kind, is not considered a useful or valid pursuit. In this sense pragmatism is both 
epistemology and ontology combined, by denying the project of ontological discussion 
outside of experiential, demonstrable knowledge.  
 
This leaves relativism to contend with. Self-proclaimed pragmatist Richard Rorty has 
defined relativism as, “...the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps on any 
topic, is as good as every other” (Rorty 1980: 727). He then dismissed the concept with, 
“No one holds this view. Except for the occasional cooperative freshman, one cannot find 
anybody who says that two incompatible opinions on an important topic are equally good” 
(Rorty 1980: 727). 
 
This is a narrow concept of relativism, however, which is often cast as something of a 
‘straw man’ accusation towards postmodernists: that they stand for nothing by trying to 
stand for everything at once. Relativism can be approached another way though, via social 
constructivism. This is the doctrine that meaning and/or truth are constructed by the society 
or individual (or discipline) in question, such that two different societies, individuals or 
disciplines could genuinely have two equally valid functional or useful truths or realities. 
This doctrine is typically not contentious to any epistemologies except positivistic ones. 
Pragmatism is itself a social constructivist epistemology, as are most (perhaps all) forms of 
postmodernism. Relativism is merely a conflation of two uses of the concept ‘truth’, the 
social and the epistemological. Few pragmatists would contend that what one society or 
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individual believes is true and acts on as true is relative to their own history and 
circumstances, but that this is not the same as the truth that can be demonstrated if two 
societies come together and attempt to resolve which truth is more correct. Regardless of 
one’s ontological stance, one truth, most often a fusion of the original two, will in practice 
be preferred.27  
 
Much of the RoIR literature on actual interdisciplinary research teams consistently shows 
the same process in action (Lyall and Tait 2001; Bruce et al. 2004; Griffin et al. 2006). 
While two disciplines will have their own approach to what is valid evidence and 
interpretation based on the nature of their subject and the history of the discipline, if they 
are brought together on a (successful) interdisciplinary project a single best approach to 
evidence and interpretation must be negotiated in order to produce an integrated result. 
Thompson-Klein has referred to this concept as interdisciplinary ‘bridge building’, and the 
fusion of concepts involved forms a core rationale for communication skills as a 
fundamental feature of interdisciplinarity (Thompson-Klein 1996).  
 
Pragmatism Naturalised: Science and the Two Cultures  
Pragmatism as defined solely by ‘usefulness’ does not specify the means of acquiring or 
testing knowledge; in principle it allows that any culturally preferred means are sufficient 
so long as these do not rely on things which cannot be demonstrated in some way. In most 
cases, however, save for Rorty, this is explicitly or implicitly taken to be some sort of 
empirical method, as we saw in Kimball’s list. The pragmatist who made the most explicit 
analysis of this was W.V.O. Quine. Under the title ‘naturalised epistemology’ Quine 
argued that the only acceptable pragmatic means for demonstrating good knowledge is 
natural science.  
 
Naturalised epistemology takes pragmatism’s denial of foundationalism and 
transcendentalism a step further by stating that epistemology should not be viewed as a 
philosophical project at all, but as an aspect of Psychology (and Sociology), and that the 
rest of human understanding is equally within the realm of the sciences (Quine 1981: 72). 
                                                 
27
 There is considerable research on this process in the anthropological study of syncretism, the blending of 
belief systems, as well as on the blending of linguistic systems to form amalgamated creole and pidgin 
languages to facilitate cross-communication (Baerman 2005). In syncretism the amalgamated belief system 
that ‘works best’ in the new situation will eventually win out, and if the old truth does not hold up to new 
information it will eventually disappear, though typically as a partial and piecemeal fusion, not a 
replacement. This process is not isolated to religious beliefs and languages though, Kuhn’s model of 




In Quine’s words, “[There is] no first philosophy prior to natural science” (Quine 
1981: 67). This step pushes pragmatism past being only a concept of what good knowledge 
is or can be (what is useful), and into a normative model of how good knowledge should be 
produced, governed by the scientific method.28 What this approach to knowledge means 
for interdisciplinarity cannot be overstated, as it suggest a solution to the ‘two cultures’ 
problem. 
 
The perception of a valid epistemological or methodological difference between various 
disciplines is a cornerstone of essentialist approaches to interdisciplinarity. But there is not 
much evidence offered in the literature to justify such a claim. The arguments almost 
universally rest on rhetorical and tacit presumptions of the ‘two cultures’ divide. 
 
Gadamer’s assertion that the ‘methods proper to science’ cannot resolve matters in the 
humanities demonstrates a common presumption in the literature. Historically though, the 
scientific method was developed as a means to foreground irrevocable uncertainty and 
human error, and to develop a system to promote reliability of interpretation given these 
premises, rather than the opposite. “For even those schools of philosophy which held the 
absolute impossibility of knowing anything [scepticism] were not inferior to those which 
took upon them to pronounce [positivism]” (Bacon 1902). The Positivism of the 18th – 
early 20th centuries, which has been a target of much postmodern resistance to ‘scientism’, 
was historically a backlash against the scientific method and its denial of absolute 
knowledge (Talbot 2010: 16). 
 
In a recent study of interdisciplinarity between the Political and Biological Sciences, Justin 
Greaves and Wyn Grant proposed that there should be no strong perception of 
epistemological distinction between the subjects:  
 
“We advocate a move away from the traditional ‘ontology, epistemology, 
methodology’ framework towards a more philosophical notion of ‘justified 
belief’. A shared understanding of what this entails across the disciplines 
could be the ultimate goal in allowing truly interdisciplinary research to 
succeed” (Greaves and Grant 2010: 325). 
  
                                                 
28
 It is worth noting that naturalized epistemology was developed as a realist ontology, with the presumption 
that the objective world does exist independent of our observations. Quine did not consider this an analytic or 
foundational certainty, but a pragmatically derived assumption because the realist view works best 
empirically (Gibson 1988: 44). This assumption is not strictly necessary though, and it is more in keeping 
with the rest of the pragmatic tradition not to presume realism, only the functional appearance of Realism. As 
we will see more in the next chapter, this allows naturalised pragmatism to support many aspects of 
sociocultural models of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, provided these are empirically derived. 
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Greaves and Grant noted that the ‘two cultures’ divide was a common assumption of 
participants in their study, taking the form that the natural sciences use experiments, while 
the social sciences use observational methods (Greaves and Grant 2010: 326). Theyfound 
though, that the first thing their Political Studies participants learned on actually working 
with Biologists was that what was meant by ‘an experiment’ was much more broad and 
flexible than they had expected. In fact, much of what political scientists were doing 
appeared to fit into what the natural sciences considered a valid experiment (Greaves and 
Grant 2010: 327).30 
 
The core notions of the scientific method and the reasons for creating it were 
straightforward. Francis Bacon identified in 1620 what he called ‘idols’, which were 
aspects of the human condition that prevented clear and reliable knowledge from 
happening. Some were external, coming from prior knowledge. These were, according to 
Bacon, difficult to eliminate, but they could be with effort. Some, however, were 
intellectual, aspects of the flawed human mind and perception itself, and these could never 
be entirely removed: 
 
“For let men please themselves as they will in admiring and almost adoring 
the human mind, this is certain: that as an uneven mirror distorts the rays of 
objects according to its own figure and section, so the mind, when it receives 
impressions of objects through the sense, cannot be trusted to report them 
truly, but in forming its notions mixes up its own nature with the nature of 
things” (Bacon 1902). 
 
Bacon listed 128 aphorisms describing these distortions, which were mostly a list of what 
we now recognise as cognitive biases, logical fallacies and postmodern uncertainty. He 
specified for example, that language was insufficient to make meaning entirely clear, that 
prior knowledge cannot be prevented from effecting observation and interpretation, or that 
a theory once made causes other observations to conform to it (Bacon 1988).  
 
                                                 
30
 There are two caveats to use of Greaves and Grant’s study. The scope of their discussion does not extend 
to ‘hard’ sciences such as Physics or Chemistry, applied fields such as Engineering or Medicine, the 
humanities or the fine arts, so we may commit an individualistic fallacy (presuming that a specific case 
speaks for a more general class of things) if this is extended without seeking more evidence. Further, it is not 
clear that the distinction between epistemology and ‘justified belief’ is coherent. The study of epistemology 
is the study of ‘justified belief’ or ‘justified true belief’, which is taken to be the best description of what it 
means to ‘know’ something (Steup 2005; Truncellito n.d.). For something to qualify as knowledge for 
epistemologists it must: be something that a person believes is true in some way; there must be some 
justification for this belief such as evidence, logic, scripture, etc.; the justified belief must be ‘true’. Most of 
the discussion within epistemology centres around the specific meaning and context of these conditions, 




To mitigate (not eliminate) these idols Bacon called for a new approach to knowledge 
construction. There were four elements:  
 
1. Knowledge must come first from sensory observation, not logic. Although prior 
knowledge in the form of idols could not be entirely removed, no a priori 
assumptions should be intentionally made,  
2. Sensory observation was to be collected into ‘natural histories’, which were 
datasets from which theory could be developed, 
3. Due to the idols, simple observation was unreliable so detailed experiments were 
required to limit the chances for error, “a kind of experiments much subtler and 
simpler than those which occur accidentally” (Bacon 1902). 
4. Even experiments by one person were far too prone to the idols, so the process 
needed to be recorded in detail and checked by others, “Moreover, whenever I 
come to a new experiment of any subtlety (though it be in my own opinion certain 
and approved), I nevertheless subjoin a clear account of the manner in which I 
made it, that men, knowing exactly how each point was made out, may see whether 
there be any error…” (Bacon 1902). 
 
These established the modern academic practices of methodological description and peer-
review, practices which were put into wider academic practice by the Royal Society in the 
later 17th century following Bacon’s model (Talbot 2010: 13). The most important aspect 
of this for interdisciplinarity is that Bacon explicitly stated that it applied to the liberal arts 
as well, just as peer-review applies across all academic practice now (Bacon 1902). The 
scientific method was designed to apply to any and all scholarly pursuits, and did not 
recognise ‘two cultures’ or disciplinarity as a barrier. Not only did the scientific method 
precede 20th century criticisms of both positivistic and sceptical philosophies (though many 
of these have substantially refined or added to our understanding of Bacon’s criticisms), it 
is inherently constructivist, and acknowledges intersubjective consensus via replication and 
peer-review as the only means to produce reliable knowledge. The scientific method is not 
a positivist epistemology.  
 
As it regards the scientific methods as the best approach to knowledge, naturalised 
pragmatism also must not recognise the science/humanism divide. This simple 
understanding of the nature of the scientific method effectively eliminates one of the most 
substantial and often cited barriers to interdisciplinarity, and states that any definition or 
curriculum model for interdisciplinarity which relies on the existence of such a divide is 
demonstrably misleading and counterproductive- that is, less useful. Further, this may 
show a more practical and effective path for developing better mutual understanding 
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communication between disparate subjects: a shared core language of the scientific 
method.31  
 
Holism, Reductionism and Interdisciplinarity as ‘Greater than the Sum of 
Parts’ 
In the previous chapter we looked at one of the main ‘betterness’ claims for 
interdisciplinarity, that it produces ‘indivisible’ solutions which are greater than the sum of 
their parts, and cannot be reduced to mere collections of disciplinary inputs (Newell 2001; 
Thompson-Klein 2004; Boix-Mansilla and Duraising 2007; Repko 2008). In pragmatic 
terms this should qualify as a good justification of the greater usefulness of 
interdisciplinarity (and in particular certain essentialists definitions of it), because the claim 
appears to address the problem of underdetermination by indicating why an 
interdisciplinary solution is the best solution. This is true, however, only if the concept of 
indivisibility or greater than the sum of parts holds up to scrutiny.  
 
There appears to be some precedent within the pragmatic literature to support such a claim. 
Quine, in particular, took issue with the principle of reductionism, which he presumed to 
be a core aspect of positivistic claims of certainty of knowledge. Reductionism is the idea 
that the nature of things can be understood by taking any whole apart into constituent 
elements: reducing it. As an epistemological principle, reductionism says this should be 
infinitely possible, that we can eventually reduce all things to simpler explainable parts, 
and then by recombining these we can invariably explain the whole. At this purely 
theoretical level it is clearly a positivistic principle, though as with relativism, scepticism, 
and positivism, what is possible in theory and what is possible in practice are not the same 
thing.  
 
Quine’s response to reductionism was what he called holism. “[Holism] says that scientific 
statements are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly 
as a theory that they imply their observable consequences” (Quine 1969: 313). Quine’s 
argument for this is supported by the claim that due to underdetermination no theory is 
susceptible to being refuted by refuting individual aspects of it because we can always 
                                                 
31
 Not in the sense of a uniform method, approach or interpretive model at the subject matter or disciplinary 
level, but in the sense that all academic knowledge is made so by adherence to the principleprinciples of 
critical awareness for achieving intersubjectively reliable knowledge. At the subject matter level it is clear 
that we cannot get the same type of information about the world from a quark and a medieval charter, nor 
should we use the same type of practice to study them, but at a hierarchically more abstracted level we can 
and should recognise the same method, and this means that at some level there should be a common source 
for understanding: a Rosetta Stone of interdisciplinarity. 
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change the truth value of another aspect to keep the theory alive. This is a dark side of the 
principle of underdetermination; it is applied to justify any theory as true because we can 
just keep changing the meaning of other parts of the theory. Epistemologist Karl Popper’s 
simple answer was that this sort of ad hoc change demonstrates a non-theory, something 
that cannot be tested and therefore has no useful truth value in itself (Popper 1992: 81). I 
would describe this instead as demonstrating a new theory in each case, which must be 
tested again by new means. Contrary to Quine, the original theory has been effectively 
refuted by refuting a part of it because that theory was a sum of all of its parts: removing 
or changing one changes the theory.32  
 
The example that Quine gives is the theory ‘water boils at 212 degrees’. If we test this and 
find that the water boils at 214, we have not, according to Quine, refuted the theory 
because the water may not be pure, the altitude may be wrong or the equipment may be 
faulty, rather than of the statement ‘water boils at 212 degrees’ being incorrect. Popper 
stated that these conditions become ad hoc extensions to the theory, and that although a 
small number of these do not make a theory unusable, more than a few make it impossible 
for a theory to ever be wrong, and therefore it explains nothing because it could explain 
anything. I would say that the original theory has been effectively refuted, it said ‘water 
boils at 212 degrees’: end of story. Clearly that was not the end of the story; that theory 
was wrong. A new theory which is more nuanced may be more correct. Quine’s attempt to 
refute reductionism has only led to the paradox that no theory can be validated and no 
theory can be falsified.  
 
This offers solid epistemological grounds on which to deny claims of irreducible 
complexity of interdisciplinary projects, or that interdisciplinary solutions cannot be 
reduced to the sum of their parts, thereby weakening another essentialist approach to 
interdisciplinarity. By failing to support holism, reductionism remains a valid theoretical 
model for approaching interdisciplinarity. While it is true to say that interdisciplinarity is 
not merely the collection of disciplinary inputs, we can attempt to carefully and empirically 
reduce interdisciplinary operations to filter what part is not accounted for by the disciplines 
functioning independently, and this should help identify what actually makes up 
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 I propose that reductionism be considered as a fourth theoretical foil of pragmatism (along with scepticism, 
positivism and relativism); another thought-experiment tool to ensure that theories do not over-reach 
themselves and approach foundationalism or transcendentalism. Holism then becomes merely a practically 
expedient concept, not foundational reality. That is to say it is certainly impractical in normal circumstances 
to reduce an interdisciplinary solution to its constituent elements, but there is no foundational basis for 
suggesting that we cannot do so.  
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interdisciplinarity itself. Much of the RoIR literature suggests that the unaccounted for 
parts may be time and the contribution of integrative skills (Griffin et al. 2006; Capper 
2009). These are by definition something additional. An interdisciplinary solution may 
produce a greater understanding than a multi-disciplinary or disciplinary solution, but it is 
not greater than the sum of its parts, it simply contains extra parts.  
 
Limitations of Naturalised Pragmatism 
One of the main arguments against naturalised pragmatism is that it is itself 
underdetermined, in the sense that that we cannot ever achieve a ‘view from nowhere’ or 
actual status as an outside observer of science, and therefore we cannot verify science as 
the best of all methods except by using science to verify itself. The argument states, quite 
rightly, that our observations are always relative to our situation and therefore circularly 
underdetermined unless we can refer to a transcendental or foundational source of 
knowledge. The answer from pragmatism is simple: this sort of underdetermination is 
preferable in any case where the only option is foundationalism or transcendentalism, 
because these are even more underdetermined.  
 
Quine invokes the analogy of ‘Neurath’s boat’, “I see philosophy and science as in the 
same boat – a boat which…we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no 
external vantage point, no first philosophy” (Quine 1951: 126-7 cited in Gibson 1988: 24). 
The tools in the boat are not perfect, but we have no better. If a better tool appears, we 
should use it, but wishing after tools not in the boat will not fix it. This is the distinction 
between justified and unjustified underdetermination. Natural science is considered a 
justified underdetermination, because there are no more effective tools available.33 Many 
of the theories of interdisciplinarity in the literature, however, such as historically-based 
and interview-based definitions, are unjustified underdeterminations because there are 
many more tools in the boat which are better and are not being used.  
 
Summary 
As a theoretical framework for this thesis, pragmatism states that the conditions for 
answering the research questions are that they be shown to be useful or effective, based on 
reliable sources, and that some attempt be made to show how they might be more so than 
other solutions. Notably the demonstration of usefulness in this case can only be 
approached in a comparative or hypothetical manner, because the model that would need to 
                                                 
33
 Most pragmatists do acknowledge that a better system than science could be possible, or at least that we 
must allow for this possibility. 
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ultimately be tested is the outcome of the thesis. As such, the focus here will be to build the 
definitions and curriculum models for interdisciplinarity from strong empirical evidence, to 
attempt to demonstrate the comparatively less effective status of other approaches, and to 
demonstrate that the solutions offered can be useful or effective by triangulating them with 
the interviews of practice in Medieval Studies.  
 
In terms of interdisciplinarity itself, pragmatism undermines the validity of 
epistemologically founded essentialist definitions such as the ‘two cultures’ by denying the 
possibility of a positivist basis for the sciences in one hand, and in the other denying a 
relativist basis for the humanities and social sciences. Taking this further, naturalised 
pragmatism adopts the scientific method as the foundation of all useful understanding or 
development of good knowledge. A historical review of the original meanings of the 
scientific method reveal it to be more postmodern than positivistic, and as Greaves and 
Grant have found, it is applicable over a much wider range of subjects than typically 
presumed. The scientific method, as both constructivist and empirical, underpins all 
academic practice, and offers a possibility for a unifying language for interdisciplinarity. 
 
Finally, the principle of holism and the claim of interdisciplinary as ‘greater than the sum 
of parts’ was evaluated and found lacking. Nothing is ‘greater than the sum of parts’, some 
parts are simply not obvious or are hard to isolate. Holism fails to justify how anything can 
be irreducible, as interdisciplinary outcomes are often claimed to be in the HTRoI 
tradition. This opens an epistemological basis for attempting to isolate what 




Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
As was briefly mentioned in the introduction, this thesis has evolved significantly to where 
the final project only resembles the original proposal in that both pertain to 
interdisciplinarity in the curriculum in some way. This came about when doing the 
background reading on interdisciplinarity for the original proposed thesis on developing 
interdisciplinary curricula for undergraduate Medieval Studies. Initially I had expected to 
critically review a selection of the most well-received literature on interdisciplinary 
learning and teaching, and to choose the model or approach that was most convincing to 
base an analysis of interviews with medievalists around. The interviews were then to be 
my chief, and in fact only, data source, with the majority of the thesis devoted to deep 
analysis of these. The interview questions were initially designed to be broad and rich 
enough to allow for this level of analysis. At that stage I had no more than a passing 
interest in psychological research on matters relating to interdisciplinarity.  
 
The outcomes of the literature review of interdisciplinarity, however, led to what I felt was 
a necessary change of the focus of the thesis. I was struck at first by two accounts of the 
nature of interdisciplinarity, the empirical cognitive analysis of Svetlana Nikitina (2005), 
and the psychology of expertise account of Rainer Bromme (2000). I presumed that I had 
located an empirical foundation of interdisciplinarity to use for my research. Unfortunately 
neither article provided a rich or complete approach to interdisciplinarity in itself, and 
further I had concerns with some of the sources of evidence in parts of each. Searching for 
more development of either of these approaches only led to the increasingly strong 
conclusion that these were isolated and atypical examples of good pragmatic approaches to 
the subject. Neither article has been substantially referred to or developed since. Instead I 
encountered ever more rhetorical and ill-evidenced accounts of interdisciplinarity, along 
with the aforementioned surprising lack of engagement with learning and teaching research. 
I realised at this point that my thesis needed to change directions and look at 
interdisciplinarity directly if I ever hoped to be able to come back to my original research 
questions about Medieval Studies with a pragmatically well justified and useful concept of 
what interdisciplinarity was and how it might work in the curriculum.  
 
Throughout my literature review on interdisciplinarity, concepts such as expertise, 
collaboration, knowledge transfer, academic qualifications, and categorisation appeared 
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intermittently but frequently, and there was certainly a lot of discussion of disciplinarity as 
well. There seemed to be, however, a substantial disconnect between the colloquial, tacit 
understandings of these as they appeared in the RoI literature, and engagement with 
empirical research on these topics in a critical manner, which did not appear in the 
literature. Consistently, though often implicitly, these topics appear in the literature on 
interdisciplinarity (and disciplinarity) with a tacit presumption of the self-evident nature of 
particular views on them, such as:  
 
• That humans do or do not naturally need to categorise knowledge in certain ways 
(Weingart 2000; Thompson-Klein 2004; Taylor 2009; Nicolescu 2012; Barrett 
2012).  
• That disciplines relate in some way to ‘expertise’ (Biglan 1973a; Newell and Green, 
W. 1982; Trowler et al. 2012). 
• That knowledge either can or cannot be transferred between areas (Thompson-
Klein 1996; Moran 2010; Newell 2010).  
• That disciplinary categorisation is a product of and/or producer of academic social 
identity (Becher 1989; Anderson and Hounsell 2007; Bamber 2012b; Trowler 
2012b).  
 
Consistent with the pragmatic goals of promoting utility and avoiding underdetermination, 
closing these gaps in the literature to define and implement interdisciplinarity in a more 
consistent, reliable, and useful way is the chief concern of this thesis. My hypothesis was 
that if a concept was fundamental enough to be discussed consistently as a justification for 
how interdisciplinarity works, then there may already be a research community dedicated 
to that subject, one which was not being engaged with but which may provide more 
definitive evidence for one theory over another. In the case of each topic listed above, this 
is indeed the case. There have been thriving communities of research in each field, mostly 
under the broad umbrella of empirical psychology, for at least several decades. When I 
became aware of this, the core focus of my thesis shifted to examining these fields for what 
they might say in reliable and empirical ways about interdisciplinarity. 
 
After this change in focus I considered the value of the planned interviews and decided that 
they still represented a very important and useful pragmatic source of evidence, though 
they could no longer be considered the main source of evidence for the thesis. The focus 
on a single field was too narrow and the experience of the participants could not be 
assumed to be generalizable. The goal of the interviews became then to test the theories 
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developed from the other sources against the practical wisdom of the participants in terms 
of learning and teaching within medieval studies. 
 
As the previous chapter has elaborated, the ‘theoretical framework’ that I have worked in 
for this thesis is that of pragmatism, as ontology, epistemology and methodological 
superstructure.34 I have not selected pragmatism because I feel it is the best framework for 
understanding this area of research, or because it best highlights the elements of 
interdisciplinarity I wish to examine. I have selected it because I feel that it is the most 
demonstrably effective approach for any academic work, in any field. The naturalised 
pragmatic criteria for whether my methodology is justified lie in whether or not the 
solutions to my research questions (definitions of interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity, and 
my recommendations of curricula for developing the former): 
 
• Are (or at this stage appear to be) useful and effective,  
• Are well demonstrated as such in a critical manner, and  
• Do not appear to be unjustifiably underdetermined.  
 
The last point means that as part of my methodology it is necessary to examine proposed 
counter-evidence or counter-theories. In the chapters to come there will be attention paid to 
whether alternate approaches to the evidence presented are or are not well justified (as 
much as space permits, in all cases there could be more of this done, however). 
 
Literature Reviews: Secondary Data as Primary Source 
The main data source for this thesis is a critical secondary analysis of the empirical 
findings on disciplinarity, expertise, knowledge transfer, academic qualifications, 
collaborative cognition, and categorisation. To do original primary data collection in each 
of these fields would clearly exceed the scope of a single thesis, and would still require a 
literature review of each subject as well. Furthermore it would require a level of expertise 
in each of these fields that exceeds my own. My intention is not to supersede the 
importance of doing further primary research in these fields which is more specifically 
focused on interdisciplinarity, but to highlight unexplored potential of connections between 
these fields and to develop the links that future primary work could address. This said, the 
reviews here are focused on revealing reliable empirical studies which can relate to 
                                                 
34
 This is considering ‘theoretical framework’ as broad notion of the ontology, epistemology and 
methodology of a research project, not as it is sometimes regarded as a much more specific social-theoretical 
model to based data analysis on. 
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interdisciplinarity. The following three chapters (4, 5, 6) are therefore regarded as the 
primary sources of evidence in this thesis, even though the data itself is secondary in 
relation to interdisciplinarity (i.e. it was not gathered with the intent to define or test 
interdisciplinarity). 
 
In addition to developing a notion of interdisciplinarity which is empirically founded, and 
therefore more reliably useful in practice, a pragmatic approach necessitates that we 
attempt to minimalise the underdetermination of any conclusions we make. For this reason 
it is important to search for and consider any alternate theories or opposition to the 
evidence, rather than merely compiling ever more examples of successful experiments or 
trials (presuming there are at least a few of these, of course). It is essential to demonstrate 
that reasonable attempts have been made to see if other theories work better or just as well 
as the ones offered as ‘better’ or ‘best’. This has been one of the most substantial failings 
of both pluralistic and competency based interdisciplinarity. 
 
As such, I have made some effort to find models or theories which appear oppositional to 
the mainstream research in the chapters that follow, and consider how strong these 
arguments may be. As before when regarding interdisciplinarity theories, I will refrain 
from selecting oppositional views which are very old or which do not appear to have any 
significant support. Not all of the topics in the next few chapters have prominent examples 
of oppositional theories. For example, in expertise research there are definitely divergent 
strands of theory, however, in categorisation research much of what might be seen as 
oppositional is more commonly viewed as supplementary within the field. 
 
Method 
Each of the literature reviews that follow was begun by first locating more than one 
existing recent literature review or subject overview by established experts in the field.36 
This was in order to become familiar with the main themes and players, identify points of 
open debate and contention (between theories and also between literature reviews), to get 
an initial grasp of the level of intra-subject language and complexity, and to identify the 
first set of empirical studies to review in more detail. In some cases this was relatively 
straightforward, such as expertise research. Here there are several recent and thorough 
literature reviews which largely agree, major theories and players were easy to identify, 
                                                 
36
 In fact, merely those who appeared to be experts as I could not make an informed judgement about such 
things until after reviewing the literature. 
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and the technical language of the field was clear and easy to acquire given my background 
in psychology.  
 
By contrast the study of knowledge transfer was more disjointed. There was no clearly 
coherent research community, therefore good literature reviews were difficult to find. Most 
sources here had to be discovered through connections to research in other areas. 
Conversely, categorisation research has many thorough literature reviews, but the intra-
subject technical language is relatively daunting, including a wide array of specialised 
terms and concepts which are often not clearly defined, as well as a considerable amount of 
probability mathematics and computer modelling. My background in computer 
programming was helpful, but deciphering the mathematics aspect of this field was 
difficult, and I admit that my understanding remains limited. It became clear, however, that 
this aspect was not critical as the maths would only be necessary in order to calculate 
similar categorisation probabilities, not for a deep understanding of the subject at a 
theoretical level.  
 
Collaboration is very widely published over many subjects, making a single thorough 
literature review beyond the scope of this thesis. The review of research in this field was 
focused therefore on publications which appeared to tie in specifically with 
interdisciplinarity or disciplinarity, particularly in academic or academic-like settings, and 
which took a predominantly psychological and empirical perspective. I acknowledge that 
such an approach may exclude more distal oppositional models by pre-selecting research 
which appeared to be in line with the research I am doing. Some effort has been made 
within the time and space available to look outside of these limits to see if any such 
contradictions are apparent, but a more extensive search would not be unwelcome. 
 
The secondary data reviews encompass the next three chapters (4, 5, and 6).The first of 
these chapters is a literature review of the research on the nature of disciplinarity in the 
same format as the review of interdisciplinarity, by identifying groupings or trends in the 
research and considering the most influential standpoints on the topic in terms of evidence 
provided. The next two chapters, on expertise and on categorisation, follow a different 
format. First I will review the foundations and evidence for the mainstream theories in 
each field. Then I will consider any significant opposition that appeared in my research. 
Finally, I will consider some of the connections that the subjects have to disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. I will only scratch the surface of these connections at this stage, 




Limitations of Secondary Data as a Method 
Using reviews of empirical literature as a research method is effectively utilising secondary 
data, something that is becoming increasingly common in research as more data is created 
and recorded for future use, but it is not without limits and caveats on its application 
(Smith 2008). The first obvious limitation of this method is that the original research was 
not directed at the research questions of this thesis. Connections must therefore be 
extrapolated/triangulated between the data and my research questions, which require an 
additional level of interpretation and abstraction. This could be done insufficiently or in 
error. 
 
Next, I have not typically had access to complete original data sets or to all aspects of 
methodology used from start to finish. There may have been parts of the data trimmed off 
or there may have been statistical methods used to normalise the data which were not 
considered worth mentioning in the final report. Further, the data presented in most papers 
is aggregated, coded, and interpreted. Aspects of the raw data that were not germane to the 
research questions of the original authors, which were therefore cut from the reporting, 
may be critical to my own questions, but I would not know (Smith 2008). 
 
It is in recognising these limitations that my approach has been to focus on the apparent 
reliability of the research as presented, and only then to determine the potential relation to 
interdisciplinarity, rather than to presume validity based on more superficial indicators 
such as citation ratings, author reputation or prestige of the source publication (Hart 1998). 
This deep critical approach to source reliability is one of the hallmark skills of historians, 
and my prior training in this field has been invaluable in this regard. 
 
Further it is not possible in the space here to fully elaborate on the details and reliability of 
each study which is pertinent in the sections below. Although I will make a point to 
describe the studies and to refer to the results rather than the authors’ analyses to some 
degree, I will only go into considerable detail on a few more instrumental studies. 
 
Secondary Data and Competency Interdisciplinarity 
Given the nature of this investigation and my criticisms of competency approaches to 
interdisciplinarity, it seems fitting to justify the choice of ‘interdisciplinary’ secondary data 
analysis as a chief methodology (lest this thesis appear hypocritical of its own conclusions). 
The justification lies in the amount of time invested in study of the relevant subjects; I have 
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more than surface-level prior training in each of the fields necessary to undertake this 
project. Further, the limits that different degrees of prior training place on how far one can 
take solitary ‘interdisciplinary’ work has been explicitly considered. This is effectively a 
question of the difference between interdisciplinarity and polymathery (if there is one), 
which is a matter that will be covered more in the discussion (chapter 8), after other 
evidence has been accrued. At this stage it is merely important to highlight the nature of 
my effective background in the relevant fields. 
 
For my own credentials, I have trained as a medieval historian and interdisciplinary 
medieval researcher at the undergraduate and postgraduate level. Not only does this give 
me perspective as an entry-level insider for my interviews in the field, but historical 
research, especially medieval, develops the practice of critical source analysis as its chief 
methodological focus. My training in these fields also included substantial interdisciplinary 
work, in which this skill was focused explicitly on application across various disciplinary 
source types. Further, I am a mature student and have spent an equivalent of three or more 
years of full time study in undergraduate psychology prior to studying history.37 This 
surely does not grant me the expertise to conduct primary research in this field at the 
doctorate level, but it does provide the necessary disciplinary enculturation to read and 
evaluate psychology-based research (Collins and Evans 2007). Where this background 
differs from competency models of interdisciplinarity is in both the amount of time spent 
in focused development of each skill as well as the explicit awareness of the limitations of 
practice that the relative levels of training engender. My advanced training in critical 
source evaluation and at least novitiate training in psychology provide the levels of 
expertise necessary to undertake this methodology. But without each of these backgrounds 
I would not feel justified in doing so, and I would not attempt to extend this to subjects I do 
not have this training in (e.g. chemistry, maths, or economics). 
 
Interviews in Medieval Studies 
In order to connect the broad empirical work across multiple fields covered in chapters 4 
thru 6 to actual practice in an HE environment, the interviews which were once the core of 
the thesis serve now as an important corner of triangulation: connecting theory and practice 
and helping to demonstrate the utility that is so essential to a good pragmatic solution. 
Before addressing the methodology used to look at ideas of interdisciplinarity in Medieval 
                                                 
37
 I hold no formal degree in psychology largely due to the study being split over many institutions while 
serving in the military. Problems with transferring credits between institutions would have required re-taking 
nearly half of the courses in order to be accredited. 
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Studies though, it is important to establish what Medieval Studies entails. This involves 
considering briefly ‘what is medieval?’, as well as which disciplines/fields traditionally 
make up the field of Medieval Studies from which the interviews were conducted. 
 
Defining the Medieval  
What is or is not medieval is most often defined by a particular period and region: Europe 
and its near neighbours between roughly 500-1500AD, however, this simple definition is 
highly contentious in a number of ways, and is also not very useful for considering 
problems of research, learning and teaching, or disciplinarity. A recent collection by Celia 
Chazelle and Felice Lifshitz, Paradigms & Methods in Early Medieval Studies,  does an 
excellent job of introducing what typically isolates the medieval period, and more 
importantly in what ways it is not isolated, in terms of research and methods (Chazelle and 
Lifshitz 2007). The defining factors are relative type, quantity and quality of sources 
compared to other places and times. The following is a synopsis of their account:   
 
At the start of the medieval period we have the fall of Rome in much of Europe, and with it 
came a number of changes. Research sources of all types, textual, material and artistic 
became much more scarce. Writing appeared less and less in imperial Latin and more in 
ecclesiastical Latin or the emerging vernacular scripts. Christianity rapidly became the 
dominant faith and the church became the administrative power throughout much of the 
area. Feudalism(s) began to replace Roman systems of government. The focus of attention 
for researchers shifts then from Rome and Roman things to the 'barbarian' indigenous 
peoples.Critically though, the changes were uneven, and happened in different areas at 
different times, some barely ever having felt the influence of Rome to start with, and some 
never fully losing it.  
 
Chazelle and Lifshitz were concerned chiefly with early medieval studies, but if we look to 
the approximate end of the period we see a similar set of changes in reverse. From the 
middle of the 15th century (the printing press) up through the end of the 16th (the 
Reformation), most of the previous unifying factors of medieval research are replaced with 
early modern institutions. The handwritten manuscript, which requires training in 
palaeography to make sense of, rapidly gives way to the printed word, and with this an 
increase in literacy changes the culture of textual transmission and use as well. Where the 
early medieval period was marked off by the hegemony of the Holy Roman church, the 
Reformation ends this. Feudalism(s) begin giving way to the rapid rise of modern nation-
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states, an emerging strong middle class, and cities. But just as with the beginning of the 
period, so too at the end these changes were not at all uniform. The rise of humanism, the 
Reformation, the emergence of cities all took place at very different rates and in different 
ways in different areas of Europe. Some changed drastically long before others, such as the 
Dutch Republic, and some held out against such changes until very late, such as the 
Western Isles of Scotland. 
 
What this hopefully makes clear is that medieval studies, while having a strongly unifying 
range of types of sources, scarcity of sources, cultural anachronism, focus of interest and 
methodological requirements for making interpretations from these, a definition of the area 
of study by dates or locations is almost meaningless. Late antique research and early 
medieval research in many cases overlap in both time and place for several hundred years, 
and the same can be said of late medieval and early modern. Moreover, as Chazelle and 
Lifshitz also point out, there are clear differences in types and amounts of sources even 
within the medieval period which separate the study of early medieval from late medieval, 
each using different goals and methods yet again. While this 'internal' divide is highly 
recognised and well supported, typically there is greater unity of goals and methods 
between the two than disunity.  
 
Cognate Disciplines 
Which disciplines make up medieval studies? History, Literature, Art History and 
Archaeology surely, but also commonly Law (as Jurisprudence), Religion, Music and 
Philosophy. In each of these cases, however, a different name can be applied, by first 
removing the unsignified common denominator, history, specifically medieval. 'History' as 
a separate study is a misnomer to include in this list; all of these studies are historical, each 
asking slightly different questions of the past, but often using the same sources. If we do 
this we can better express each of these disciplines as: Medieval text as Non-fiction, 
Medieval text as Fiction, Medieval Arts, Medieval Material Culture, Medieval 
Jurisprudence, Medieval Faith & Belief. Certainly within each of these there are a myriad 
possible specialisations, some of which have developed into disciplines of their own in 
some places. Expressed more mathematically the result can be shown as: Medieval 
(Fiction, Non-fiction, Material Culture, Arts, Law, Religion and Philosophy), which might 
further be reduced to Medieval (Culture and Society). A better way to say this might be 
Medieval Socio-Cultural Studies, so as to differentiate it from geology, botany and other 
fields of study which are not expressly concerned with human matters, but may look at 
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sources from the same period.38 For practical purposes of timeframe and comparability, I 
chose to focus my interviews on the largest four of the disciplines above (History, Art 
History, Literature, Archaeology). 
 
Limitations of Interviews as a Method 
Pragmatically speaking, interviews with practitioners from a single field or small set of 
disciplines cannot be used, themselves, to define interdisciplinarity or to demonstrate a 
reliable effective approach to it. Such a subset of practice is insufficient to develop a model 
of interdisciplinarity that is not highly and very unjustifiably underdetermined. Although 
my interviews with medievalists could indeed produce a pragmatically valid model of 
interdisciplinarity and associated curricula specifically within Medieval Studies as 
practiced in Scotland, there is no reason to presume, and many reasons not to presume, that 
this cannot be generalised to a wider disciplinary or geographical audience.  
 
As evidence the interviews are neither an unnecessary add-on to the thesis, nor are they a 
evidence which should be considered continuous and equivalent to secondary research 
reviews. Rather they are an essential pragmatic extension of the development of a model of 
interdisciplinarity into the realm of praxis within a specific field/discipline. The two 
sources of evidence, that of the synthesis of secondary data and that of the interviews, 
share a uni-directional connection; the empirical evidence from the literature reviews feeds 
directly into the analysis of the interviews in terms of developing practical and effective 
curricula of interdisciplinarity, but I do not believe that the interviews can justifiably feed 
directly back into developing a definition of interdisciplinarity due to the same 
misspecified identification of expertise problems present in Biglan’s study of the 
disciplines: disciplinary experts who do interdisciplinary work cannot be assumed to be 
experts on interdisciplinarity in general. This represents a substantial departure from much 
of the current practice in much interdisciplinarity research (Lattuca 2001, 2004; 
Huutoniemi et al. 2012). The interview data can, in fact must, feed back into the 
development of a definition of interdisciplinarity in some sense though, but in a pragmatic 
framework it must only do so only abductively as hypothesis development, not as direct 
evidence of the nature of interdisciplinarity itself. This distinction is not merely sophistry, 
but is a critical aspect of the research design.  
 
                                                 
38
 Of course there is interplay between humans and both geology and botany though, but there is a linguistic 
barrier of mathematics and techniques of the natural sciences which likely stands in the way here for most 
medievalists, excepting perhaps archaeologists and possibly some art historians (concerned with plant and 
rock origins of dyes and pigments). 
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For example, rather than give primacy to the fact that the interview results suggest several 
different concepts of interdisciplinarity (which might suggest pluralism if viewed from a 
more relativistic framework), I take this to mean only that no consensus on the term exists 
in practice any more than in theory and that the question therefore does not lead directly to 
a useful pragmatic solution. Instead, I have compared the narrow set of interviews to the 
concepts of interdisciplinarity that have emerged from the broader reviews of expertise, 
categorisation, and disciplinarity to see if there is any correlation. Indeed, beneath the 
surface level of non-consensus definitions there is a clear pattern in the interviews, which 
is strikingly similar to the notions of interdisciplinarity that expertise and categorisation 
research suggest, and which are further triangulated by being very similar to the results of 
similar interviews made in the RoIR literature (Bruce et al. 2004; Griffin et al. 2006). In 
this way the framing and analysis of the interviews are approached to help reduce 
underdetermination and broaden overall utility of the solutions to the research questions, 
instead of enhancing underdetermination and narrowing utility as would be the case if they 
stood alone as a defining factor. 
 
Method 
I interviewed a number of academics who are active in some way with teaching or 
researching medieval topics at each of Scotland’s four universities which offer 
postgraduate study and research in ‘Medieval Studies’. These individuals ranged across a 
wide array of specialist topics of interest, and the entire range of the medieval period, from 
late antiquity (~300-500AD) through to late Renaissance (~1500-1600AD). An attempt 
was made to balance the number of participants evenly across each university, as well as to 
get equal representation from each of the chief cognate areas within Medieval Studies. 
Neither of these goals were perfectly achieved. Though the numbers across universities 
were roughly balanced, balancing the ‘home’ disciplines of the participants proved far 
more problematic. Aside from a simple lack of response from some individuals, it became 
apparent that the disciplines were not themselves balanced across the universities (for 
example one university featured several medieval-focused archaeologists, while another 
did not include medieval archaeology in its curriculum at all). Further complicating this 
issue was that many of the individuals interviewed were listed under a particular subject, 
but professed allegiance elsewhere or no preference at all. This was not unexpected. Indeed, 
this is the sort of finding I hoped to uncover. The criteria for balance was only intended as 





Within Scotland only four universities of the total 19 offer significant postgraduate study 
in Medieval Studies by that name, and only one currently offers undergraduate coursework 
also under this heading (Universities Scotland 2014). These four are Glasgow, St Andrews, 
Edinburgh and Aberdeen (the four ‘ancient’ universities of Scotland). These also represent 
four of the five research intensive universities of Scotland (the fifth being Dundee). Each is 
a member of the Russell Group. 
 
Although focusing on these institutions is clearly limiting in the sense of a wider 
discussion of interdisciplinarity (and is part of the reason that this thesis has focused on 
other sources before the interviews), it is both necessary and sufficient for a discussion of 
potential and existing interdisciplinarity in undergraduate Medieval Studies, owing that 
other universities do not currently possess the staff or structure to address the issue. This is 
not to say they could not or should not at a later date, however. 
 
The final demographics of the interviews were: 
 
Female: 9 
Male:     8 
University of St Andrews: 6 
University of Aberdeen:    4 
University of Edinburgh:   3 
University of Glasgow:      4 
History:         4 
Art History:   3 
Archaeology: 3 
Literature:      7 
3.1 Interview Demographics  
 
It is essential to note that the designation by subject here is only based on the subjects 
under which each participant was located or identified with most. When asked how they 
would identify themselves academically the responses were not so clear. Each of the art 
historians and archaeologists identified clearly with the subject, but often also indicated a 
strong degree of overlap with other disciplines. Of the historians and literary scholars only 
one clearly identified as only one of these, and this participant also identified as a 
‘medievalist’. Most of the historians and literary scholars instead identified as both history 
and literature concurrently, as having alternated between the two at different times, as 
medievalists, by what department they were employed by, or by the specialist focus of 
their primary research interests. 
 
Drawing on critical reviews of survey methodology, I asked some questions which 
intentionally revisit questions already asked, but from a different perspective. This was 
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intended to illuminate consistencies and/or inconsistencies in the definition of 
interdisciplinarity and other elements. For example one question simply asked ‘define 
interdisciplinarity’ while a different question later asked ‘what do you think makes a good 
interdisciplinary researcher?’ I hypothesised that defining interdisciplinarity in isolation, 
and defining the traits of an interdisciplinary person separately might yield interesting 
comparative results. 
 
The first question after introductions was immediately an open-ended ‘How would you 
define interdisciplinarity?’ This was carefully chosen as the first question; participants 
were not given any prior warning of the question, and there was no specification that it 
pertain to Medieval Studies only. My goal was to catch each person’s first impressions, 
without the influence of other questions, my reactions, or any opportunity to prepare from 
outside sources. Judging from the slightly overwhelmed reaction of several participants,  
this goal seems to have been successful. 
 
The follow-up question ‘how would you define a discipline?’ was not given until several 
questions later in the hope that the intervening questions may offset any tendency to 
merely define a discipline as the opposite of the definition of interdisciplinarity just given. 
In general this appears to have been effective. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
The participant selection and structure of the interviews was approved by the University of 
Glasgow College of Social Sciences Graduate School ethics committee. In compliance 
with the anonymity clause of this approval, no participants have been named, nor have any 
quotes or comments been directly linked to individuals or institutions. This is much of the 
reason that results and analysis below includes many short quotes or paraphrases rather 
than detailed quotations. Because Medieval Studies in Scotland is a reasonable insular field 
it would be quite easy to identify particular participants or their institutions if any quotes 
which offer specific information about a programme, previous or on-going research or 
university structure.   
 
Coding and Interpretation 
My approach to coding has been largely a hybrid of many established methods, while also 
not expressly considering any one method to be well justified as superior or dominant.  
Loosely, my approach can be referred to as ‘thematic’ augmented by elements of 




Unlike GTM, I entered into my coding with a hypothesis already in mind (actually several), 
and with reviews of the literature in several related areas of study already conducted. The 
questions asked in the interviews were developed specifically to match the topics and 
emerging questions from the literature reviews in the previous chapters. My intent then 
was to establish codes based on this knowledge, and to look for comparative references in 
the interviews, both pro and con, in order to test the hypothesis in one field of academic 
practice. There are a wide array of thematic coding methods or approaches offered in the 
literature on the subject, however it seemed that these were more often than not arbitrary, 
specific to only very narrow types of interviews or studies, or not generally useful for 
broader applications. I developed instead my own approach which consisted of setting out 
each of the main themes that I was concerned with on a separate paper, and then copying 
each reference to that theme across all of the interviews to the page, with coded notations 
for where each originated.  
 
These initial themes related to key terms and concepts which emerged in the initial 
literature review and the various literature reviews which formed the main dataset for the 
thesis: disciplinarity, expertise, knowledge transfer, categorisation, collaboration, skills, 
method, periodicity, truth,  and subject matter. 39 
 
I then supplemented these codes with new themes as they emerged from patterns in the 
interviews themselves that were not covered by my original hypotheses, in a manner 
similar to GTM, though without the extensive iterative approach that this traditionally 
involves. Codes which emerged from the data involved additional factors in disciplinarity 
and interdisciplinarity, many particular to practice in Medieval Studies, such as 
administrative issues, geographic area of study, and vernacular languages. There was also 
an interesting and somewhat consistent trend of declining or preferring not to answer or not 
wishing to give a strong answer to certain questions, which I have coded for separately as 
well.  
 
My existing expertise in medieval studies has been instrumental in coding, in that I am able 
to recognise relationships between concepts which may not be apparent to a novice or 
outside observer. Notably though, my expertise is not of the same level as those I have 
                                                 
39
 Recalling that I am regarding the previous chapter on epistemology as part of the overall analysis of 
interdisciplinarity. As such there were questions and coding based on concepts of truth, validity and evidence 
in terms of the disciplines.  
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interviewed, who have taught and published in the field for many years. Also my mid-level 
expertise has a potential downside as this may suggest connections to me based on my own 
experience of Medieval Studies, but which may be more nuanced to the more expert 
interviewee. Additionally, coding is invariably biased towards my own understanding of 
Medieval Studies. 
 
Coding of the interview results was aided by the software package Nvivo10, though I have 
not made use of any extended features of the software. Coding was then visualised and 
structured via the mind-mapping software Freemind. 
 
Difficulties Encountered 
As part of the attempted to elicit personal views on interdisciplinarity, participants were 
not briefed in detail on the questions they would be asked. Some questions did not work 
well unprepared. Out of an interest to explore the perceived or empirical importance of 
‘good’ interdisciplinarity, as well as something of the importance (or lack thereof) of 
Medieval Studies in the broader world, I asked participants whether they had experienced 
‘questionable’ use of their home discipline by others in the name of interdisciplinarity, and 
whether they thought this could have impact outside of the academy. The question turned 
out to be frequently misunderstood or hard to explain, and when it was understood 
participants were clear that without time to think they could not answer effectively. 
Although I had hoped to develop a more nuanced empirical justification for the importance 
of good interdisciplinarity from this, and several answers given do indicate that this should 
be possible, the question will not be considered in detail here as answers were too 
inconsistent. This has highlighted for me the value of a pilot study, which did not seem 
feasibleinitially due to the small set of possible participants overall, and the perceived time 
that this would take. In retrospect, this could likely have been done. 
 
One notable gap in the interviews was the lack of any counter-views, a view that opposed 
the notion of Medieval Studies or interdisciplinarity. This was not for lack of attempting to 
find such voices. Medieval researchers who were not at least somewhat involved in 
Medieval Studies were not readily identifiable. Further, when I did inquire for names of 
anyone who was vocal against interdisciplinarity or Medieval Studies very few were 
offered (or known), and none of these responded to my interview requests. Although I am 
aware that it is speculative, my impression from this search, as well as from the interviews 
themselves and my own previous experience in the field, is that such directly oppositional 
voices are few and far between. A sense that to study the medieval effectively in any 
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capacity necessitated some interaction with other disciplines, whatever this might be called, 
was consistent in the interviews. Notably, a lack of direct or pre-stated opposition to the 
project did not equate to a lack of sometimes strong scepticism about the terms or ideas of 
both Medieval Studies and interdisciplinarity.  
 
Of the seventeen participants not all answered each question. A few did not reach the end 
due to time constraints. Also the first half of one interview was unfortunately lost due to an 
equipment problem. For each question I will indicate how many responses there were in 
the form of [N = X]. In some cases participants who were not asked a certain question 









Chapter 4: Disciplinarity 
Introduction 
“Moreover, as disciplines become increasingly broken down into more 
highly specialisized sub-disciplines, so the very idea of the discipline itself 
becomes redundant. Indeed, there are those who argue that the very concept 
of the discipline is no longer meaningful” (Rowland 2006: 70).  
 
“However, as Krishnan (2009: 6) indicates, a central problem with the notion 
of interdisciplinarity is that people using it do not make explicit what they 
understand by the term ‘discipline’...”(Trowler 2012a: 14).  
 
In this chapter I will approach interdisciplinarity from the perhaps obvious starting point of 
asking ‘what is a discipline?’. The same effort has been made in many other attempts to 
discuss interdisciplinarity, but there is an important distinction between most of what has 
been done before and what I will undertake here. In the HTRoI literature especially, but 
also in the other RoI traditions, discussions of what a discipline is do not typically engage 
with the several decades of existing research on the nature of the disciplines by 
educationalists, especially empirical studies. Some of the most recent ERoI literature is 
showing a change in this pattern, presumably because these are also coming from 
education researchers (Davies and Devlin 2010; Trowler 2012a, 2012b; Land 2012). In lieu 
of educational research, many accounts have relied uncritically on popular disciplinary 
metaphors and prevailing postmodern discourses of power structures, as well as many of 
the same circular and underdetermined methods used to define interdisciplinarity.40 These 
methods lead to a surface level understanding of the disciplines which are another clear 
cause of the subsequent lack of consensus; if anything there is less agreement in the RoI 
literature on disciplinarity than interdisciplinarity. Delving into the nature of disciplinarity 
chiefly addresses the problem of disciplinary essentialism in the interdisciplinarity 
literature. 
 
I am preceded in my critical review of disciplinarity by other recent efforts, which call into 
question several of the most popular and resilient essentialist metaphors: C.P. Snow’s 
‘Two Cultures’ (1959), Anthony Biglan’s ‘Hard/Soft, Pure/Applied, Life/Non-Life’ 
categories (1973, also uses Snow’s metaphor), and Anthony Becher’s ‘Tribes and 
                                                 
40
 There has been occasional use of educational researcher Anthony Becher’s popular Tribes and 
Territories: ... (1989). This particular source likely appeals to HTRoI researchers because it is an 
ethnographic study of the disciplines, mirroring, though in a more rigorous manner, the historical and 
culturally focused methods of the HTRoI literature. Becher’s work also lends itself well to Foucaultian 




Territories’ (1989, also uses Biglan’s metaphors). These are not the only metaphors for 
disciplinarity though, and in recent years more and more seem to be appearing, producing 
something of a ‘metaphorapalooza’ around the subject. A metaphor is a powerful thing to 
create, and as a great writer once said, “With great power there must also come - great 
responsibility” (Lee 1962). I will focus my attention away from creating useful metaphors 
then, and onto a deeper analysis of what meaning and evidence lie beneath the metaphors 
themselves. 
 
The literature regarding disciplinarity is wide and varied, but like the literature on 
interdisciplinarity, there are patterns. At least two broad approaches might be proposed: 
 
• Quantitative attempts to classify disciplines 
• Sociocultural attempts to describe disciplinarity.  
 
These rarely cross over or incorporate elements of the other, with the exception of the 
resilient metaphors above. In addition to these two main threads, there is also considerable 
input from recent debates over generic versus situated learning and teaching of critical 
skills. First I will look at the classifications efforts, which appeared first chronologically, 
and are also the source of the most prevalent essentialist metaphors. Next I will look at the 
more recent and more nuanced range of sociocultural approaches to the disciplines. In this 
section I will look critically at the legacy of Michele Foucault on the understanding of 
disciplinarity and I will revisit the ‘two cultures’ metaphor from the sociocultural 
perspective. I will then consider several newer trends in the understanding of disciplinarity 
which have emerged from the sociocultural research: the nature of ‘evidence’ according to 
the disciplines, what ‘subject matter’ means to disciplinarity, whether there are essential 
aspects of learning which supersede or are common to all disciplines. Lastly I will look at 
two compelling recent methodological approaches to researching disciplinarity: Ways of 
Thinking and Practicing (WTP) and Social Practice Theory (SPT). Throughout, I will 
focus on what empirical data and methods have been (or not been) brought to bear and how 
disciplinary insights may relate to interdisciplinarity.  
 
Classification Models 
Most of the early work in the 1960s and 70s on the nature of disciplinarity was focused on 
figuring out how the disciplines fit together into categories or classifications, which were 
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then described as essential features of what a discipline is. These efforts were heavily 
influenced by Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigms in scientific research. As a result of this 
common origin, this approach shows a pronounced lean towards using the natural sciences 
as the base from which other fields are then considered. The line of progression from Kuhn 
to the prevailing classification models is clear, as Braxton and Hargens point out in their 
review of the classification approach (Braxton and Hargens 1996: 3).   
 
Kuhn’s model stated that in scientific practice different subject matters, question sets and 
epistemological/methodological traditions were historically clustered together into 
different communities of research which he called paradigms. Some paradigms had strong 
internal consensus and others less so (Kuhn 1996). Paradigms were only presented by 
Kuhn as a model of practice in the natural sciences. In 1964, however, W.O. Hagstrom 
introduced the notion of 'consensus' between academic studies, which was clearly built on 
Kuhn's paradigms but generalised to refer to all scholarly study. N.W. Storer in 1967 first 
coined the now ubiquitous classifications hard/soft and pure/applied, hard/soft being 
directly related to Kuhn's paradigms by Storer. Storer's work went unnoticed until 1973 
when Anthony Biglan effectively launched the study of disciplinarity as a coherent practice 
by publishing a pair of statistical analyses of the disciplines; he applied Storer's 
classifications to the resulting patterns (along with a new dimension of life/nonlife). Since 
Biglan, attempts to classify the disciplines have shown a great deal of uniformity in use of 
statistical analysis (Biglan 1973b, 1973a).41  
 
Biglan’s notion of the hard/soft dimension was based on the degree of apparent consensus 
or paradigm that the discipline displayed internally. All of the natural sciences were 
considered exemplary of hard disciplines (hence the term, ‘hard sciences’) because they 
presumably had strong degrees of internal consensus around research questions, methods 
and results. Humanities disciplines were considered soft because there was presumably 
more internal debate and flexibility about methods, interpretation of results and research 
                                                 
41
 It should also be noted that the repeated use of statistical methods since Biglan may have aided in self-
selecting for a bias towards the natural sciences, such that researchers knowledgeable in and inclined to use 
statistics over other methods may do so due to an already established personal bias towards 'scientific 
thinking' (Kolb 1981; Anderson and Hounsell 2007; Nye et al. 2011). Substantial empirical study would be 
needed to confirm this, but from the sources reviewed here the pattern holds up rather well. This trend has 
been noted by several other studies, but it is worth noting that even many of those have continued to 
approach the humanities and the social sciences as one large collective of 'non-science' disciplines, and it is 
common to see studies which use only disciplines from the social sciences to allegedly answer for both. For 
example, Lowell Hargens, (Hargens 1996) presents only Psychology, Sociology, Economics and Psych/Soc 
as his 'soft' dimension samples in a paper designed to test this very dimension for meaning and validity. 
Further, Hargens selects specific specialisation from these, each of which represents areas of study which 
more commonly lean towards quantitative analysis and 'scientific' methods already. 
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questions (Biglan 1973b: 201–2). The hard/soft dimension classified the disciplines exactly 
along C.P. Snow’s ‘Two Cultures’. The pure/applied dimension was assigned to disciplines 
based on the degree to which participants in Biglan’s study felt the field was associated 
with practical applications (Biglan 1973b: 202). The concepts of hard/soft and pure/applied 
disciplines have remained very popular both implicitly and explicitly in the study of 
disciplinarity, and the effects of each and how this relates to interdisciplinarity, will be 
considered below. 
 
Problems with the Biglan Model 
Although Biglan's results for the hard/soft dimension have been confirmed in a number of 
studies for the disciplines he originally tested, the model has suffered from a considerable 
failure to be replicable, expandable or applicable to many 'real-world' situations or other 
disciplines. It nevertheless remains quite popular and resistant to obsolescence (Michels 
2011). The impact of this resilience is that it invariably creates a foundational level of 
categorical essentialism about the disciplines, even though most work in recent decades 
has been decidedly sociocultural and often openly resists the notion of rigidity or 
essentialism in disciplinarity. This should seem familiar from the discussion of 
essentialism in the chapters above, but there is a subtle difference between this and the 
trouble with essentialism in the HTRoI literature. In the theoretical literature on 
interdisciplinarity, disciplinary essentialism exists as an explanatory necessity for certain 
explanations of interdisciplinarity to work. In the sociocultural literature on disciplinarity, 
the essentialism of the Biglan categories (and also the ‘two cultures’ and ‘tribes and 
territories’) appears to be based more on embedded tradition and the impression of strong 
quantitative verification. 
 
A study of categorisation methods among tree experts (which will be examined in more 
detail in chapter 6) points out one of the chief problems with Biglan’s study (Medin et al. 
1997: 55). Biglan’s method was to present cards of various disciplines to scholars in 
different fields and ask them to sort them into categories by which were more alike. Medin, 
et al.’s tree study used a very similar method, participants were to categorise note cards 
with tree names on them in increasing and decreasing complexity of groups. The tree study 
differed though in that each group of participants was already established as experts at 
categorising trees, just different types of experts at it (taxonomist, landscapers, and 
maintenance workers). In Biglan’s case the participants were only experts in their 
respective fields, not experts in different types of categorising of academic study. Medin et 
al. also tested for familiarity first, and removed from the study trees which were not 
 96 
 
recognised. Biglan did not account for disciplines that participants may have had no 
knowledge of at all. In terms of the tree study. Biglan’s fault was in presuming that 
disciplinary specialists could be seen as specialists on disciplinarity. 42  
 
There are other problems with the interpretation of Biglan’s results, such as that they do 
not account for cases of both hard and soft aspects within the same discipline (Roxa and 
Martensson 2009: 210). Further, although the statistical methods can accurately show some 
relationship between the model and the factors tested (such as staff pay levels, time spent 
teaching/researching, number of citations in articles, and other secondary aspects of 
academic life), most of these factors are contemporaneous with disciplinarity, and no 
causal relationship can be shown (Creswell and Bean 1981; Smart and Elton 1982; 
Stoecker 1993; Hargens 1996; Braxton et al. 1998). Regression analysis, as these studies 
invariably are, is not capable of demonstrating causality, it must be determined externally 
usually via qualitative or logical means.43 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, such a 
method does not determine whether there is, in fact, a larger causal factor which may be 
affecting both the discipline and the tested factors at once, which, if true, would mean that 
although the discipline and the test factors do vary uniformly, there may be no actual 
causal relationship between them at all. In short, the model shows there is a connection 
between disciplinarity and the factors tested, but it tells us very little about what that means 
or how it matters. 
 
Additionally, much like the pluralistic classifications of interdisciplinarity, these methods 
are underdetermined; not able independently to answer the question of whether the 
underlying model is the best model to define or explain the differences between the 
disciplines, or whether a better model might exist which does more and works better, and 
which still passes the same tests (Hargens 1996: 2). There is evidence that it may indeed be 
insufficient, incomplete or improperly represented. Biglan's Life-Nonlife dimension, for 
example, has steadily fallen out of use.44 Nevertheless, Braxton and Hargens say 
unequivocally, “We believe it likely that if Biglan's typology of disciplines had not been 
generally adopted by higher education researchers, an essentially equivalent classification 
                                                 
42
 A very similar methodological problem to HTRoI studies presuming disciplinarians could describe 
interdisciplinarity effectively. 
43
 For example, if a relationship between gender and performance were shown, performance could not have 
caused gender, so the causal relationship must be the other direction. Because most of the factors tested in 
studies of the Biglan model do not have any empirically necessary causal relationship like this, one cannot be 
assumed. It is just as likely that disciplinarity causes the factors instead.  
44
 Becher & Trowler outright refute its use, Braxton and Hargens simply do not mention it, and one major 
study which did find statistically significant results found that it represented only 4% of the total variation in 
disciplinarity (Becher and Trowler 2001: 35; Smart and Elton 1982: 222). 
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would have” (Braxton and Hargens 1996: 6). Effectively they are saying that the model is 
'natural', and would have been found or developed by someone.45 When making this claim 
Braxton and Hargens, and others, cite several tests of the Biglan model which have 
allegedly been successful in verifying it. This may not be as true as it seems though, in fact 
these studies demonstrate another critical failing of the Biglan model: it cannot be 
expanded. 
 
One frequently cited example is Judith Stoecker (1993). Stoecker attempted to re-verify the 
Biglan dimensions against the disciplines he originally used, but also to apply the model to 
eight new disciplines. Stoecker was clear from the start that no one had successfully 
applied the Biglan dimensions to new disciplines yet, noting that the one strong claim to 
having done so was flawed because it could not have failed to classify any discipline 
(Stoecker 1993: 435; Braxton and Hargens 1996: 15). In Stoecker's analysis only one of 
the eight new disciplines was able to be categorised at all on the Biglan model, and that 
only barely. Stoecker suggested a number of reasons this may be, such as the relative 
newness of the disciplines and the corresponding lack of formal paradigms, but this is a 
flawed notion because the 'soft' dimension is defined as pre-paradigm status, so by this 
rationale all of the new disciplines should have manifested as 'soft' (Biglan 1973a: 195). 
What seems far more likely here is that Stoecker's study has demonstrated the Biglan 
model as incapable of incorporating new data. When this is coupled with the fact that the 
model makes no provision for any form of interdisciplinarity, disciplines which may use 
both hard and soft methods, or the fact that some disciplines in the original model are now 
divided into several new disciplines, each of which may classify differently, the Biglan 
model does not seem capable of describing actual practice much at all. 
 
There is one notable exception to the pattern of Biglan-based classification studies, the 
ethnographic analysis of Tony Becher’s Academic Tribes and Territories (Becher 1989; 
Becher and Trowler 2001). While not discarding the Biglan model or its essentialist 
aspects (although he did refute the life/non-life dimension), Becher headed in a new 
direction, developing two additional dimensions of disciplinary classification which were 
socially constructed, rather than based on subject matter, as all of the Biglan dimensions 
allegedly were (Biglan 1973a: 195). Becher's specification of rural/urban and 
convergent/divergent dimensions of disciplinarity refered respectively to the pace of 
                                                 
45
 I will look more at the notion of a 'natural' category in the chapter on Categorisation. 
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demand for scholarly results and the social cohesion of the disciplines.46 As Becher states 
it, these can be used to better situate the disciplines and explain certain properties which 
came to light from his research which could not be explained by Biglan's dimensions alone, 
such as why both physicists and historians professed to have strong senses of disciplinary 
unity to their peers, while no other factors appeared to be similar between them (Becher 
1989: 165). Becher considers these factors to be social, but, as Braxton and Hargens have 
noted, these may still be explained as results of subject matter creating a social determinant: 
again we are faced with the problem of indeterminable causality, and therefore a lack of 
expandability or predictability (Braxton and Hargens 1996).47  
 
Sociocultural Models 
Along with new metaphors, Becher's work brought a new methodology to the study of 
disciplinarity, non-statistical qualitative analysis. Like the 1972 report on 
interdisciplinarity, Becher’s ethnography was not a ‘first cause’ but a landmark whose 
popularity helped usher in the now dominant sociocultural approach to understanding the 
disciplines. While the classification approach centred on statistical analysis, the 
sociocultural discussion has focused on qualitative research, social theory and historical 
analysis. Matters of pedagogy, methodology, epistemology and ontology factor highly in 
such discussions. It is not uncommon also for the language of the research to be different 
to reflect this focus, such as the interchangeable use of 'learning environment' and other 
terms for ‘discipline’ (Anderson and Day 2005: 321).  
 
Sociocultural explanations examine how disciplines are socially formed, what properties or 
patterns this social construction has, and sometimes why the social construction has taken 
place in relation to previous social constructions and factors (Piaget 1972). Such 
approaches frequently lean towards describing disciplinarity as a social action more than 
defining it in a predictive or proscriptive way, under the notion that a definition is too 
objective or that disciplinarity is inherently too ‘messy’ to be generically defined (Messer-
Davidow et al. 1993; Parker 2002; Moran 1999; Peters 1999; Moran 2010). Initial causal 
factors of disciplinarity, when these are addressed, are typically considered in terms of 
                                                 
46
 Becher is mostly known for the still popular metaphor for disciplinarity ‘tribes and territories’, but this 
metaphor focuses exclusively on the social aspect of the disciplines, which is not the focus of this thesis. 
47
 The avoidance of directly addressing meaning or causality seems most obvious in Hargen's follow-up to 
his 1996 collaboration with Braxton, which is another statistical analysis of the Biglan model with the 
evocative title Interpreting Biglan's Hard-Soft Dimension, which does not in fact make any attempt to 
actually 'interpret'. It is also notable that following this study there do not appear to be any substantial 
quantitative surveys of the classification debate in the last 13 years. Perhaps the limitations of explanatory 
power of this method have been realised. 
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prior social conditions. In general this raises some of the same possibilities for unjustified 
underdetermination that were present in the HTRoI literature, such that it becomes difficult 
or impossible to decide which accounts are more or less reliable/effective. These 
methodological limitations are typically more directly recognised and engaged with in the 
sociocultural disciplinarity literature though, and more value is given to empirical evidence 
than in the HTRoI literature (though not in all cases).  
 
Sociocultural approaches tend to range from the avowedly relativistic, through numerous 
types of relativist/realist blends, such as Critical Realism or Social Systems Theory, with 
varying degrees of success at balancing these (Messer-Davidow et al. 1993; Weingart 2000; 
Bernstein 2000; Anderson and Day 2005; Wellbery 2009; Moran 2010; Bhaskar 2010). 
Foucault-inspired power rhetoric also figures strongly in this tradition (Messer-Davidow et 
al. 1993; Lenoir 1993; Amariglio et al. 1993; Thompson-Klein 1996; Bernstein 2000; 
Parker 2002; Rosamond 2006; Trowler et al. 2012; Moran 2010; Wheelahan 2010; Ashwin 
et al. 2012). The blended models consistently offer the most compelling individual notions 
of disciplinarity, but often suffer considerably from attempts to balance realism and 
relativism without a strongly established epistemological structure for doing so. Critical 
Realism, for example, runs into problems with the claim that there are ‘social facts’ which 
have a pre-existent ontological reality from which social construction develops. This 
approach effectively revives the ‘final causes’ argument of Aristotelian natural science, 
which is both foundational and transcendental at once and therefore incoherent from a 
pragmatic stance (Wheelahan 2010; Bhaskar 2010). Other models, such as Ways of 
Thinking and Practicing or Social Practice Theory, which I will explore below, are more 
epistemologically compelling, and triangulation of these from a wider range of evidence 
may help expand the scope and reliability of the understanding of disciplinarity (and 
interdisciplinarity). Pragmatism and naturalised epistemology are almost never mentioned 
as options in the literature (for an exception see Allen, 2004). 
 
Foucault and Power 
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the ability to consider a hierarchical structure as a 
potentially positive and emancipatory notion is instrumental to disputing the essentialist 
model of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. This means reconsidering postmodern 
resistance to hierarchies or power relationships. Power and its effects on social 
construction of self and truth as a starting point for analysis is prominent in a substantial 
amount of the sociocultural literature on disciplinarity. This view has precursors in 
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Nietzsche, Marx, Adorno and others, but the most commonly cited source is Michele 
Foucault.  
 
Summarising Foucault is difficult, his views evolved much over time. The source of his 
views on power though, are mostly articulated in (and cited from) Discipline and Punish 
and The Subject and Power (Foucault 1995, 1982). Here Foucault made eloquent 
arguments for an historical transition of modes of social control from overt authority 
exercised by a single ruler to obscured and socially constructed control by observation and 
normalisation. Foucault’s argument was that individuals themselves had become complicit 
in creating the means of their own subjugation by generating a society in which we are all 
under constant observation and pressure to be ‘normal’. Most importantly, Foucault 
characterised this power as an externalised ‘machine’ that was a pre-existing condition of 
all society and which always seeks to impose this controlling power (Foucault 1995: 139–
40). Foucault was not explicit in Discipline and Punish that this control was negative; in 
fact he never directly said power was inherently negative in his writings. But it was 
strongly implied by Foucault’s use of only negative examples of power, and the relation of 
these to what would typically be considered positive examples, “Is it surprising that prisons 
resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, all of which resemble prisons?” (Foucault 
1995: 228). This was made more apparent in The Subject and Power in which Foucault  
focused more on how to emancipate oneself from power structures, which begs the 
question why we would need to emancipate ourselves from something positive.  
 
Much of the core HTRoI literature originated in the 1990s, when Foucault’s star was 
arguably at its brightest. The presumption that the disciplines were first and foremost a 
means of exerting power and control in an inherently negative sense is explicit in several 
accounts and implicit in many more. The 1994 analysis of disciplinarity by Ellen Messer-
Davidow, David Shumway and David Sylvan has been particularly influential in this 
regard, not least because Thompson-Klein’s even more influential 1996 Crossing 
Boundaries: Knowledge, Disciplinarities and Interdisciplinarities was based on this source 
and drew many of its examples of disciplinarity from it though this source has appeared 
independently in other RoI literature. Messer-Davidow et al. were explicit in the 
Foucaultian nature of their analysis, as well as the assumption of the inherent negative 
aspects of power (Messer-Davidow et al. 1993: 3–15). Others have used Foucaultian 
analysis to suggest that academic qualification standards are a negative normalising force 




But there are problems with this negative reading of Foucault. The foremost is that 
Foucault’s evidence does not well support such conclusions. His argument is historically 
based, but uses very few specific examples, nearly all several centuries old, which are then 
extended to form broad generalisations about the present. It is not at all clear that the 
examples are indicative of a pattern. More importantly, there is no substantial evidence of 
the negative power-based motivations or effects that Foucault implies are behind his 
examples, nor is there any clear relation between the types of power structures Foucault 
gives examples of and other types more commonly regarded as positive. Several 
pragmatists, particularly Jurgen Habermas and Richard Rorty, have expressed similar 
criticisms of the application of Foucault due to the failure to adequately demonstrate the 
negativity of power (Habermas 1986; Rorty 1986). Rorty has said, “There's a kind of 
formulaic leftist rhetoric that's been developed in the wake of Foucault, which permits you 
to exercise a kind of hermeneutics of suspicion on anything from the phonebook to Proust” 
(Knobe 1995). 
 
The effects of Foucault’s popularity as an integral figure in the development of 
sociocultural analysis of disciplinarity has been far reaching and has become deeply 
embedded, to the extent that power relations as a negative pre-condition in discussions of 
disciplinarity and hierarchical structures are often taken as a given. Although I 
acknowledge that in all social situations there is a relation of power present, and that this 
certainly has the potential to be negative and motivated by a desire to control, there has not 
been sufficient evidence given by Foucault to assume that this is necessarily or even 
frequently the case. Rather, I concur with Jan McArthur (2010: 308) that when power is 
exerted negatively by or within a discipline that this is an example of bad practice, not an 
example of the innate badness of disciplinarity. To presume a negative stance as a base is 
not merely pessimistic but it is another source of essentialism in the form of ‘us versus 
them’ dichotomies. The wider evidence I will review in the chapters that follow offers 
substantial reasons to reconsider hierarchies and power structures as an essential and even 
emancipatory aspect of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. It would be unwise to ignore 
Foucault’s warnings entirely, however: we should remain vigilant against bad practice of 
power relations.  
 
The ‘Two Cultures’ Revisited 
C.P. Snow’s ‘two cultures’ has been a regular theme in the sociocultural literature on 
disciplinarity. A substantial portion of the literature on this topic derives from the 
longstanding perception of the ‘crisis in the humanities’, wherein it is believed that the 
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existence of the humanities as a discreet area of study is in jeopardy (Arndt 2006; Hall 
1990; Harpham 2005). This discussion has much in common with the ‘us versus them’ 
rhetoric of the HTRoI literature, and both the two cultures metaphor and the ‘crisis in the 
humanities’ are similarly essentialist by way of othering (Trowler 2012c: 91). Hounsell 
and Anderson (2007: 269) suggest that humanities and social science students, but by 
omission not science students, can be involved in critiquing their own disciplines. Jan 
Parker has suggested that disciplinarity in the humanities alone is defined primarily by 
pedagogy (Parker 2001: 31). This runs into trouble when it must be accepted that for this to 
be true, then teaching the natural sciences in the same manner must make them become 
humanities, which is clearly not Parker's intention. Ellie Chambers (2001: 5) has suggested 
that the humanities are distinguishable from science by the moral element inherently 
present in the subjects involved. While this may address a potential intrinsic quality of the 
subject matter, that humanities sources have a moral element, this model would imply that 
there is not a moral element to weapons research or particle physics because the weapons 
or particles themselves do not have intrinsic moral qualities. Although this argument could 
itself be challenged (that the moral aspects of weapons research are a matter for humanities 
scholarship), it is not clear why such a separation is either necessary or desirable. 
Chamber's elaborates that the moral aspect which defines the humanities is a normative 
and proscriptive role to seek social change, rather than an epistemological aspect of the 
subject matter. Such a model seems to present obvious problems for academic neutrality 
and therefore academic freedom/autonomy (Post 2009: 764).  
 
Pure versus Applied Knowledge 
Many ‘betterness’ claims for interdisciplinarity rest on the notion that is has more ‘real-
world’ application, such as Boix-Mansilla and Duraising’s definition which explicitly 
requires that interdisciplinarity serve an applied goal.48 Although pure versus applied is 
often discussed in terms of disciplinarily, its core actually rests in the distinction between 
academia and the ‘rest of the world’. On the one hand this can invite radical 
transdisciplinary responses such as mode 2 knowledge, project based curricula and staffing, 
or globalisation of the curriculum (Gibbons et al. 1994; Rosamond 2006; Taylor 2009). 
Alternately this can promote a retreat from application in the curriculum to remove 
knowledge production from training (Bernstein 2000).  
                                                 
48
 “the capacity to integrate knowledge and modes of thinking in two or more disciplines or established areas 
of expertise to produce a cognitive advancement – such as explaining a phenomenon, solving a problem, or 
creating a product – in ways that would have been impossible or unlikely through single disciplinary means” 





Gibbons et al. suggested that the world is moving towards a concept of practice and 
knowledge production as application-based interdisciplinary or extra-academic short-term 
projects (mode 2 knowledge), which supersedes the narrow confines of academic pure 
research represented by the disciplines (mode 1 knowledge). This approach has been 
further developed by Mark Taylor in a call to remove all disciplines and transform higher 
education, including staffing, to a fully short-term project based model (Taylor 2009). 
Gibbons et al.’s examples of mode 2 practices, however, are not clearly distinct from 
ordinary academic practice, but rather rest on the same strong notions of disciplinary 
essentialism that many interdisciplinary models derive from. This depends only on the 
author’s assertion of what is or is not representative of a particular discipline to justify that 
one practice is disciplinary and another is not so. Any reliable difference between mode 1 
and mode 2 knowledge would need to rest then on establishing a strong case for the 
existence of discrete mode 1 knowledge prior to mode 2 becoming the new norm, but like 
HTRoI efforts to do the same, this is not manifest in the literature. Instead, the focus of 
Gibbons et al. is on the nature of mode 2 knowledge with the presumption that mode 1 is a 
given, but this has not been substantiated historically.   
 
Basil Bernstein’s distinction between training and knowledge production makes more 
sense as a case for pure-applied distinction. Bernstein suggests that training into an applied 
field is different than education for the purpose of knowledge production, and historically 
this distinction appears more coherent (Bernstein 2000). In terms of the stated intention of 
each this is likely to be at least somewhat true, but is this essential and discreet or just 
another continuum which is arbitrarily divided? Is there any case of ‘pure’ knowledge 
production which cannot have application, and is there any practical application of training 
which cannot also lead to knowledge production?  
 
There is only a need for such divisions in disciplinarity if it can be justified that there 
actually is ‘pure’ research which is ‘unreal’ or not applied, rather than simply research that 
is less obviously applied to the layman. The notion that interdisciplinarity deals with more 
real-world problems as a defining criterion is based on such a misperception. In fact it is 
easy to see examples of problem-based and real world application within any discipline on 
a near constant basis, finding an example of the opposite would be the difficult task, some 
are simply more commercially or politically relevant or more obviously useful to non-
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experts.49 The earliest professional degrees, Law, Medicine and Priesthood show this lack 
of dichotomy easily, as do more recent entries into the academic world such as 
Engineering and Economics. Each of these has both training and knowledge production 
aspects.  
 
From the humanities and social sciences this is also true, as ‘traditional’ fields increasingly 
adopt a focus on work-placement and problem-based learning and digital humanities, 
largely as part of a broader employability agenda within the universities (Hawkins and 
Harvey 2011; Higher Education Academy 2013). Conversely, emerging fields such as 
Area Studies or Gender Studies continue to be considered interdisciplinary and applied to 
‘real-world’ extra-academic issues in much of the current literature, but in practice these 
often function as disciplines with a strong focus on ‘pure’ academic research (Widerburg 
2010). In fact it is not clear that it would be possible to find examples of any discipline that 
does not feature both aspects, only relative degrees of focus on one or the other. There is a 
distinct difference between something that cannot be applied and something that is not 
applied.  
 
The Meaning of Evidence 
There is something of consensus within the academic community that what each discipline 
considers to be valid and reliable evidence is a core element of disciplinary identity. This is 
well supported and broadly triangulated in much of the literature: 
 
• “The concept of evidence is arguably the most fundamental concept in all 
disciplinary enquiry” (Rowland 2006: 93).   
• In particular, it brings into central focus the ways in which individual disciplines 
represent (or at least debate) the nature of knowledge in their domains, what counts 
as ‘evidence’ and the processes of creating, judging and validating knowledge 
(Hounsell and Anderson 2007: 496). 
• “Signature pedagogies are important precisely because they are pervasive. They 
implicitly define what counts as knowledge in a field and how things can become 
known” (Shulman 2005: 54). 
• “Soft science is soft because of the nature of the subject matter” (Greaves & Grant 
2010: 331). 
 
This notion is problematic as a definitive end point for defining disciplinarity though, 
because in pragmatic terms it is incomplete. Few authors leave the notion of evidence 
unqualified as a defining factor; nevertheless it does stand as a de facto end point in much 
                                                 
49
 Notably this is not the same as saying all disciplines are preparing students for real jobs and employability. 
Many of the ‘real-world’ applications being taught may not correspond well to jobs which are likely to exist 
for students when they leave. These are separate issues. 
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of the sociocultural literature given that what each discipline considers ‘good’ evidence is 
clearly a socially constructed matter and therefore not in need of further reduction. In 
pragmatic terms, this is unjustifiably underdetermined because it does not adequately 
explore the conditions which give rise to the social practices that determine what is ‘good’ 
evidence, and whether some of these are more effective or reliable than others.  
 
A discipline’s approach to evidence may open a door to undoing essentialism by defining 
discipline by a fluid element, which makes it a compelling potential aspect of a new 
definition of interdisciplinarity. But without a deeper understanding of what ‘approach to 
evidence’ means and how it relates to practice the model may instead enhance essentialist 
approaches, as well as promote relativistic pluralism by validating an ‘anything goes’ 
approach to disciplinary identity. ‘Approach to evidence’ alone is both a relativistic 
definition of disciplinarity that allows each discipline to be internally self-justifying by its 




That disciplines are related to the subject they are roughly based around is neither a new 
concept, nor is it typically contentious. It is a common element in much of the literature on 
interdisciplinarity, generic skills, and disciplinarity, and it appeared steadily throughout my 
interviews with medievalists. In order to look deeper into ‘approach to evidence’ as a 
possible defining factor of disciplinarity, it will be useful to look at how the concept of 
subject matter has been handled in the literature. Many sources discuss the inherent status 
of subject matter briefly, but invariably this is either set aside to consider more 
complicated sociocultural aspects, presumed without explanation in order to classify 
disciplines, or presumed without explanation in order to define interdisciplinarity (Biglan 
1973b; Newell and Green 1982; Moore 2004; 2011; Szostak 2008; Trowler 2012b; 
MacKinnon et al. 2013). Where I differ from most accounts on this issue is that I see more 
value in resting here, and evaluating what these core aspects mean devoid of or as 
foundational to the many complex social and traditional structures which make up much of 
the discussion on what disciplines are and how they function.  
 
What ‘subject matter’ actually is, however, is an ontological question, one which is 
inherently foundational or transcendental and is therefore incoherent from a pragmatic 
perspective. What is more useful to pursue is whether there are patterns and stability to be 
found in the conditions which lead to our differentiation of subject matters, particularly at 
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levels beyond the disciplines themselves. For example, Lee Shulman (2005: 54) suggests 
that disciplines (at least professional ones) can be distinguished by ‘signature pedagogies’ 
which are inextricably linked to the social practices and enculturation into the discipline. In 
his descriptions of these practices, however, Schulman consistently notes that the subject 
of the pedagogy is the chief aspect that makes it ‘signature’. This suggests the underlying 
subject matter is a condition which gives rise to the social practices which provide the 
stable core of pedagogies that Schulman found. Similarly, in reviewing the field of 
Geography Warren Moran notes, “Although it has the flavor of determinism, I wish to 
argue that geography shapes what the discipline of geography is and what geography does” 
(Moran 1999: 128). Consideration of the conditions of social practice in turn leads back to 
the nature of ‘evidence’ as it is seen by different disciplines, and whether there can be any 
stable, empirical and non-relativistic framework for this which might then enhance our 
understanding of interdisciplinarity and how to teach it. The psychology of categorisation 
(chapter 6) has much to say on this matter, as well as research into expertise (chapter 5). 
 
There is another elephant in the room though: what creates the apparent distinction 
between disciplines which look at the same, or nearly the same, subject matter? Historians 
and literary scholars, for example, may both look at the biographies of medieval saints as 
primary sources. How are these disciplines to be seen as different if all that defines them is 
a generic epistemology common to all academic study (the scientific method) and the more 
specific epistemological qualities of a common source material? Many HTRoI discussions 
of disciplinarity have attributed the distinction to the methodology that the disciplines 
employ, but this relies on problematic presumptions of disciplinary essentialism and 
disciplinary ownership such that a discipline actually has the right or ability to ‘own’ a 
method. Most recognised disciplines can and do use an array of methodologies for 
different purposes without being considered interdisciplinary for doing so. The 
methodology explanation does not suggest why a multiple methodologies approach used 
on the same source type sometimes constitutes different disciplines and sometimes not 
(Thompson-Klein 1996; Bromme 2000; MacKinnon et al. 2013).  
 
A number of discussions of disciplinarity independent from interdisciplinarity have 
suggested that the answer is in the questions the discipline asks of the common subject 
(Becher 1989; Bernstein 2000; Moore 2004; 2011; Rowland 2006). This seems more 
plausible because it relies on a consensus of intent or purpose, rather than dubiously 
attributed ownership of methods, but it still leaves open the question of why distinctions 
are made at certain points, and why some appear to shift rapidly while others barely shift at 
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all. Why do we not typically consider what the historian and the literary scholar ask of the 
saint’s biographies to be part of the same discipline, and are there conditions in which this 
might change? A deeper look at the psychology of categorisation will help us to understand 
this process.  
 
Generic Skills, Critical Skills and Transferable Skills 
There is another area of higher education research which is of considerable use for 
understanding the nature of disciplines and interdisciplinarity, the on-going discussion over 
generic skills or ‘graduate attributes’. Graduate attributes, also sometimes referred to as 
critical skills, transferable skills or employability skills, are meant to be non-discipline 
specific skills that all students should be expected to develop during the course of an 
undergraduate degree. The specific skills involved vary from one university or study to the 
next, but there is some degree of consistency. Of the four universities I reviewed the 
attributes for, no two featured the same list, and there was considerable difference in how 
they were arranged, grouped and presented, almost as if everyone were trying to be the 
most original at doing the same thing. In Kuhnian terms it appears that a new master 
paradigm has taken a fairly solid hold, the graduate attributes agenda in general, but now 
there is paradigm revolution and chaos at a hierarchically more nuanced level within this 
around the questions of implementation and presentation.   
 
The University of Glasgow has ten attributes with a matrix of three sets of descriptions of 
how the attributes apply to students, academics, and professions. The University of 
Aberdeen has nineteen total attributes grouped into four categories. Edinburgh Napier 
University has the same layout, but instead of university wide attributes, each subject has 
their own set (I have used English as my example). Finally the University of Edinburgh 
have seven attributes arranged in two concentric circles with four in the centre and three 
encompassing these. Regardless of the substantial differences in presentation, there are 
very strong similarities in the nature of the attributes across all four universities (and in fact 
several others which I viewed). Each of the sets featured essentially the following:  
 
Students should graduate as 
• Subject experts 
• Ethically, socially and culturally aware, typically often in terms of global citizenry 
• Self-motivated, reflective, open-minded and investigative learners 
• Effective communicators and collaborators, often across disciplines  
• Self-confident, able to present self and make arguments 
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• Critical thinkers in a general sense 
 
The principle of graduate attributes is that these skills do/should exist independently above, 
around or within all of the disciplines: critical to a complete education for all students, but 
not specific to any discipline (Barrie and Prosser 2004; Barrie 2005, 2006; Sumsion and 
Goodfellow 2004). Clearly some of these skills above directly relate to the most 
consensual aspects of interdisciplinarity noted in the first chapter, collaboration and 
communication, and indeed these often include direct mention of interdisciplinarity or 
working across disciplines in the lists of attributes. But there are important reasons why the 
graduate attributes agenda is not ‘magic bullet’ to interdisciplinary learning.  
 
The main difficulty with applying graduate attributes to interdisciplinarity lies in 
understanding the two sides of the debate over how to implement them in the curriculum. 
The discipline specific argument states that such skills can only be learned within a 
disciplinary context, and that they then either apply only within applications of that 
discipline, or they will automatically generalise themselves later (views on this aspect 
differ substantially) (Moore 2004; 2011). The generic skills training argument holds that 
such skills are inherently generic to all disciplines and need to be taught separate from 
disciplinary learning (Davies 2006; 2013; Davies and Devlin 2010). These represent 
extreme views and pedagogic approaches to graduate attributes. But embedding the 
attributes into the objectives and teaching of most or all courses, while also maintaining 
some degree of centralised unity among the attributes, appears to be a broad consensus 
(Moore 2004, 2011; Sumsion and Goodfellow 2004; Barrie 2005, 2006; Davies 2006, 
2013). In terms of interdisciplinarity neither argument addresses learning such skills across 
the disciplines, though in each case knowledge transfer or the generalising of the skills is 
presumed to happen at some point. There is, however, strong evidence that the efficacy of 
knowledge transfer in such cases may be grossly overstated (see chapter 5). 
 
Graduate attributes evolved chiefly from a focus on universities developing broader 
employability in graduates, though most current sets of attributes also make space for 
aspects of global citizenship as part of this (Barrie and Prosser 2004; Sumsion and 
Goodfellow 2004). The focus on employability as something which requires skills and 
abilities beyond the disciplines may suggest similarities to claims about the more ‘real-
world’ nature of interdisciplinarity, but a comparison would be premature. Both the degree 
to which graduate attributes actually transfer beyond the disciplines and the degree to 
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which ‘real-world’ generic skills are developed by interdisciplinarity are questionable and 
are not backed by much evidence yet. 
 
Recent Approaches to Disciplinarity 
One compelling recent analysis of the nature of disciplinarity is Ways of Thinking and 
Practicing (WTP). WTP was developed as part of a large qualitative study of disciplinarity 
at the University of Edinburgh. The project independently reviewed undergraduate 
practices in Biosciences, History, Economics, and Electronic Engineering. For evidence 
researchers triangulated student views at the beginning and end their degrees, staff views 
of what they felt they were teaching or wanted to impart, existing literature on the nature of 
each discipline studied, and actual student work (McCune and Hounsell 2005; Anderson 
and Day 2005). Subsequent attention has been focused mostly on the reviews of History 
and Biosciences (Anderson and Hounsell 2007; Hounsell and Anderson 2009).  
 
Within each subject the results showed that students formed a clear overall unity in ways 
they thought about the subject by the end of their degree, which was closely related to what 
the lecturers hoped would be gained and which was also supported by their assessed work; 
this was proposed as evidence of disciplinary ways of thinking and practicing. Diane 
Laurillard (2012: 21–22) has suggested there is another way to read the results, however, if 
the separate reports are compared side by side. What Laurillard discovered was that the 
goals that instructors had for their respective programmes were highly consistent across all 
of the programmes. After substituting any obvious subject specific wording for more 
generic terms, Laurillard quizzed instructors at her own institution to say which applied to 
their field. She found that: 
 
“Across subjects as diverse as math, sociology, philosophy, cognitive science, 
and computer science, four of the 43 ETL items were identified by the majority 
of teachers as ‘irrelevant’, while 17 (40%) were seen as ‘relevant’ by more than 
75% of them...The commonality across disciplines of the relevance of these 
general statements of learning outcome is quite high, and suggests that 
although some learning outcomes are clearly unique to a subject discipline, 
there can be broad agreement on many of the aspirations of formal learning in 
terms of cognitive competencies being developed” (Laurillard 2012: 23).  
 
What this implies is not disciplinary thinking but a general way of thinking common to 
academic study, one which works at a hierarchical level of abstraction from subject 
specific detail. Such similarities were also noted by Becher and others who found that 
biologists reported as much concern for uncertainty of knowledge as historians (Becher 
1989: 15; Shopkow et al. 2013). Similar results have been found in a study by Susan Lea 
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and Lynne Callaghan, “...differences between academic cultures and their disciplinary 
epistemologies...did not emerge very strongly...” (Lea and Callaghan 2008: 218).  
 
The WTP studies may have inadvertently supplied a significant empirical foundation for 
the high-level unity of academic thinking around the scientific method discussed in the 
previous chapters, as well as substantially undermining classification models of 
disciplinary essentialism such as the ‘two cultures’ or hard/soft. Further, these findings 
support the notion of graduate attributes as a potential means to both facilitate teaching 
these traits, but also as a common means of translating concepts across the disciplines.  
 
Ways of Thinking and Practicing was meant to support disciplinary distinction (in a fluid 
and evolving way, not essentialist), but other recent publications have increased the pace of 
critique of disciplinarity itself. In a recent edited collection, Tribes and Territories in the 
21st Century, Paul Trowler, Murray Saunders and Veronica Bamber (2012) develop Social 
Practice Theory (SPT) as a fairly nuanced yet structured attempt to resolve some of the 
problems of balance between realism and relativism. The SPT approach focuses less on the 
rhetoric of social construction, and more on the tangible evidence of social practice; 
decentring the individual as the subject of study and placing the emphasis on the 
demonstrable social practice itself. In this sense it appears to be a pragmatic model 
(Trowler 2012b: 30-34). The SPT approach to disciplinarity serves to substantially 
problematise the traditional views of essentialism and boundaries, while not outright 
dissolving them. A wide array of models and approaches to disciplinarity and beyond are 
discussed in the chapter of the collection, some more compelling than others. A consistent 
trend across them all, however, is a direct challenge to the notion of discipline as fixed and 
essential, while also not venturing into the realm of radical transdisciplinarity; i.e. 
disciplinarity was seen to still have substantial practical value for organising research and 
teaching even if most of the boundaries are both protean and chimerical. But although it is 
a compelling approach, the application of SPT in the text remains somewhat theoretical 
and focused on sociological discourse and case studies: it might be expanded further. 
 
For example, Saunders notes, “We argue that any useful theory of knowledge and of 
disciplines needs to see them as being to some extent socially constructed, but at the same 
time recognising that knowledge is objective in ways which transcend the historical 
conditions of its production” (Saunders 2012: 170). In Trowler’s discussions as well there 
are several hints towards a deeper level of constraints or underlying structure to the 
disciplines, but these are not explored specifically in the text (Trowler 2009, 2012c, 2012a). 
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There is limited triangulation from other types of evidence which could be illuminating, 
such as psychology or other research specialisations outside of curriculum research and 
case studies of practice within the disciplines. Because SPT is a similarly pragmatic and 
evidence-based (i.e. naturalised) approach, my consideration of the psychology of 
expertise, categorisation and knowledge transfer in the following chapters should prove 
complementary to the evidence already presented by focusing on the demonstrable 
conditions from which social practices may arise, and therefore providing an additional 
degree of triangulation.  
 
Summary 
My main focus here has been to further undermine the notion of disciplinary essentialism 
through the lens of what is said about the disciplines themselves apart from 
interdisciplinarity. The unintended evidence of the WTP project has been strong in 
questioning which perceived differences in disciplines are actually as different as they 
seem, and the graduate attributes debate further develops the notion of academic unity of 
understanding and practice (as discussed in the previous chapter on epistemology). The 
perpetuation of Biglan’s categorical system of disciplinary distinction, especially now in 
more subtle and embedded forms continues to promote the notion of disciplinary 
essentialism though. The crisis in the humanities has created a long-running ‘us versus 
them’ discussion of how the humanities are distinctly different from science (hard/soft), 
often fuelled by Foucaultian notions of social emancipation and power hegemonies, but 
most of these distinctions fail to stand up to critical analysis. The pure versus applied 
debate has also continued in the form of either resistance to HE as training (Bernstein 2000) 
or resistance to HE as not training (Gibbons et al. 1994; Taylor 2009). SPT offers a new 
approach to disciplinarity as a continuum. Carrying on from a number of empirical studies 
such as Becher’s, the SPT model approaches disciplinarity as something more fluid and 
unregimented than a simple categorical structure. The work done with SPT so far though 
has only produced a narrow band of evidence, and not all of this appears to refute 
essentialism. Looking now to entirely new sources of data on disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity, I hope to add more types of evidence to the SPT structure and 








Chapter 5: Expertise (Knowledge Transfer, Qualifications 
and Transactive Memory Systems) 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will consider the empirical research in the specialist fields focused on the 
psychology (and some sociology) of expertise, knowledge transfer, and transactive 
memory systems (group cognition). I will also consider in more detail the purpose and 
processes for developing both subject specific and generic academic standards and 
qualifications frameworks. Expertise research is the most robust of these, and aspects of a 
deeper understanding of expertise extend into the understanding of each of the other topics 
in this chapter, as well as the following chapter on categorisation.  Expertise research 
suggests a number of things which have a direct bearing on some neglected or assumed 
understandings about disciplinarity, and many of these are presented via strong empirical 
evidence. Applying the lessons learned in this field should go a long way to settling some 
disputes and cyclic debates about the disciplines and interdisciplinarity. First I will 
investigate the nature of expertise and the study of it, establishing the core findings of the 
field and how these relate, often directly, to understanding interdisciplinarity. Then I will 
explore the current research in each of the other fields, relating this both to 
interdisciplinarity and to expertise research. The evidence in this chapter will make a 
strong case for how interdisciplinarity might best be defined, and also how it may best be 
developed in an undergraduate curriculum.  
 
Core Principles of Expertise 
Expertise is a commonly used term, but like many common terms it also has a technical 
meaning in academic study. In common use expertise can refer to any example of 
considerable skill at a thing, with fairly vague criteria for what does or does not qualify. 
This is consistently how it has been applied to disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. In the 
academic (often called ‘scientific’) study of expertise the definition is similar, but the 
criteria become much more particular. Expertise researcher K. Anders Ericsson defines 
expertise as, “The acquisition of reproducible superior performance on domain-specific 
tasks...” (Ericsson 2005: 238). Expertise research focuses on such questions as: 
  
• Is expertise qualitatively or quantitatively different from mere competence,  
• is expertise socially constructed or objectively definable,  
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• are there multiple types of expertise,  
• can expertise be learned without limit or is our potential innate,  
• is expertise a generic skill/trait or is it domain/subject specific,  
• are there downsides to expertise,  
• how do we acquire expertise?  
 
It might be expected that since the study of expertise looks at all of these aspects of 
subject-based skill development, it would have strong links to the study of academic 
disciplinarity, but this has not been the case. Researchers of expertise have only 
infrequently addressed academic learning, and even less in terms of disciplinarity:  
 
• Chi et al. (1981, 1988) who looked at various student and expert problem solving 
abilities in physics;  
• Voss, Greene, Post, and Penner (1983) who looked at reasoning in political science 
between experts, novices, and non-politics experts (chemists);  
• Wineburg (1991) looked at how expert historians read and review sources 
differently in practice from novices;  
• Schunn and Anderson (1999) looked at specialised and generic hierarchies of 
expertise within psychology. 
 
Nevertheless, expertise research has basic similarities with Educational Studies: both ask 
some form of the question ‘how do we develop knowledge or skill in a particular area?’53  
 
There are a number of seemingly essential connections to disciplinarity, and by extension 
interdisciplinarity, which have been hinted at or suggested by some expertise researchers, 
but which have not yet been explicitly pursued. Although in the broad field of education 
studies there has been some crossover with expertise research, in the specific focus that 
deals with disciplinarity there has been almost none; expertise research is an elephant in 
the room in the discussion of what a discipline is and why we have them. Expertise instead 
remains an assumed background value: sometimes it is acknowledged briefly, but seldom 
in any detail. Expertise is touched on slightly more in interdisciplinary research, but still 
via ‘common usage’ of the term, rather than engagement with or acknowledgement of 
actual research on the subject. 
                                                 
53
 This dichotomy itself is an interesting look at the separation of disciplinarity, as it could be argued on 
several grounds that expertise research and theory of learning research are indistinguishable, while from 




This disconnect can be seen clearly in the number of references within the literature. In the 
forty-two chapters of the Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance 
(Ericsson et al. 2006) there is no direct or sustained discussion of HE training, disciplines 
or academic development, even in the two chapters specifically focused on the 
socialisation of expertise. The only mention that is made is a brief account of the training 
phase of professional development and several citations of Chi, Glasser, and Farr’s (1988) 
landmark study of expertise development in physics, which does not address disciplinarity, 
merely expertise development in a specific context.  
 
Conversely there are no citations of any of the eighty-five contributors to the Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance in the two most substantial recent edited 
collections on disciplinarity The University and its Disciplines (2007) and Beyond 
Disciplinarity: Tribes and Territories for the 21st Century (2012).54  The same is true of 
recent collections of research on interdisciplinarity. The Cambridge Handbook of 
Interdisciplinarity (2011) contains no references to expertise research, and the edited 
collections Interdisciplinarity in Higher Education: Perspectives and Practicalities (2010) 
and Interdisciplinary Learning and Teaching in Higher Education (2010) contain only 
one.55  
 
Expertise research is not a magic bullet to resolving interdisciplinarity though; many points 
within the field remain under debate, and many questions about disciplinarity still lie 
outside of anything covered under expertise. Although much of the existing research seems 
that it can be directly related to disciplinarity, we must be careful in making jumps the 
original researchers did not intend, and in using empirical data differently than the purpose 
it was gathered for. Expertise research has only barely touched on issues outside of those 
which are easily quantifiable; leaving a possible question whether something fundamental 
may be different between academic disciplinarity and the more conventional fare of 
expertise research. These caveats must be firmly held in mind when considering any 
potential links between the fields. That said, evidence from within the disciplines 
themselves seems to match up quite well to what expertise research reveals. 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Excluding Robert Sternberg, who is cited for Cognitive Styles, not his work on expertise. 
55
 Martin Davies and Marcia Devlin (2010) include a brief but direct discussion of Chi, Glasser, and Farr 
(1988) and Johnstone (2003), and the possible problems these create for much of interdisciplinary theory; 
this is the only such reference I have encountered in any source on interdisciplinarity, though it is promising. 
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Research Paradigm of Expertise Study 
Ericsson’s definition of expertise included the term ‘reproducible’, and this is critical for 
understanding the predominant research paradigm of the field: 
 
“The first step in a science of expert performance requires that scientists be able to 
capture, with standardised tests, the reproducibly superior performance of some 
individuals, and then be able to examine this performance with laboratory methods... 
 
...a complete understanding of the structure and acquisition of excellence will be 
possible only in domains in which experts exhibit objectively superior performance, in 
a reproducible manner, for the representative activities that define the essence of 
accomplishment in a given domain” (Ericsson 2006a: 686-7).  
 
These requirements are a response to a perennial problem with researching expertise which 
is well recognised within the field (though not in all cases acted on): many socially 
acknowledged ‘experts’ actually fail to demonstrate abilities much beyond a novice in their 
fields. This was noted in a number of studies by Ericsson, who lamented not being able to 
get reliable results because he could not find reliable experts: 
 
“In most domains information about the objective performance of experts 
was not available, and investigators defined expertise by social indices and 
by the length of their professional experience” (Ericsson 2005: 235).  
 
“the focus should not be on socially recognised experts, but rather on 
individuals who exhibit reproducibly superior performance on 
representative, authentic tasks in their field” (Ericsson 2006: 686).  
 
Ericsson’s statements may seem to doom any attempt to apply expertise research to the 
study of interdisciplinarity because the applications of interdisciplinarity are not typically a 
laboratory reproducible matter.56 But although Ericsson is certainly one of the most 
recognised and generally respected names in expertise research, and most other researchers 
in the field work follow the same strongly empirical paradigm, most make more allowance 
for situational conditions and merely incorporate this into their interpretation (Schunn and 
Anderson 1999; Bromme 2000; Evetts et al. 2006; Kellogg 2006; Voss and Wiley 2006). 
Recently a number of sociologically focused perspectives on the development and 
expression of expertise have also emerged (Evetts et al. 2006). Some of these are of special 
importance to the connection between expertise and interdisciplinarity, especially the work 
of Eduardo Salas (2006) on expert teams. These sociological studies are predominately 
empirical and therefore integrate well with the still dominant psychological paradigm of 
expertise research into an emerging psycho-social paradigm.  
                                                 
56
 Some of the work emerging from the RoIR tradition may be approaching this, but there would need to be 




Chunking and Miller’s Law 
To understand expertise research we first need to understand something called Miller’s 
Law. In 1956 George Miller published a still influential synthesis of patterns of memory 
and recall which demonstrated that humans have a fixed and limited amount of short term 
working memory (STWM): 7-9 independent meaningful concepts at a time.57 He called 
these singular units ‘chunks’, and the creating of these meaningful units ‘chunking’. 58 The 
human limit of 7-9 memory chunks has been replicated and refined considerably and is 
now referred to as Miller’s Law (Baddeley 1994). The most essential aspect of chunking in 
terms of expertise and learning though, is that Miller found that some people seemed to be 
able to recall things in more complex chunks (Miller 1956: 93). This meant that although 
the rule of 7-9 concepts at a time remained consistent over an array of studies, some people 
were able to recall more total information because more meaningful information was 
stored in each chunk.  
 
Miller’s work formed a foundation for expertise research, but it was the work of Chase and 
Simon (1973) on skill development in chess that made the link to learning processes and to 
understanding what expertise actually meant.59 They found that novices (players who were 
familiar with the game rules, but were of very limited experience or practice) could only 
correctly remember the locations of three to four pieces from a complete chess board if 
shown it for a few seconds, while chess masters could consistently recall the entire layout, 
and could even make statements about how it got there or who was winning (Chase and 
Simon 1973). Their hypothesis was that the experts were using meaningful short-cuts to 
notice key features of the board, in order to store the entire layout as a recognised pattern 
in the same amount of fixed mental ‘space’ that a novice was able to store substantially 
less meaningful information. Through a series of human and computer experiments they 
developed Miller’s chunking model into a theory of human expertise development which 
said that although STWM was limited to 7-9 chunks, as any person increases in skill they 
learn to form more complex and meaningful chunks and to store them in Long Term 
                                                 
57
 “Short-term memory (or "primary" or "active memory") is the capacity for holding a small amount of 
information in mind in an active, readily available state for a short period of time. The duration of short-term 
memory (when rehearsal or active maintenance is prevented) is believed to be in the order of seconds. A 
commonly cited capacity is 7 ± 2 elements” (MedicineNet.com 2013; Wikipedia 2014) 
58 That STWM is a fixed quantity in humans remains the primary view today, although there is some recent 
research which suggests there may be limits to this model, or some flexibility (Hill and Schneider 2006: 662) 
59
 It is interesting to note that this is the same year that Anthony Biglan published his model of classification 
of the disciplines, effectively launching the modern study of disciplinarity. The simultaneous early 
development of these fields may help in understanding how they remained unaware of each for so long, each 
being more busy developing its own identity. 
 118 
 
Memory (LTM) in more meaningful and easily accessible patterns (Chase and Simon 1973; 
Gobet 1996). 
 
Although there have been some criticisms of the chunking model, and it has certainly 
evolved in complexity, especially with advances in neurological imaging and memory 
models, it has remained amazingly resilient as a basic model of expertise development, and 
continues to be the foundation of most other discussion in the field. 
 
Chunking and Language 
The chunking model also presents the first major link between expertise research and 
disciplinarity research, in the form of the need for specialised academic languages. 
Language has been an area of much surface level discussion within some literature on 
interdisciplinarity, and more importantly has been the focus of considerable empirical 
study within the disciplines by Paul Hyland and others (Hyland 2006; Thompson-Klein 
1990, 1996). These have focused on the sociocultural aspects of communication between 
the disciplines, often with a Foucault-inspired understanding of power relations as negative 
and elite cultural structures (Messer-Davidow et al. 1993; Amariglio et al. 1993; 
Rosamond 2006; Chettiparamb 2007). A direct connection between these and expertise 
research has not been made.  
 
Expertise research provides considerable empirical evidence that complex and technical 
domain languages are necessary elements of increasing skill and understanding. In order 
for more effective chunking operations to take place, and for faster more accurate memory 
and recall to happen, more comprehensive terms are required, terms which encompass 
more nuance in the same cognitive ‘space’. For example in chess a novice must describe 
the entire board in detail to explain where the pieces are, but an expert can say 'king 
defence configuration' and mean the same thing (Gobet 1996; Ericsson 2006). Additionally, 
the expert’s statement carries more information for other experts, such as prior and 
subsequent likely positions, and who is winning.  
 
An example from the discipline of History might be that a novice would have to describe at 
length the reasons and methods for paying special attention to the perspectives of non-
western peoples in the historical account, especially when they are the focal subject, while 
an expert can simply mention ‘post-colonialism’ or ‘orientalism’ and convey the same 
ideas, again including extra information as well such as the historiographic debates around 
these terms. Further the expert can distinguish nuanced differences in the technical terms 
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of the discipline, such as that post-colonialism and orientalism, though related, are not the 
same thing. A novice historian might also have to describe the events and situations of the 
Restoration in detail, while an expert could gain all of the same information from the term 
alone, as well as more advanced information about causes and effects of the period.  
 
Traits of Experts 
Over the previous four decades of expertise research, a fairly consistent and well evidenced 
set of basic traits of experts has emerged. The evidence for each is varied, usually being 
researched in very different contexts over a number of different studies by different 
researchers, but in aggregate the evidence is compelling.60 More interesting is that this 
research has shown consistently that there are about as many ‘negative’ traits associated 
with expertise as there are beneficial ones. A list of these traits, both positive and negative, 
was compiled by Michelene Chi (Chi 2006).  
 
Experts have been demonstrated to be quantitatively and qualitatively better 
than non-experts at: 
 
• Generating the best solutions faster and more accurately 
• Detecting and recognising nuance, complex patterns and deep structures 
• Qualitatively analysing subject specific information 
• Self-monitoring, i.e. knowing what they do not know and detecting 
errors 
• Choosing effective strategies 
• Confident risk-taking 
• Minimising cognitive effort and maximising cognitive control 
 
Experts, however, have been shown to exhibit a number of less desirable 
traits as well: 
 
• Failure to demonstrate expert traits outside of limited subject domain  
• Contextual limitations on expert abilities even within specialised 
domain 
• Inaccurate perception of novice/non-expert understanding 
• Glossing over surface elements  
• Inflexible thinking 
• Overconfidence  
• Bias towards personal experience and personal ‘best’ knowledge. 
 
                                                 
60
 This should not be carried too far, however. Although the general traits below are well agreed upon within 
the field, the field has been so far rather narrow in its empirical scope. Also it could be argued that the field in 
general could benefit from more cross-checking and replication of older key studies, as some results are still 
regarded as sufficiently evidenced without re-evaluation in several decades. This does not mean the original 
results are themselves uncompelling, however, some situations or environments in which the research was 
conducted may have substantially changed. Also it is important to remember that these traits of experts are 
not absolute, but are relative to novices and non-experts, and that the practical manifestations of them will 
vary widely depending on all aspects of context. 
 120 
 
These will serve as a starting point for further discussion about some of these traits, our 
understanding of how they come to be, and how they may relate to disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity.  
 
It is clear that several of the positive and negative traits above are opposite aspects of the 
same concept. Although experts are more confident risk takers, they can also be 
overconfident. Although experts are substantially better at grasping deep structures of 
knowledge, they can also gloss over surface details, which are sometimes critically 
important. In a similar vein experts display a tendency towards stereotyping, by tacitly 
adding patterns to their personal experience which often do not have a verified causal 
connections, such as basing medical diagnosis in part on sex, race, etc. when these are not 
verified (Chi 2006: 27).61  
 
These pairs are particularly important when considering interdisciplinary curriculum 
designs. Chi and other expertise researchers do not say much about the causes of the 
differences in terms of curriculum or pedagogy, but some possible reasons for (and 
solutions to) the counterbalance of positive and negative traits are suggested by educational 
research on ‘personal epistemologies’. Personal epistemology is, “a field that examines 
what individuals believe about how knowing occurs, what counts as knowledge and where 
it resides, and how knowledge is constructed and evaluated” (Hofer 2004b: 1).62 The work 
began with William Perry in 1970, who proposed a developmental stages model of the 
epistemological complexity of student thinking (Perry 1999). Work since, led much by 
Marlene Schommer-Aikens, has moved away from developmental stages as the underlying 
factor, and more towards the nature of a student’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing: 
epistemology as viewpoint and pedagogy (Schommer 1990; Schommer-Aikins et al. 2003; 
Schommer-Aikins 2004). Studies in this field have demonstrated that different learners 
respond differently to the same instruction based on what preconceptions about knowledge 
and learning they come to it with and/or how it is presented. Students with personal 
epistemologies which included believing in discreetly separate bits of knowledge, 
intelligence and learning ability fixed at birth, The learning is quick or not-at-all, and that 
knowledge once learned is certain (all highly positivistic traits) also showed considerably 
less reflective judgement (overconfidence and inflexible thinking), more likelihood to draw 
absolute conclusions from tentative information (personal experience bias), and weaker 
comprehension of texts (glossing over surface details). Students approaching with the 
                                                 
61
 More in the chapter on categorisation 
62
 Carol Dweck’s recent concept of ‘fixed’ and ‘growth’ mindsets appear similar as well (Dweck 2012). 
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opposite perspectives typically achieved the opposite results, in line with the ‘positive’ 
expertise traits (Schommer-Aikins 2004: 27).   
 
In terms of expertise, personal epistemology as an explanatory model suggests that some 
experts approach expertise or are instructed to see expertise as both deeper and broader 
levels of nuance, interconnectivity, uncertainty, and learn to recognise the limitations that 
narrowing their focus creates. Others, however, appear to perceive expert knowledge as 
absolute and uncontested, the pinnacle of development such that what an expert knows 
simply is and an expert’s judgement is simply correct, because this is how they have 
perceived experts before them or it is how they have been instructed to look at 
knowledge.63 Interdisciplinarity as a form of decontextualisation or decentering of 
expertise may have some ability to reduce these problems. The nature of the negative traits 
suggests though, that competency interdisciplinarity is not the way to go, however, because 
of its focus on increasing decision making confidence without developing the subject 
expertise required for self-monitoring and dealing with deep structures. It appears to 
promote the negative side of expertise.64  
 
The personal epistemology approach of Barbara Hofer (2004) offers a different path for 
developing a curriculum model of interdisciplinarity (one that promotes flexible instead of 
inflexible expertise). Hofer suggests that epistemological stance can be trained and shaped 
as a metacognitive skill which can then be applied to multiple settings, “Such theories 
develop in interaction with the environment, are influenced by culture and education and 
other context variables, operate at both domain-general and domain-specific level, are 
situated in practice, and are activated in context” (Hofer 2004a: 46). Hofer does not discuss 
practical means of developing these reflective metacognitive skills. 
 
Automaticity & Cognitive Entrenchment 
Research on expertise has identified at least one basic psychological/neurological 
mechanism of expertise performance, called automaticity, which states that as we learn 
skills they eventually become automatic and can then be performed with less attention, 
faster, more consistently, and while focusing on other tasks (Feltovich et al. 2006: 58). The 
                                                 
63
 Research specifically focused on personal epistemologies and expert traits would be helpful. 
64
 The paradox of this is that many IDS programmes claim to explicitly train students in ‘interdisciplinary 
thinking’ but because this is still based on an individual as ‘interdisciplinarian’ model this inherently requires 
viewing interdisciplinarity as a surface level and positivistic process that one person can learn quickly and 
execute with certainty. This is a positivistic misperception of interdisciplinary thinking as crossing of 
essentialist disciplinary borders instead of developing reflective skills.  
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same research has also found that automaticity is essential to developing higher levels of 
expertise, particularly  abstracted thought, knowledge transfer and manipulations of the 
underlying knowledge. Expertise researchers Lesgold and Resnick (1982) found that if 
children as young as kindergarten age did not automatise their basic reading skills then 
they would not be able to develop the same reading comprehension and word manipulation 
skills of their peers years later (Feltovich et al. 2006: 53). 
 
Automaticity has also been strongly supported by neurological data in a series of studies 
which compared fMRI scans of regions and amounts of brain activity as participants 
progressed from novice through extended practice to skilled levels at various basic tasks 
(Hill & Schneider 2006).65 Some practice periods lasted a short time, such as an hour, 
others charted progress over weeks of practice. In the early stages much more of the brain 
was active, and this activity was in domain general ‘learning’ regions such as visual and 
spatial processing or generic control centres, while by the end of practising far less of the 
brain was actively used when completing the task, and the active areas had moved to 
regions associated specifically with the type of task. Moreover in the earlier stages 
participants could adapt to changes in the task and learn new patterns easily, but also their 
accuracy was strongly effected by distractions or fatigue, while at the end they could not 
easily change or adapt the process to incorporate new elements, but could perform the task 
consistently and accurately while also performing other tasks or when tired. The 
conclusion was that the tasks once practised and committed to LTM became both rigid and 
inflexible in the face of new conditions, but automatic and able to be completed with 
minimal effort as a part of other tasks. 
 
The rigidity of automaticity has serious implications for interdisciplinarity as it suggests 
that expert knowledge may be inflexible and unable to be expanded or be revised to cope 
with new interdisciplinary input or working effectively with other disciplines. Erik Dane 
(2010) has labelled this bleak overall picture ‘cognitive entrenchment’, but he has also 
suggested some methods for mitigating the problem. There are concerns with Dane’s 
approach, however, which highlight further issues with competency interdisciplinarity. 
Dane suggests that resisting developing ‘too much’ expertise, working in dynamic 
environments and focusing on non-domain tasks can mitigate entrenchment (Dane 
                                                 
65
 fMRI is one form of brain activity scanning which is used to determine which areas of the brain are active 
during particular tasks. Notably, fMRI are only accurate to somewhat general regions of the brain, which can 
often house processors for several different types of mental activity. In the case here the activities being 
scanned took place in different regions, so overlap was not an issue. 
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2010: 589). Unfortunately Dane’s recommendations are somewhat simplistic and rhetorical, 
i.e. not accompanied with evidence or examples of actual practice. 
 
Solutions such as this lend fuel to competency interdisciplinarity rationales for lowering 
the overall level of expert knowledge in each field studied, rather than retaining expert 
knowledge and experience while developing ways to enhance knowledge transfer in 
interdisciplinarity. Rigidity of discipline expertise is resisted by a curriculum which 
mandates non-expertise focus and a dynamic environment. While this is appealing 
conceptually, these approaches have consistently failed on the ground. This approach to 
expertise appears as well in the literature surrounding knowledge transfer (below), and 
evidence there suggests this is not the only way to go, it is merely the ‘easy’ way (Chi and 
VanLehn 2012; Lobato 2012). 
 
Both automaticity and entrenchment may have implications for the order in which certain 
things are best learned. While the notion that disciplinary expertise (or competency) should 
be learned prior to interdisciplinarity may seem ‘common sense’, and indeed is often 
treated as such in much of the RoI literature (including some of the IDS literature), there is 
reason to doubt this based on automaticity. If disciplinary knowledge, skills and methods, 
and more importantly disciplinary ways of thinking, are learned first these are likely to 
become relatively fixed points thereafter, and according to the evidence on automaticity 
quite difficult to dislodge. This notion is also upheld by the comments of several of the 
medievalists I interviewed, who made mention of the continuing influence of the ways of 
thinking of their first disciplines, even after many years of interdisciplinary work: in 
several cases no longer even working within that discipline.  
 
This begins to paint a picture of a pedagogic paradox. Expertise is needed to develop the 
higher-order thinking that makes interdisciplinarity useful, but developing this first may 
make interdisciplinary thinking unlikely. Balancing between entrenched and 
overgeneralised curricula may be the most important function of well implemented 
interdisciplinarity. 
 
Domain Specificity & Knowledge Transfer   
Domain specificity is perhaps the most important basic feature of expertise for 
interdisciplinarity research. The notion is that the enhanced skill and problem-solving 
abilities of experts become increasingly specific to the domain of study as practice 
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continues, that this focus eventually becomes quite narrow, and that the skills and 
enhanced abilities are not transferable, even to very similar seeming fields or conditions. 
“There is little transfer from high-level proficiency in one domain to proficiency in other 
domains – even when the domains seem, intuitively, very similar” (Feltovich et al. 
2006: 47). A study by Gobet and Simon (1996) showed that chess masters had no greater 
ability than novices to recall randomised board positions. This suggests that their expertise 
does not extend to all tasks involving chess pieces and boards, but only to patterns which 
represented actual play. Similarly, Eisenstadt and Kareev (Feltovich et al. 2006: 47) found 
that masters of the game Go were no better than novices at recognising Gomoku 
arrangements, even though both are played on the same board and using the same pieces. 
There have been many more experiments across a fairly wide array of domains which have 
continued to support the domain specificity feature of expertise (Voss et al. 1983; 
Wineburg 1991; Schunn and Anderson 1999). 
 
For studies of disciplinarity this data is critical. It offers empirical support for functional 
disciplinarity being deeply embedded in the human learning process, and suggests that 
disciplinarity will happen as we become more skilled in areas, whether we want it to or not, 
as a side-effect of the domain specificity of building expertise.66 It is perhaps telling that 
Chi (2006) chose to list this trait of experts as a hindrance, not a benefit; the domain-
specific nature of expertise may be essential for understanding disciplinarity, but it 
presents a big problem for interdisciplinarity. Quite a few of the most popular models of 
interdisciplinarity rest on the presumption of transferability between disciplines which 
seem similar, “Interdisciplinary studies provide an approach in which such skills become 
habits of mind; they fall naturally out of the interdisciplinary process. Indeed, a host of 
intellectual skills, sensitivities, and sensibilities valued by educators are developed as by-
products of interdisciplinarity” (Thompson-Klein 2004; Repko 2008; Newell et al. 2010; 
Newell 2010: 363).  
 
There is little said in the literature on expertise of the possibility of meta-expertise, or 
expertise in meta-cognitive skills (e.g. graduate attributes), such as may be domain specific 
but also extendable across many domains with training (Knight 2001; Barrie and Prosser 
2004; Moore 2004; Davies 2006). “The notion of an ‘expert generalist’ is difficult to 
capture within the current explanatory systems within expertise studies” (Feltovich et al. 
2006: 46). Further, the narrow specificity and lack of transfer discussed in most expertise 
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 This concept relates as well to the notion of ‘natural’ categories, which will be explored in chapter 6 
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studies has been of high-level domain experts. Little has been said empirically of the 
domain specificity of novices (i.e. undergraduates), or perhaps more usefully of middling 
levels of expertise such as postgraduate students (Davies, M. and Devlin, M. 2010: 24).  
 
There is some hope for interdisciplinarity though, in that there appear to be many different 
functional levels of expertise within and around domains. Shunn and Anderson (1999) 
conducted a study of expert performance in psychology, “to determine whether there are 
domain-general procedures that expert scientists from different domains share, but are not 
found in all educated adults” (343). This was an extension of earlier work by Voss et al. 
(1983) which presented a simpler concept of two levels of expertise, that of doing ‘science’ 
and expertise in specific scientific domains (Schunn and Anderson 1999: 342). Schunn and 
Anderson found that, as expected, only narrowly trained specialists gave the best and most 
complete answers to questions about their particular specialism of psychology, but on more 
general psychology questions all psychologists of the same approximate level of training 
were able to produce consistently better answers than non-psychologists. Further, the more 
questions became about general science, and not only psychology, the more the gap 
between the experts and the other participants narrowed. 
 
Notably, in Schunn and Anderson’s experiment the category of ‘all educated adults’ was 
filled by undergraduate students. This means that in terms of proposing further hierarchical 
similarities across the ‘two cultures’ this study is substantially limited: it would need to 
gauge the responses of equivalent levels of expertise in each ‘culture’ against a set of 
domain-general academic thinking skills (i.e. graduate attributes and scientific method). 
Nevertheless, the results which Schunn and Anderson found have broad ranging 
implications for developing interdisciplinary and domain-general curriculum designs. The 
findings suggest that although domain specificity is clearly a problem for transfer and 
interdisciplinarity, that it is functional on many levels at once, in a form of a hierarchy of 
expertise. Schunn and Anderson, and Voss et al., did demonstrate substantial losses of 
expert knowledge at each step away from the specialist level, but recalling that the 
scientific method is meant to encompass all academic study, not merely the traditional 
STEM fields, this hierarchical concept could offer a pedagogic path to greater 
transferability across any field. If interdisciplinarycurricula could be focused on 
developing the skill to translate one’s own expertise into the common language of the 





The notion of conceptually ‘near’ and ‘far’ disciplines appears in the interdisciplinarity 
literature periodically as ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ pluralistic types of interdisciplinarity, but 
they are typically loosely defined and underdetermined (Newell 1992, 1994; Huutoniemi 
2010). HTRoI and ERoI interviews consistently show that disciplines which are 
traditionally or topically ‘near’ each other appear to be better suited to interdisciplinary 
activity on a regular basis (individual or collaborative) (Thompson-Klein 1990; Lattuca 
2001; Nikitina 2002).67  Why some structures appear ‘near’, and therefore more effectively 
transferable, is not clearly established in a consistent or empirical way that could reliably 
be used to structure a curriculum around though.  
 
One possible explanation is that ‘nearness’ is not the best way to consider the issue. Rather 
I propose that this increase in ease of transfer can be more effectively understood in terms 
of shared core training, and that this is what Schunn and Anderson and Voss et al. have 
demonstrated. STEM disciplines often share a considerable amount of early undergraduate 
coursework over many fields, only separating into specialisations in the later years of a 
degree, and even here there is often overlap across specialism ‘groupings’ (Gunn and 
Talbot 2012). This is not common practice in the humanities, though, which could suggest 
a flaw in the concept. In the humanities, however, there are a number of shared non-
disciplinary theories and methods which are taught in each field contextually, such as 
Marxism or feminist critique, deconstruction, or source criticism. (Thompson-Klein 2005a; 
Rowland 2006; Moran 2010). These also form a type of shared core of knowledge across 
these subjects. In practice, the social sciences appear to combine practices of both 
humanities and the sciences (Becher 1989). 
 
Knowledge Transfer Research 
So far we have looked at knowledge transfer seen through expertise research or 
interdisciplinarity theory, but there is also a more dedicated specialisation of study which 
looks at the psychology of knowledge transfer itself.68  The RoI literature is awash with 
discussion of transfer of knowledge, often regarded as something that occurs naturally as a 
result of interdisciplinary actions or being in interdisciplinary environments. Knowledge 
transfer researchers, however, tend to take a different view, one which concurs with 
expertise research on domain specificity, “Unfortunately, considerable research suggests 
that the knowledge-to-go served up by schools does not ‘go’ that far” (Perkins and 
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 Whether or not interviews are the best way to isolate a generic concept of interdisciplinarity, they are 
surely a reliable source of evidence on the relative perceptions of the difficulty of different tasks by the 
participants. 
68
 Michelene Chi is notable for being a prominent researcher in both expertise and knowledge transfer. 
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Salomon 2012: 248). In some RoI cases it is suggested that explicit teaching should be 
offered for students to learn to engage in interdisciplinary knowledge transfer, though it is 
not clear that this is ever developed into actual curriculum (Repko 2008; MacKinnon et al. 
2010, 2013).  
 
First though, Perkins and Salomond raise an interesting concern with transfer research, 
which may have bearing on how we choose to perceive the goal or process of 
interdisciplinary learning and teaching that there is perhaps terminal ambiguity between 
when something is transferred knowledge and when it is simply applied knowledge, i.e. 
where is the demarcating line between an application of knowledge to a novel situation, or 
a transfer of knowledge to a novel situation.69 Followed to its conclusion this may suggest 
that the goal of interdisciplinary curricula should not be enhancing transfer of knowledge 
between expertises, but developing a generic skill to allow all knowledge acquired to be 
applied to all situations without regard for notions of disciplinarity. This is typically the 
goal of most radical transdisciplinary initiatives, but there remains no substantial evidence, 
from Perkins and Salomond or transdisciplinarity proponents, that such a broadly 
applicable skill exists or could be learned by humans.  
 
There may be a positive approach to this notion in terms of interdisciplinary curricula 
though. Samuel Day and Robert Goldstone demonstrated this unrecognised transfer of 
ordinary application in an experiment using computer tasks (Day and Goldstone 2012). 
Most respondents failed to realise any transfer had taken place. It is conceivable that with 
weakened concepts of disciplinary ownership and an increased interdisciplinary curriculum, 
that this simple task of cross disciplinary application of knowledge could become more 
commonplace. There remains a clear potential for such a perspective to devolve into non-
expertise or abstracted models of transfer though. A curriculum designed around these 
ideas would need to take this into consideration. The two are opposite sides of a single 
balance of educational agenda; educating for expert skill in a specific field and educating 
for a generic ability to function in many situations.  
 
Transfer research often considers curriculum or pedagogy, at least in a general sense, 
because the notion of improving transfer is typically assumed to be related to the quality or 
type of instruction happening. Several approaches have suggested avoiding a deep 
structure understanding of knowledge, and instead that knowledge transfer is best 
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 This returns to the previously discussed Pure versus Applied debate of disciplinary classification. 
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approached by trimming off the unique traits or contextual elements: transfer by 
abstraction. There is considerable empirical evidence for this being successful (Dane 2010; 
Day and Goldstone 2012). This is the core agenda of competency interdisciplinarity. But 
although transfer may occur to a greater total degree in the sense that more of it is 
happening, in the sense that depth and nuance of the initial knowledge is actually 
transferred it does not happen at all (this is typically confirmed empirically in the same 
studies). “It is as if the lowest common denominator is sought in order to reach consensus, 
rather than facing the challenges of the disciplinary difference” (Rowland 2006: 95).  Such 
a situation, if it is applied to developing interdisciplinary expertise in higher education, 
could easily make the resulting transfer ineffectual or even dangerous.70  
 
If transferring expert knowledge is to be the goal of interdisciplinary learning and teaching 
in higher education a different approach is needed. Joanne Lobato offers a method of actor-
oriented transfer (AOT) based on the studies of J.F. Wagner (Wagner 2006, 2010) that 
seeks to both develop and grow contextual nuance as an aspect of transfer, thus increasing 
the nuance and depth of the transferred knowledge in each case, rather then further 
abstracting it which would lead to eventual surface comparisons (2012: 243). This 
approach has significant ties to personal epistemology, though this connection has not been 
made. Lobato proposes that transfer between tasks or subjects of some kind always occurs 
in students, it is just not the kind we want in most cases, and can sometimes even be 
detrimental to future learning. Lobato shows that the mechanism which determines which 
kind of transfer occurs is based on a combination of contextual elements (situated learning), 
prior knowledge and beliefs about knowledge (personal epistemology), and instruction. 
The solution Lobato implies is to direct the curriculum to building links to contextual and 
prior knowledge in an expanding web of interconnections, rather than trimming context 
and personal aspects to abstract the knowledge and remove nuanced expertise from it 
(Lobato 2012: 243). 
 
Failure of knowledge transfer is another big concern in the literature, something that is 
scarcely encountered as a possibility in the literature on interdisciplinarity. Typically in 
transfer studies one or another explanation for the failure to connect ideas is explored, but 
Michelene Chi and Kurt VanLehn (2012) took a different approach to understanding the 
problem: that the failure was not in transferring, but in having not learned the knowledge 
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 Dangerous in the sense of the potential overconfidence, which the presumption of expertise can develop. If 
transferred knowledge is missing essential nuance, but expertise is presumed regardless, this could lead to 
dangerous conditions in many fields. 
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effectively in the first place. Chi and VanLehn showed that both experts and novices could 
identify relevant surface features in a transfer situation, but that experts made much fewer 
extra or irrelevant identifications. They propose that this is due to the experts having the 
relevant deep structure knowledge to see the interactions between the surface features, and 
thereby quicker identify the relevant ones and not waste time on irrelevant ones (181).71 
When they examined the reasons for the choices each group made, there were no matches 
in the thought processes. Novices only looked at the surface features themselves, and 
recognised ones they had most encountered in similar situations (i.e. they recognised genre 
patterns), while experts mentioned the meaningful patterns of relationships between the 
surface traits. Chi and VanLehn recommend a pedagogic approach which focuses 
explicitly on developing the deep structure knowledge in each isolated example/lesson that 
might be required to recognise the transferable interactions between surface features across 
domains (183). For example, in situations dealing with measurement in different 
environments students should be explicitly instructed to consider the relationship between 
length and width in order to apply the concept of area to dissimilar cases. 
 
This could have a profound effect on the approach to interdisciplinary curriculum design, 
as it suggests that focusing disciplinary and deep structure explicitness and clarity may be 
more important for facilitating interdisciplinarity than breadth or number of disciplines 
covered (i.e. interdisciplinarity might be better learned from within deep immersion in two 
or perhaps even only one discipline, than learning surface features across many).72 
Drawing on Chi and VanLehn’s findings, deeper understanding may actually facilitate 
broader and more nuanced interpretation of categorical similarities between 
interdisciplinary elements.73 Conversely, if a bit of knowledge is only understood on a 
surface level, then only surface level sameness can be categorically compared to anything 
else.74 It is also reasonable to expect false-positives at this surface level (apparent transfer 
wherein deep similarities don’t really exist), and that there is likely to be very little 
transformative transfer or genuine integration of knowledge in either direction. The solitary 
undergraduate interdisciplinarian of IDS programmes is such a case, but this issue can 
translate into poorly constructed collaborative interdisciplinarity as well. This suggests that 
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 This relates strongly to the notion of causal categorisation as an advanced feature of categorising as well. 
See chapter 6. 
72
 This brings to the foreground the often unaddressed question of interdisciplinarity as knowledge of several 
disciplines or interdisciplinarity as the skill to integrate knowledge, though both concepts do still imply a 
solitary practitioner which is itself debateable. 
73
 This is one reason for the decision to look in more detail at the psychology of categorisation in the next 
chapter. 
74
 Categorical similarity is discussed in more detail in chapter 6 
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pedagogic development of deep knowledge structures may be essential to integrative 
transfer and therefore to effective interdisciplinarity.  
 
Time, Trust, and Qualification Frameworks  
One thing above all, be it constructed or objective, that our best efforts do nothing to 
mitigate the practical truth of is time. Financial, human and other resources can be 
negotiated. The situated environment of learning can be rebuilt or recontextualised. The 
value and means of truth and knowledge can be re-written entirely from one culture to the 
next. But no culture, context, or resource allocation has shown any capacity to alter the one 
constant that is time. IDS programmes, thematic university restructuring and many other 
interdisciplinary models profess to be able to develop some form of interdisciplinary result 
within a specific span of time, typically the three to four years of the undergraduate. 
 
“…only interdisciplinary studies can integrate what insights the various disciplines have to 
offer in the most comprehensive understanding currently possible” (Newell 2010: 363). 
This is a huge claim, and should have big evidence to support it, but there appears to be 
very little of this evidence available. Instead closures of IDS programmes in increasing 
numbers have been well documented in the pages of recent HTRoI literature. The three 
flagship IDS programmes of the early days of the AIS, for example, have all recently been 
closed, along with a string of other such programmes (Newell 2010; Thompson-Klein 
2010b; Wexler 2012).75 Further, experimental interdisciplinary universities like Murdoch 
have returned to disciplinary focused curricula, keeping only an ethos of promoting 
interdisciplinarity in students,  and the University of Melbourne has returned to a more 
discipline based curriculum, with only 25 units of the curriculum now mandated to out of 
discipline coursework (Marshall 2010; University of Melbourne 2010; King 2011). 
Speculations on the causes have varied. William Newell suggests that IDS may be 
evolving into a more widely accepted approach to general education, and that ‘ironically’ 
the originally programmes are now obsolete.76 Most other authors have not been so 
optimistic though, citing administrative bean-counting, narrow vision of funding bodies, 
‘institutional pushes against innovation’, overt disciplinary hegemony, or even the concept 
of academic standards itself (in a distinctively negative sense) as the cause (Henry 2005; 
Thompson-Klein 2010b; Wexler 2012). A different possibility though is that these 
                                                 
75
 Wesleyan University (Thompson-Klein), University of Miami, Western College (Newell), Appalachian 
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 There may be some truth to this analysis, but Newell appears to take the notion too far by suggesting IDS 
as the new face of university education. 
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programmes do not offer any consistent example of a recognised national or international 
qualification: they do nothing to engender trust in the abilities of their graduates. A steady 
feature in RoI on effective interdisciplinary collaborations is the degree of trust and mutual 
respect team members need to have in each other’s expertise (Lattuca 2001; Lyall and Tait 
2001; Bruce et al. 2004; Thompson-Klein 2005a; Boix Mansilla 2006; Spelt et al. 2009). 
Trust in the abilities of others is useful in a general sense as well though. A degree or 
certification confers a recognised judgement of trustworthiness to a certain level in a 
certain area of knowledge or skill. Qualification frameworks extend beyond these to 
attempt standardisation of the criteria for degrees across all or many subjects, and 
furthermore extend beyond a single department to institutional, national and more recently 
international scope (QAA Scotland 2012; Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation 
2005; OECD 2012):  
 
“The development of subject benchmark statements was one of a set of linked 
recommendations of the National Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education 
Report of 1997 (commonly referred to as the Dearing Report). Together with 
the development of national qualification frameworks, programme 
specifications, and a code of practice for the assurance of quality and standards, 
subject benchmark statements were seen as a means of making more explicit 
the nature and level of academic standards in higher education and, in turn, 
providing a foundation for students, employers and others to have confidence 
in the academic awards of higher education institutions” (QAA Scotland 
2012: 2). 
 
What these have in common is the intention to signify an amount of reliable trust which 
should be placed in the expertise of the person who holds the degree or certificate, or who 
meets the qualification standards. It is also in the degree of trustworthiness of expertise that 
competency interdisciplinarity, especially in its institutional form as IDS and thematic 
university structures, demonstrates its most profound problems, due to the extreme 
inconsistency between programmes: there is no standard. 
 
Qualifications are also a substantial marker of the emergence of new disciplines. 
Benchmarking a field of study requires considerable time and money, as well as prolonged 
consultation with field experts, which also means there must be enough of these to justify 
doing so (Szostak 2008; Hjørland 2008; QAA Scotland 2012; OECD 2012). When 
completed, however, benchmarks express a broad (though often generic and somewhat 




As stated above, proponents of competency interdisciplinarity have often criticised 
qualifications as an inherently negative neo-liberal form of control. Non-rhetorical 
justifications for these criticisms, however, are not given. While qualification standards 
surely can be a source of exclusionary or elitist control, they can also be a source of 
egalitarian and emancipatory development: the distinction being how they are developed 
and by whom. Standards based on demonstrable skill and the scientific method for 
example are inherently egalitarian.77 Standards based on a transparent democratic ethos 
and peer-review are inherently emancipatory.78 The Scottish Credit and Qualification 
Framework (SCQF), for example, considers social mobility one of the chief reasons for 
qualifications:  
 
“Why does Scotland need a framework of levels and credits?  
There are many different qualifications - for example, Standard Grades, 
Highers, SVQs, HNC/Ds and Degrees - and the Framework is a way of 
showing how they relate to one another. It shows that qualifications are 
broadly comparable, but it does not mean they are equal. The SCQF supports 
the Scottish Government's lifelong learning strategy and - now that there's 
more mobility of learners and workers across the UK, Europe and 
internationally - qualifications frameworks are the method by which learning 
will be understood globally” (SCQF 2014). 
 
My argument is not that standards are never used to exclude some views or to exert 
hegemony for its own sake. Rather that this represents bad practice, not bad theory and 
method, and that the resolution lies outside of the question of disciplinarity and 




There is no apparent dispute in the literature that what particular skills/traits we 
choose to assign to a particular level of expertise qualification is intersubjectively 
constructed. This is not the same, however, as suggesting that it does not or cannot 
have an empirical basis, or that such qualifications are merely relative such that some 
standards cannot be shown better than others. In the earlier days of guilds and 
medieval universities such standards could be established entirely by ‘masters’ 
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 This is based on the notion that demonstration of skill is relatively objective, and as Kimball noted the 
scientific method can be learned and used by anyone.  
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 Peer review and democratic ethos being the principle that control is distributed and egalitarian. This does 
not presume in either case that the egalitarian or emancipatory efforts are likely to be perfect, or that there are 
not substantial other social factors involved in a process as complex as higher education. My assertion is only 
that the principle of such efforts is egalitarian and emancipatory; the degree of success is then dependent on 
the quality of each process. 
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within a particular guild or university, a circular system which clearly did have a 
high potential for abuse. But the process of benchmarking and developing 
frameworks has moved on substantially since then, to become a largely transparent, 
regulated, and nationally and internationally distributed network of systems. 
 
The development of a qualification standard, be it for a single course, an 
undergraduate programme, or a complete international system is not based on whim, 
but on collected experience and in many cases extensive empirical data collection as 
well. The General Dental Council (GDC), for example, is a group of professionally 
acknowledged dentistry experts who deliberate extensively before publishing a 
detailed account of the skills that a new dentist must exhibit to claim that title 
(Bissell 2012; General Dental Council 2013). Similar professional bodies of experts 
exist to develop standards in many fields where substantial risk to humans or the 
environment are present, such as medicine, or electrical engineering (General 
Medical Council n.d.; IEEE 2014).  
 
Similar benchmarks are developed for all broadly recognised HE fields, often first at 
the national level, via organisations dedicated to this task. In Scotland this is 
represented by the joint efforts of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and the 
Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework (SCQF) group. The QAA works 
extensively with field experts (and professional accrediting bodies such as GDC) 
across the sector to develop comprehensive subject benchmarks. The SCQF 
establishes the national qualifications framework. The latter develops a generic 
structure of what approximate amount of expertise should be expected of a graduate 
at each level of further or higher education in Scotland in any subject. The former 
establishes the specific benchmarks of skill and knowledge that correspond to the 
SCQF levels in each subject individually. Combined, these are then coordinated with 
wider international qualifications frameworks:  
 
“A working group was convened in 2006 by QAA Scotland and Universities 
Scotland to verify, against criteria stipulated in the 'Bologna Process' in 
higher education, that the framework for qualifications of higher education 
institutions in Scotland is compatible with the framework for the European 
Higher Education Area (EHEA). The Scottish working group consisted of 
experts from the sector, students and international representatives, and 
progressed the verification process through SACCA under the auspices of 
the QAA Scotland Committee. The final report on the verification process 
was approved by the QAA Scotland Committee, and subsequently submitted 
to the Bologna working group on qualifications frameworks. It is hoped that 
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the Scottish verification report can inform the verification procedures in the 
remainder of the countries signed up to the Bologna process, each nation 
having a target date of 2010 to verify that their national frameworks are 
compatible with the framework for the EHEA” (QAA 2006: 4). 
 
Structure of Qualifications 
A consistent consensus in expertise research is that it takes approximately ten years to 
reach expert levels in any field (Ericsson 2005; Feltovich et al. 2006; Dane 2010). In terms 
of the academic disciplines the three to four years that an undergraduate spends in study is 
not sufficient for this. The title ‘expert’, however, is usually reserved only for those who 
hold a PhD or equivalent, and this does take nearly a decade to achieve (six years 
minimum if in England and not taking a masters, but eight years more commonly, ten if 
including two years of post-doctoral work, which is often expected on job postings). 
Effectively this says that the undergraduate degree is not a qualification to practice as an 
expert in a field, but rather completion of the novitiate stage and readiness to advance to 
further training. This is an important consideration for interdisciplinary curricula, because 
it means only a certain degree of expertise is expected. Acknowledgement that ‘expert’ 
status is not expected at the undergraduate level appears to be one source of some of the 
rationale for competency interdisciplinarity. Novice level expertise is not, however, simply 
an unqualified concept with no standards or bounds. It is important to be able to have trust 
in the skills of graduates, especially in the globalised world we now live in where mobility 
makes personal knowledge of the skills of others less likely.  
 
To understand how qualification frameworks intersect with interdisciplinarity it will be 
helpful to take a brief look at the origins of the most common markers of expertise. Several 
expertise researchers have addressed the problem of identifying expertise levels in some 
effective way while allowing for the vicissitudes of social construction, the most notable 
being Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) and Hoffman (1998 cited in Chi 2006: 22). Perhaps 
surprisingly, these studies have not presented entirely novel models for classifying 
expertise, rather they have revived and refined the medieval European guild model: novice, 
initiate, apprentice, journeyman, expert, and finally master. Table 4.1 shows the guild-
based levels and the descriptors as given by Hoffman. I have paired these with the 











Novice Literally, someone who is new – a probationary member. There 





Initiate Literally, a novice who has been through an initiation ceremony 




Apprentice Literally, one who is learning – a student undergoing a program 




Journeyman Literally a person who can perform a day’s labour 
unsupervised. An experienced and reliable worker, or one who 
has achieved a level of competence. Despite high levels of 
motivation it is possible to remain at this proficiency level for 
life. 
Postgraduate 11 
Expert The distinguished or brilliant journeyman, highly regarded by 
peers, whose judgements are uncommonly accurate and 
reliable, whose performance shows consummate skill and 
economy of effort, and who can deal effectively with certain 
types of rare or ‘tough’ cases. Also, an expert is one who has 
special skills or knowledge derived from extensive experience 
with subdomains. 
Doctor 12 
Master Traditionally, a master is any journeyman or expert who is also 
qualified to teach those at a lower level. Traditionally a master 
is one of an elite group of experts whose judgements set 
regulations, standards, or ideals. Also, a master can be that 
expert who is regarded by other experts as being ‘the’ expert, or 
the ‘real’ expert, especially with regard to sub-domain 
knowledge. 
Professor  
Table 5.1 Guild Expertise (adapted from Hoffman 1998) 
 
Transactive Memory Systems 
If developing personal expertise involves developing more efficient chunks and memory 
patterns to utilise the limited resource of STWM, then perhaps a form of collaborative 
expertise can do the same for the ubiquitous collaborative form of interdisciplinarity. But 
there may be complex social constraints on this, and a whole new type of expertise might 
need to be considered.  
 
“Interdisciplinary synthesis often takes place in an individual researcher’s 
mind. Yet many contemporary research projects involve so many researchers 
and disciplines that it is unrealistic to expect all relevant knowledge to be 
integrated in the cognition of a single individual. In these cases the synthesis 
takes place in distributed cognition, involving several individuals capable of 
melding theories, methods, and data from different disciplines. We know 
very little about the cognitive processes of knowledge integration, be they at 
the individual level or distributed among several individuals” (Huutoniemi, 
et al. 2010a: 86). 
 
The quote above is half right; much (perhaps most) interdisciplinary activity is indeed 
occurring in groups.79 What Huutoniemi et al. have missed, however, is the rich field of 
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research on the psychology/sociology of team cognition and group expertise thriving since 
at least 1985 (Lewis and Herndon 2011: 1254). We know quite a lot about ‘the cognitive 
processes of knowledge integration’ in fact, but this has not been coordinated with work on 
interdisciplinarity. The research that has been done comes in two forms that are of specific 
interest here: Transactive Memory Systems (TMS) and expert teams. These concepts are 
very similar, but have been developed and researched separately from each other. There is 
more research on the former than the latter.  
 
A Transactive Memory System is a specialised form of group-based distributed knowledge 
and memory construction, one that exceeds simple group work in much the way expertise 
exceeds novice abilities.  
 
“A transactive memory system (TMS) is the shared division of cognitive 
labor with respect to encoding, storage, retrieval, and communication of 
information from different domains that often develop in close relationships” 
(Lewis and Herndon 2011: 1254).80 
 
In a simple group environment each member works to develop as much personal 
knowledge of the collective pool of shared knowledge of all members as they need to 
resolve the project. This can take a long time replicating and sharing information, may 
cause considerable overlapping knowledge, and can lead to substantial confusion based on 
non-expert interpretations and miscommunications. Both problems are among the most 
widely cited issues facing interdisciplinary projects in the RoIR literature and beyond 
(Lyall and Tait 2001; Bruce et al. 2004; Thompson-Klein 2005b; Griffin et al. 2006; 
Huutoniemi 2012). In a TMS, however, members of the group work to develop a more 
efficient and less error prone shared knowledge of what skills and knowledge each other 
possesses in relation to their own, and learn to call on these like a phonebook or Google 
search.81 The distinction is analogous to the difference between a novice who must explain 
a complex concept in great detail, and an expert who can convey the same information 
with a single word or phrase. Members of a TMS do not seek to understand what others 
know themselves; they seek to be aware of how to access that understanding.  
 
A TMS can arise spontaneously from well-formed teams, but this can be achieved faster 
and more consistently via explicit pedagogic development, “...teams that had received 
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 The inclusion of ‘develop in close relationships’ is suggestive of the tacit concept of ‘near’ fields again, but 
in practice this can be taken to mean that the collaborative effort itself has developed in close relationship. 
This makes this aspect an important pedagogic feature. 
81
 In fact the process in individual terms has been referred to as the ‘Google Effect’, where individuals 
memorise where information is stored and can be accessed, instead of memorising the information itself 
(Sparrow et al. 2011). 
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team-skills training in problem solving, interpersonal relationships, goal setting, and role 
allocation were more likely to develop TMS than were non-trained teams” (Prichard and 
Ashleigh 2007 cited in Lewis and Herndon 2011: 1255).  
 
Expert teams are a similar notion to TMS, but while research on TMS has arisen from 
research into the psychology of group work, expert team research has developed out of 
expertise studies. A typical example is a professional sports team, the best of these being 
functional as expert in their field as a team, while each member is an expert at being a 
member of the team. The notion of an expert team, however, can extend to any field (Salas 
et al. 2006). An expert team of researchers would be a group which works so well together 
that the combined expertise of the group can be seen as an enhanced singular expertise 
unto itself, while each member is not only expert in their own discipline, but expert in 
being part of the team.82 The parallel between expert teams and TMS is clear. Such 
correlation offers substantial validation of the independent research in each field, and is 
something not achieved by RoI. 
 
 
Traits of Transactive Memory 
There has been considerable empirical research on TMS, the psychology of how they work, 
what enhances them, and what any downsides may be. A key benefit of TMS research over 
RoI is that the bulk of TMS studies include primary or at least secondary empirical tests of 
whether TMSs actually produce more effective, efficient or desirable results. In RoI this is 
all but non-existent, and where attempts have been made they remain unconvincing 
(Lattuca et al. 2004). Within this there is a near unanimous consensus that team 
performance is demonstrably enhanced in TMS situations over both individual work and 
over ordinary group work as well, which presents a problem for approaches to 
interdisciplinarity which consider individual and collaborative work to be compatible 
under the same definition.  
 
Lewis and Herndon (2011) reviewed the empirical findings of 30 years of TMS studies, 
and offer the following propositions to define TMS and its effectiveness:  
 
• “Proposition 1A. Compared with groups in which group cognition is 
limited to shared understanding of who knows what, groups with 
TMS will have higher performance. 
                                                 
82
 Not unlike a discipline perhaps, though this stretches the credulity of the notion a bit. 
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• Proposition 1B. The higher performance by groups with a TMS will 
be attributed to the degree to which the group’s knowledge is 
differentiated, evidenced by the diversity and depth of knowledge 
possessed by members and applied to the group’s task. 
 
• Proposition 2A. Compared with groups whose members have a 
shared understanding of who knows what, groups with TMS will 
demonstrate greater learning. 
• Proposition 2B. This greater learning in groups with a TMS will be 
attributed to integrations, evidenced by new knowledge that no 
member had previously possessed”  
(Lewis and Herndon 2011: 1256-1257).  
 
Propositions 1A and 1B establish that a TMS is not merely a group where the members 
share an understanding of what the others know about, but also that the knowledge of the 
group members must be differentiated, that is there must be different natures and sources 
of expertise to make a TMS. Propositions 2A and 2B establish the process of the superior 
performance exhibited by TMSs. The findings of the TMS research suggest that the 
increase is due to the differentiated nature of the expertise combined with the shared 
understanding, which creates integrated knowledge that becomes unique to the group. 
 
Not only is this effectively the same as many definitions of interdisciplinary integration, it 
also mirrors the claims to ‘betterness’ found in the HTRoI literature, except that many of 
the latter refer to solitary competency models. In the case of TMS the claims are backed by 
empirical studies of actual outcomes.  
 
“TMSs are thought to improve performance in workgroups because they 
facilitate quick and coordinated access to specialized expertise, ensuring that 
a greater amount of high-quality and task-relevant knowledge is brought to 
bear on collective tasks” (Lewis and Herndon 2011: 1254). 
 
This suggests that the ‘betterness’ is a result of collaborative work, and only a specifically 
formulated and developed type at that. The need to both define interdisciplinarity as 
collaborative and to explicitly develop the skills of TMSs as part of interdisciplinarity 
seems clear. 
 
Zhang et al. (2007) studied what conditions lead to the increased performance in both TMS 
development and TMS activities, something which could help develop interdisciplinary 
curriculum models. They found that task interdependence, cooperative goal 
interdependence and support for innovation were the elements most positively related to 
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developing good TMS, as well as further confirming that actual group output was also 











Figure 5.2 Factors of Transactive Memory (Zhang et al. 2007: 1723) 
 
Task interdependence refers to the degree to which each member’s tasks require 
information from other members. TMS (or interdisciplinarity) is clearly unnecessary if 
there is little or no task interdependence, i.e. wherein a single disciplinary solution would 
suffice. They also found that task interdependence increases as work complexity does, 
which supports some interdisciplinarity models that consider interdisciplinarity essential 
due to the complexity of the current knowledge environment or world problems (Gibbons 
et al. 1994; Newell 2001; Thompson-Klein 2001). Cooperative goal interdependence refers 
to the belief of each member that achieving their own goals aids in achieving the group 
goal. This was seen to promote the sense of shared purpose and facilitate mutual respect 
and communication. Again, these are elements commonly identified in the RoI literature, 
but without the benefit of empirical study they are not differentiable from mutually 
exclusive claims, nor are pedagogic models apparent.  
 
The third condition Zhang et al. list is institutional support for innovation. This translates 
clearly as a matter of administrative support for interdisciplinarity. Thompson-Klein 
(2010a) has made considerable claims in this regard to the effect that administrations must 
make space for interdisciplinary institutes, dual-hire staff, or give staff extra leave for 
interdisciplinary projects (Thompson-Klein 2010b: chapter 4). This approach ignores 
pedagogy and the nature of the curriculum itself as a more effective place to locate support 
for innovation, chiefly in support for models which develop the other two traits of TMS 













more with undergraduate curriculum, and will not look at administration of 
interdisciplinarity to any great degree. 
 
Two additional apsects of Zhang et al.’s study are worth mentioning. First is that the study 
was conducted in a practice environment, not a laboratory or university student setting, 
which substantially expands the scope of the findings on TMS in general, making 
comparisons to interdisciplinarity more viable. The second is that they tested the model 
they proposed against other models to determine empirically that theirs best explained the 
results (Zhang et al. 2007: 1728). This direct engagement with the problem of 
underdetermination is not seen in the RoI literature. 
 
Interdisciplinarity is a Transactive Memory System 
Although the literature on TMS almost never refers specifically to interdisciplinarity, it is 
clear that there is a close relationship between the concepts, TMS is by definition the 
coordination of different expertises (Wenger et al. 1985; Lewis, K. and Herndon, B. 
2011: 1256).83 In fact it may be correct to say that the best/ideal form of collaborative 
interdisciplinarity is always a transactive memory system. A TMS, however, need not 
always be interdisciplinary, due to the lines we draw between what is a discipline or a 
specialisation. A TMS requires differentiated expertise, whether or not these are called 
disciplines, interdisciplines, trades, talents, specialisations, etc. It is possible, for example, 
to have an effective TMS within the discipline of Archaeology in which each member has 
a non-overlapping specialisation of archaeology. TMS and interdisciplinarity appear to 
have a non-reciprocal definitive relationship much like squares and rectangles.  
 
Limitations and the Importance of Pedagogic Solutions 
Like expertise, many TMS benefits appear to come at a cost. For example, long-term and 
well developed TMSs appear to build the same cognitive entrenchment and rigidity 
sometimes found in individual experts (Skilton and Dooley 2010). If a well-developed 
TMS is viewed as a functionally singular co-created expert unit, then this should not be 
surprising. The effects of this can be seen in the evidence that loss of a key individual can 
cripple such a highly tuned interactive structure (remembering that the power of a TMS 
lies in each member not sharing the expert knowledge of the others) (Lewis and Herndon 
2012).  
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possesing an expertise which, however broad, has limits, as opposed to a more nebulous notion of simply 
possessing expertise. Recognition of the limits of an expertise is essential to the concept of collaboration in 




Considerable effort has also gone into resolving how to balance the efficiency and higher-
order output of a TMS with the apparent need for redundancy or other solutions in order to 
both work well and cope with change. Just as cognitive entrenchment may be mitigated in 
individuals through meta-cognitive awareness and flexibility training, we might expect 
TMS development to follow the same pattern, if team development training (or 
undergraduate interdisciplinarity training) included the same meta-cognitive flexibility. In 
fact, Lewis et al. (2007) found exactly this to be true when explicit training was given to 
groups displaying obsolete and rigid TMS patterns after the replacement of a key member. 
Initially the loss crippled groups, who got stuck in entrenched but now obsolete 
interactions. But when groups were instructed simply to reflect on the effects of the change, 
the rigidity not only vanished but overall group performance increased.84  
 
This suggests that balancing between developing a strong TMS and also cycling in new 
members periodically may lead, with proper training, to a progressively increasing 
interdisciplinary output.85 An effective curriculum around this goal would be essential at 
the undergraduate level in order to make the most of the longer timeframe and lower levels 
of entrenchment available there. The links to explicitness in the curriculum  as an 
expedient to developing TMS (and thereby potentially interdisciplinarity) were 
demonstrated by Lewis’s study, and also Prichard and Ashleigh’s analysis of the positive 
correlation between TMS training and performance.  
 
An Alternative Expertise Model? 
Lastly in this chapter it is worth reviewing an alternative model of expertise, which does 
not appear to have much connection to the main field of research on the subject, but which 
has recently been adopted by some proponents of IDS and competency based 
interdisciplinarity: the ‘interactional expertise’ of Harry Collins and David Evans (2007).86 
Interactional expertise refers to a specific range of skills which allow a sociological 
researcher or journalist to engage in conversation about a field as though they possessed 
the expertise to perform as an expert, but without having this capacity. The model calls this 
a fully fledged type of expertise such that in conversation it is empirically impossible to 
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 This also correlates with Chi and VanLehn’s (2012) recommendations about explicitly training students to 
see the underlying features of a problem. 
85
 Presumably the increase would level off at some point 
86
 Collins and Evan’s model is not mentioned in any other accounts of expertise outside of the close circle of 
Social Studies of Science of which Collins is a pioneering figure. Likewise Collin and Evans make no 
mention or reference to any other existing research on expertise that would justify that their model is situated 
within the wider academic understanding of the term. 
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tell the difference between a practicing expert in a field and an interactional expert who 
can merely talk about the field. It is largely a misnomer to refer to this as a theory of 
expertise instead of a theory of communication, but the appeal of such a model for 
proponents of competency interdisciplinarity is clear. It allows the outward appearance of 
expertise without requiring the time necessary to develop the expertise in practice (Addis 
2013a, 2013b; Doing 2011).   
 
Collins and Evans do not suggest that interactional expertise is a replacement for real skill, 
but in much the same manner as Foucault’s work has been used to validate the negativity 
of power (although Foucault did not say as much directly), proponents of IDS have 
suggested that interactional expertise is indeed a valid replacement (Adams 2012: 12). 
While Collins and Evans’ work has clear (and useful) value for validating the degree of 
theoretical understanding of a field that highly trained journalists and ethnographers can 
possess after considerable immersion, it has no wider value, and certainly does not validate 
that competency interdisciplinarity curricula develop real expertise.  
 
Summary 
The research on expertise and development of such offers a clue to why it is important to 
pursue a theory and comprehensive framework of interdisciplinarity instead of trial and 
error teaching and post-hoc evaluations. Both of these are good, but both are also the 
methods of novice practitioners, not experts. Research of Interdisciplinarity needs to 
become an expert field. 
 
This chapter has considered the current state of empirical research on the psychology of 
expertise, including the expertise related fields of knowledge transfer, qualifications and 
standards and transactive memory systems. The goal throughout has been to relate non-
circular and well-formed findings to some of the unresolved problems of disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. A number of salient ideas about each have emerged from the research 
so far.  
 
After familiarising with the basics of expertise research it was revealed that expert 
knowledge is qualitatively superior to novice knowledge in most regards, but that it comes 
at the price of domain-specificity, entrenchment and an inability to transfer knowledge. 
Personal epistemology appears to account for some of the negative aspects, such as 
inflexible thinking and biased thinking. Barbara Hofer suggests there may be pedagogic 
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ways to develop more flexible personal epistemologies as meta-cognitive skills. Expertise 
requires automaticity though, in order to develop the high-order decision making and skill 
of being expert, and automaticity creates entrenched knowledge and lack of transferability.  
 
Competency interdisciplinary proponents suggest that transfer happens automatically as a 
result of interdisciplinarity. Although expertise and knowledge transfer researchers 
universally disagree with this statement, several propose a similar solution to entrenchment. 
There have been several studies to demonstrate that removing expert nuance from 
knowledge by abstracting it, or more directly resisting developing expertise at all past a 
point can increase knowledge transfer and flexible thinking. But this comes at a cost as 
well. The knowledge transferred is surface knowledge only, and prone to errors and 
redundancy: expertise and the qualitative better and faster decision making that goes with 
it are lost. 
 
Some have offered other solutions, such as building layers of explicit transfers practice into 
developing expertise, or focusing on the interconnections between deep structures of expert 
knowledge. Both are pedagogic solutions, requiring to be implemented as expertise is 
being formed. This suggests a possible pedagogic solution to developing expert 
interdisciplinarity, and that it may need to start as undergraduates.  
 
Next we considered measuring expertise, in the form of academic qualifications. 
Qualifications develop recognisable trust in the abilities of those who hold them, an 
essential element to collaborative interdisciplinarity according to those doing it. Many of 
the failures of IDS and other competency programmes appear to be due to a lack of 
consistent programme goals and coherent qualifications: the expertise they develop is 
unrecognised and unreliable. Some proponents of competency interdisciplinarity have 
opposed qualifications on principle as a form of control, but most academic frameworks 
and benchmarks are transparently developed on rigorous processes of expert analysis.  
 
Finally, this chapter looked at collaborative expertise in the form of transactive memory 
systems. These are special expert teams which exhibit the same benefits and problems as 
individual experts, but on a higher level and with additional capabilities. TMSs are also 
inherently interdisciplinary, in that they require differentiated expertise to achieve results. 
TMSs also require expert skill, unlike competency interdisciplinarity. Unlike RoI, TMS 
research has consistently demonstrated that TMSs perform better than individuals and non-
TMS teams. Further, TMSs can be trained, there can be a curriculum model for expert 
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collaborative interdisciplinarity via TMS research. TMSs also display the same problems 
with entrenchment as individual experts, but being teams with distributed knowledge, this 
has been shown to be easily corrected by simple training, even producing better results.  
 
The expertise benefits and trust which are desirable versus the cognitive entrenchment 
inflexibility and lack of transfer this creates presents a ‘paradox of interdisciplinary 
curricula’. To learn enough expertise for interdisciplinary transfer to be worthwhile 
typically means having become entrenched, domain-specific and unable to effectively 





Chapter 6: Categorisation 
Introduction 
Traditionally (meaning throughout the 20th century at least) it has been a dominant 
assumption that disciplines need to be viewed as separate bodies, and that any discussion 
of them can start from this basic point. But not only has a small but sometimes popular 
stream of inter/trans/non/a-disciplinarity literature suggested that disciplinarity and 
classification of academic knowledge is either unnecessary or undesirable, but recent 
trends in globalising technologies such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) could 
conceivably challenge disciplinary borders by removing delivery of content from 
established departments.87 But even without any push to end the division of knowledge, we 
should still ask how we know that we need to be dividing knowledge into sections, and 
more importantly, is there a best way to do so?  
 
At its base the study of categorisation is about answering questions of how and why we 
make categories, of any kind. Psychological approaches tend to consider categorization as 
a cognitive, developmental or neurological process, to be tested and explained via complex 
models and experiment (Danks 2007). It is very similar in nature to the psychological 
research on expertise, and in fact there is a small amount of cross-over.88  
 
The bulk of publication on the psychology of categorisation has been of empirical studies. 
Most publication is in journals and follows the familiar IMAD format.89 Collections of 
essays are also common more recently, and these typically take an overview of the 
empirical research either to provide a general look at the field, to review the collective 
evidence for a particular model, or occasionally to speculate on a new model before 
experiments have been done. I have made a point of looking at both types of publications, 
though most of the wider insights come from the latter set. 
 
There are three chief areas where categorisation research informs the analysis of 
interdisciplinarity: 
  
                                                 
87
 So far no such case has manifested, and indeed may not. 
88
 There is also considerable study under the heading of sociology of categorisation, but this is a quite 
different field, being concerned with the historical and political development of social categories such as 
race, class, gender, etc. Although some of this research can and has been linked to interdisciplinarity, it is not 
the focus of this thesis. 
89
 Introduction (literature review), Methods, Analysis, Discussion. 
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• whether knowledge classification is necessary at all, a fundamental question given 
the presence of transdisciplinary and non-disciplinary models of knowledge such as 
‘mode 2’, 
• how are disciplines best distinguished, and are there patterns or reliable trends in 
categorisation research which can help to understand this, 
• how, why, and under what conditions should novel categories such as new 
disciplines, hybrid disciplines, interdisciplines, fields, studies, etc. be made, and 
where do they best fit?  
 
As with expertise research, before delving into these questions it is important to lay down 
the core principles of categorisation research. The next few pages are devoted to this. 
 
Core Principles of Categorisation 
Supervised and Unsupervised Categorisation 
One of the most fundamental and most widely agreed upon aspects of categorisation is the 
distinction between supervised and unsupervised categorising. Although extensive research 
has been done to understand the mechanism and principles of each, the concept is simple. 
Unsupervised categorisation is any creation of categories or classification of things into 
existing categories that a person can perform without aid, specifically aid in the form of 
instruction and feedback (Pothos et al. 2011b, 2011a; Sagi et al. 2012). Supervised 
categorisation is creation of categories or classification which is done via training and 
feedback. Unsupervised categorisation further refers to categorisation which is 
spontaneous, self-directed, or ‘natural’. This normally implies that an individual is forming 
new categories from new input. If there are existing categories these are likely to have 
come previously from supervised categorisation, or even if unsupervised, they are likely to 
have been intersubjectively or experimentally confirmed since and therefore have an 
element of supervision as well.  
 
It should be clear that prior experience plays a large role in this part of categorising, and 
that after time it can become very difficult indeed to isolate purely unsupervised 
categorisation from categorisation which is at least partially based on existing supervised 
categorisation. Novel supervised categorisation is easier to isolate, as this requires active 






The core notion of how we categorise, prior to any discussion of what models or methods 
we use to do it, is that we must as humans selectively ignore some aspects of things in the 
world. Something that is considered essential for all categorisation is that it requires 
selection or differentiation of some kind (Medin et al. 1997; Rehder 2003; Kruschke 2011; 
Pothos et al. 2011a). If we can ever perceive that more than one experience occurs in time, 
it is because we have the capacity to say they are not the same occurrence (Kant 2012). If 
that is the case, then it is in a different category as the other experience, even if that is 
merely ‘this one happened first, that one happened second’. As noted in the previous 
chapter we do appear to be subject to time, the differentiated nature of which we exhibit no 
ability to pragmatically refute, therefore we cannot be conscious and aware and fail to 
categorise (Harnad 2005). This is normally expressed in terms of selective attention; that 
those aspects of a thing which are considered by a person to be critical for categorising it 
are those which receive attention.90 The unavoidable side-effect of this notion is that some 
things do not receive attention.  
 
This may seem like an obvious statement such that it hardly need be mentioned. Of course 
we can’t pay attention to everything all at once, but this apparent obviousness can lead to 
dismissal of the underlying importance of holding onto the idea (in a way similar to the 4 
foils of pragmatism), and this, I believe, leads to many problems with ‘unity of knowledge 
models’ such as ‘mode 2’ and others. There are further questions derived from this simple 
concept which are critical to understanding knowledge differentiation and 
interdisciplinarity such as: 
 
• how many things can humans pay attention to simultaneously (which seems likely 
to invoke Miller’s Law),  
• to what extent do conceptual or perceptual similarities between things matter,  
• what role does prior experience play,  
• what role does subject expertise play,  
• is selective attention irrevocably unconscious or can we explicitly learn to be better 
at this and to use more efficient models (i.e. is there ‘expertise’ at attentiveness)? 
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Simplicity, Similarity and Typicality 
Moving up from the notion of selective attention we get to the most basic of the models for 
how conscious categorising takes place. This is known as the simplicity model, and it is 
almost universally regarded as valid in the literature, though there is considerable 
discussion of the details and reach of the model (Danks 2007; Pothos et al. 2011a; Sagi et 
al. 2012). Essentially the simplicity model says nothing more profound than that we place 
things in categories when the average similarity of things within the group is greater than 
the average similarity of things between groups with regards to the features we are 
attentionally focused on. What is or is not similar to different people in different situations 
then becomes of great concern to researchers, because although the basic principle of the 
simplicity model is not much contested, how it actually manifests in practice is much more 
complicated. In categorisation research within-group similarity is referred to as ‘typicality’, 
denoting qualities which are typical of members of that category. This is similar to the 
statistical concept of ‘central tendency’, being the range within which the overwhelming 
majority of results fall. The connection also to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblances’ has 
not gone unnoticed (Lakoff 1987: 12; Pothos and Wills 2011). The core question remains, 
‘how do we determine which things are more or less like each other?’ This same question 
is also at the heart of determining periodicity in history: how do we distinguish one period 
of history from another, what features make a point in time more medieval, more antique 
or more modern? How different medievalists responded to this question was an integral 
aspect of my interviews, which I will return to in chapter 7.  
 
The principle of typicality/similarity lies at the core of understanding pluralist models of 
interdisciplinarity, as well as considering collaborative and solitary interdisciplinarity to be 
the same broader concept. Pluralism proposes many different interdisciplinarities by 
suggesting that the within-group similarities of each discreet type are greater than the 
between-group similarities to a single type, which would otherwise suggest a single 
definition for interdisciplinarity. Conversely, considering both solitary and collaborative 
interdisciplinarity to be part of the same category suggests that the within-group similarity 
of the single concept of interdisciplinarity that covers both approaches is greater than the 
between-group dissimilarities of solitary practice and collaborative practice. I do not 
believe either of these claims is well justified in the literature.  
 
Models of Categorisation 
How we actually develop and differentiate categories from the core cognitive features 
above is where the bulk of research in the field has been focused. Pothos and Wills (2011) 
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not only include chapters on at least twelve different models in their edited collection 
Formal Approaches to Categorization, but they also list nine more which they have not 
included but which are also influential in the field (2011: 1). It may appear that this would 
support the pluralistic nature of several approaches to interdisciplinarity: that if there is so 
little agreement on the nature of categorisation this may be because there are a variety of 
equally valid types. The appearance of disunity is misleading though.  
 
The difference between this ‘letting a thousand flowers bloom’ approach and the type of 
pluralism present in the RoI literature is that in categorisation research each of these 
models is a single self-contained model which represents analytical structures to explain 
details of one or more of three widely accepted ‘core models’ of categorisation, themselves 
not seen as incommensurable but rather as complementary and inter-related to each other 
(Danks 2007). Each new model can be tested and compared with others in isolation, and 
can be disregarded without throwing the baby out with the bathwater. In RoI, however, 
entire pluralistic structures are the models, and are considered holistic and indivisible (in 
the Quinean sense as discussed in chapter 2). That is each new model is itself a plurality, 
and although a very general core definition of interdisciplinarity may remain similar, the 
models are typically incommensurable or are meant to be.91  
 
Briefly, the three ‘core models’ of categorisation are Exemplar, Prototype and Causal. 
Exemplar categorisation involves the individual mentally comparing a new stimulus to a 
series of actual examples of other things to determine which are more similar. If nothing is 
very similar a new category may emerge (Nosofosky 2011). Prototype categorisation 
involves comparing new information to an abstracted ideal mental model of the category 
derived from many different examples, which represents the aggregate features of these 
(Minda and Smith 2011). This can be significantly faster than direct comparison to each 
real example of something which our memory holds, but clearly it can also lead to 
oversimplification by reducing attentional selection to idealised traits which may not 
represent any one actual example. This was the revelation of Wittgenstein’s ‘family 
resemblances’, that all members of a category can be related without there being any single 
trait which all members have. This oversimplification may help explain some of the 
overconfidence and missing surface features problems with experts as well. A faster, more 
effective categorisation model could be more stereotype than prototype in some cases, 
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 Some more recent efforts have attempted to assimilate other pluralistic models, but with limited success 
(Huutoniemi et al. 2012). 
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leading to more apparent expertise than real expertise.92 Most categorisation theorists hold 
that we actually use a combination of these, depending very much on the situation and our 
prior experience (Pothos and Wills 2011).  
 
The third model, causal categorisation, has been proposed more recently by Bob Rehder 
(2003). Causal categorisation involves creating or placing things into categories based on 
cause and effect relations between them and existing members of various groups. This can 
mean either adding a new thing to a group because it shares a causal link to an existing 
member, or adding it to a relational group of ‘caused by’ or ‘cause of’ the main group. In 
essentialist views of interdisciplinarity, hybrid disciplines would be a good example of a 
new category formed in a many-to-one ‘caused by’ relationship to the cognate fields. As 
research on this model is relatively new, there are still many open questions. It is not yet 
clear whether causal categorisation supersedes or supplements the other two models, or 
whether it applies only in certain cases, where causality can be determined, and otherwise 
we default to the other methods (Hayes and Rehder 2012).93  
 
There is speculation and some research findings to support the idea that all three models 
may be developmentally sequential and active also in most people concurrently (Hayes and 
Rehder 2012). This suggests that we begin with the most basic and least cognitively 
stressful type, exemplar categorisation, then rather quickly we progress to being able to 
generate and apply prototypes, and finally we appear to develop causal categorisation 
abilities, which become more complex with age as well. Hayes and Rehder recently 
demonstrated that five to six year olds appear to be able to make simple causal 
categorisations by determining whether the expected cause or effect is present, but from 
around age nine upwards we increasingly rely instead on causal coherence - whether both 
cause and effect are present or missing together (Hayes and Rehder 2012). Causal 
categorisation is presumed to be the most complex and the most mentally taxing (but also 
the most nuanced), and thus develops latest. This is also a form of categorisation that has 
been related to the development of expert reasoning (Rottman et al. 2012).  
 
Rottman et al.’s study is important because it effectively confirms the findings on deep 
structure knowledge leading to better transfer found by Chi and VanLehn (2012), but from 
the direction of causal categorisation research. The study tested whether expert students in 
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 This was one of the chief reasons that Ericsson insisted on demonstrable expertise over self-reported, and 
why I am looking for the same in terms of interdisciplinarity. 
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 Interestingly, the specific nature of unity and differentiation between these models in the research suggests 
to me a potential similar unity of postmodernism, empiricism and hermeneutics. 
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the physical sciences could make connections between concepts and situations outside of 
their domain focus better than novices if there were similar causal links between the 
concepts to ones they were familiar within in their fields. Rottman et al. found that experts 
did indeed show an ability to transfer concepts or recognise similar situations outside of 
their expert fields if the causal connections were similar, just as Chi and VanLehn found 
that transfer occurred much quicker and better in experts who had the deep structure 
knowledge to see interactions (possibly causal connections) between surface details. Not 
only does this further suggest that deep expertise must be developed for good 
interdisciplinary thinking, it suggests that this may also be a route to mitigating domain 
specificity without resisting expertise as Dane (2010) and others have suggested. 
 
Limitations of Current Research 
Recently D.L. Medin produced a short analysis of the state of methodologies and foci 
within the field addressing what he saw as several on-going shortcomings (based on a 
review of work in the field since 1980). It is important to review Medin’s concerns both 
because they provide some contextual limits on how far to take evidence from 
categorisation research, but also because several of Medin’s concerns are similar to my 
own concerns with the RoI literature (I have excluded some technical elements of the 
list):94 
 
“1. Although concepts serve multiple functions (categorization, inference, 
communication, etc.) virtually all attention was directed at the 
categorization function of concepts. 
 
2. Although there was a body of work on natural language concepts and a 
body on artificially created concepts...and similar empirical results, the two 
literatures had little, if anything, to say to each other.  
 
3. Almost all the adult research was conducted with undergraduate students 
at major universities. 
 
4. Almost all of the adult research used tasks that could be completed 
within an hour and nearly always involved exactly two categories. 
 
5. Virtually all of the empirical work was on supervised categorization. 
 
6. The models of categorization focused primarily on predicting transfer 
performance to a new stimuli given after a category training period. 
 
7. The stimuli themselves tended to be visual figures having little meaning 
or relevance to research participants. 
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8. The representation of the stimuli was assumed to be fixed and subject 
only to attentional weighting...Furthermore, the constituent features or 
dimensions were assumed to be independent and relational properties were 
ignored... 
 
9. There was relatively little categorization research in the cognitive 
neurosciences...”(Medin 2011: 236). 
 
This suggests that my concerns with the RoI field are not entirely unique, and may even be 
common to most specialised or disciplinary research. Medin also suggested the need for 
more direct connection between categorisation and expertise research.  
 
Categorisation and Interdisciplinarity 
The ‘Tree Study’ 
I will consider several studies below, but one by Medin et al. (1997) bears a bit of 
introduction as it is complex and it suggests links between several elements of this thesis at 
once. The study was designed to see whether different types of expertise led to different 
categorisation schemes, and why. To test this Medin et al. used different types of tree 
experts, each with notably different utilitarian applications of tree categorisation: 
 
“Participants fall into three broad groups: taxonomists, landscapers, and 
maintenance workers. Taxonomists are principally engaged in research, 
teaching, and other educational activities. Landscape workers focus on 
design, aesthetic, and utilitarian aspects of trees. Maintenance workers focus 
on planting, pruning, and generally maintaining city trees” (Medin et al. 
1997: 55). 95  
 
The researchers noted that these categories were neither perfect nor mutually exclusive, but 
represent a continuum of tree expertise types.96  
 
Two experiments were conducted. The first considered what categories of trees each group 
created spontaneously, and their reasons. Each group was asked to “put together the trees 
                                                 
95
 The use of tree experts is compelling for categorisation research, like chess for expertise studies, because it 
allows for study of distinct groups who converge on the same activity in different ways. Also because tree 
categorisation is not, in most cases, already steeped in social and political rhetoric and debate. 
Inter/disciplinarity does not share this trait, being integral to the identity and economy of individuals, 
institutions and even nations. As with expertise research, there are apparent correlations between this study 
and disciplinarity, but we must keep an eye on the degree of difference as well.  
96
 Another notable aspect of the study, which conforms to other research on expertise, is that considerable 
expertise on the subject had to be developed by the researchers in order to conduct the study effectively and 
interpret the results. In the study of disciplines this has been noted as well by Shopkow et al. (2013), that to 
consider expertise in different disciplines they would first have to acquire enough expertise to do so 
effectively (this is perhaps a useful application of Collins and Evans’ ‘interactional expertise’). 
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that go together by nature into as many different groups as you’d like” (Medin. 2011: 57). 
Then participants were asked to collate these into as many higher order groups as desired, 
and to split the initial groups into as many sub-group as desired. Participants were not 
asked to categorise trees they did not recognise. The common textbook taxonomy of trees 
formed the baseline against which each group’s categories were gauged. Categories were 
deemed ‘scientific-taxonomies’ if they conformed to the textbook taxonomy, and ‘folk-
taxonomies’ if they diverged substantially. The results were consistent and reliable for 
each group. “Taxonomists tended to produce taxonomies which were both broad and 
deep...In general maintenance workers’ taxonomies were broad but shallow...[landscape 
personnel’s] taxonomies tended to be narrow but deep” (Medin et al. 1997: 90).  
 
The second experiment considered whether the groups used the same or different reasoning 
as in the first experiment for categorising new information. Each group was shown a triad 
of cards where one was a tree with a ‘novel’ property, and they were asked to say which of 
the other two it best classified with. The results suggest a great deal of things about how 
interdisciplinarity has been handled, especially in terms of relative levels of expertise. 
These will be considered over the next few pages.97  
 
 
Natural Categories - Optimal Categories 
Much of the work on the psychology of categorization not only suggests that some aspects 
of human categorisation are innate/automatic (such as colour vision) but also that nature 
really does exist in some degree of universal or ‘optimal’ categories (Medin et al. 1997; 
Harnad 2005; Hayes and Rehder 2012).  
 
“The notion of a privileged level can be thought of in absolute or in relative 
terms. If a level is absolutely privileged, then categories at that level should 
be extremely salient, virtually ‘‘crying out to be named’’ (Berlin, 1992, p. 
53). Such categories might well figure into other, special-purpose 
taxonomies as primitives and would seldom if ever be broken up. 
Alternatively, a level might be relatively privileged, in that categories at a 
given level are more likely to appear across subjects, are more inductively 
powerful, and are more coherent than categories at other levels, but are not 
                                                 
97
 In a sorely under-represented piece on the nature of interdisciplinarity, Rainer Bromme (2000) relates a 
very similar set of studies he has conducted with chemists (130). In a first test chemists of various types were 
asked to categorise acids by which were more typical as a common example of an acid (which represented 
the ‘prototype’). There was substantial agreement on several acids, but not so on many more. Some were 
more typical than others. In the second study Bromme asked them to categorise again, but this time 
imagining they were doing so for a teaching environment. Again there were consistent patterns, but based on 
the application the categories were different. This study not only corroborates with Medin et al. (1997) on 
goal-driven categorisation and optimal categories, but also with Schunn and Anderson’s finding on 
hierarchies of practical expertise.  
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reified or universal to the extent that absolute privilege would imply” 
(Medin et al. 1997: 51). 
 
Whether this is due to nature occurring in, “strikingly discontinuous bundles that impose 
themselves on human cognition”, or there are “universal cognitive tendencies” that 
predispose us to see certain categories is less clear (Medin et al. 1997: 50, 91). Nature in 
this case is not personified and does not make ‘decisions’ about categories as such, rather 
humans appear to be able to reach strong consensus about some categories without aid or 
much disagreement. I would argue that disciplinarity likely falls into the second type here, 
a relatively privileged category. This would suggest that disciplines are not likely to be 
unsupervised optimal categories, but that they may very well be supervised optimal 
categories, i.e. intersubjectively optimal, not subjectively optimal. I will refer to these 
concepts as ‘optimal’ categories henceforth, rather than ‘natural’ as this can be a contested 
term.  
 
Results in the second part of the ‘tree study’ supported that the scientific genus level 
category was privileged by all groups: it was optimal.98 Participants matched new trees 
increasingly and consistently towards their own folk-taxonomies if a match to the scientific 
taxonomy was not apparent at the genus level. That is, the further from the base or ‘optimal’ 
category a classification became, the more they used their own folk-taxonomies instead of 
the scientific one. Relating this to expertise and interdisciplinarity, it suggests that the more 
nuanced or specialist a field is, the less likely anyone from a non-cognate field will 
recognise it in favour of their own more personal categories of fields and disciplines. 
Importantly, the study refutes that ‘nearness’ of subject-matter is the key factor in this, 
which is presumed in much of the RoI literature (Newell 1994). Rather it appears to be that 
the ‘nearness’ of the level of categorisation to the privileged or optimal categorical level 
matters most. This means that the ‘traditional’ and well travelled disciplines would be easy 
to categorise new subjects into for any academic (humanities, social science, STEM), but 
newer and more nuanced hybrid or interdiscipline groupings would be less likely to be 
used over personal ‘folk-taxonomies’ of disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity except by 
those within these new groups.  
 
Rottman et al. (2012) also found that certain categories consistently exhibited high-
consensus without feedback. These studies, as well as several others cited by Medin et al., 
                                                 
98
 Genus is the most recognised level of scientific categorisation of trees (and indeed most things which have 
scientific taxonomies). It contains many of the ‘common’ names for trees such as Elm, Birch, and Oak. Many 
trees also have alternate common names which are not parts of the genus category (Medin et al. 1997, 51). 
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suggest that there may be something psychologically consistent with optimal categorisation 
that is very much like Miller’s Law: there may be a human constant of categorical 
size/complexity. More research would be needed to find out what this may be. Following 
from the principle of chunking and similar research on TMS, however, if such an optimal 
size does exist it is also reasonable that as the academic community or wider society 
becomes itself more complex, this optimal size/complexity may also increase. Academia as 
a community could be getting more expert at categorising disciplinarity.   
 
Creating/Placing New Academic Categories - The Lure of Pluralism 
Pothos, Chater and Hines (2011) demonstrated compellingly that unsupervised 
categorisation of novel items or concepts is increasingly easy as groupings become more 
high-consensus, obvious, or optimal. This is a widely accepted finding, but they also found 
that this was easier to do when participants are free to create greater numbers of categories 
(at least up to five in the study, it is reasonable to suspect that Miller’s Law may come into 
play here). Conversely, the study showed that once the new categories were made, 
supervised categorisation of the same items or concepts by other participants (not those 
who created the categories) was significantly harder the more categories there were. The 
researchers found that if the difficulty of learning more than two supervised categories was 
factored out, the predictions based on the simplicity model were nearly identical for 
supervised and unsupervised, suggesting that it was the act of learning new existing 
categories that accounted for the difference.  
 
Additionally, it is a widely confirmed finding in categorisation research that humans can 
distinguish things which differ substantially or obviously much faster than ones which are 
more similar (Sagi et al. 2012). When differences are pronounced not only is 
categorisation quicker, but also consensus is easier to reach without the need for debate, or 
much of it (Sagi et al. 2012; Bahrami et al. 2012). The more similar things become, 
however, the more nuanced and open to debate the distinguishing features become. We can 
no longer safely presume easy consensus about how to categorise, and we then need to 
justify our categories to others, who are increasingly less likely to agree.  
 
This process reverses, however, when participants are asked to explain why they have 
made the categories they have. We are much more able to explain differences of fine 
nuance between similar things than between substantially different things (Sagi et al. 
2012). This study showed that the reason appears to be related to the need to overlay and 
compare the images or concepts in order to isolate the difference, which is clearly easier 
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for more similar items. The quicker identification of dissimilar things actually occurs 
because this overlapping step is bypassed. As soon as we can determine that two things do 
not easily map to each other, we can forgo further more complicated comparison.  
 
This finding has considerable impact on understanding interdisciplinarity as a means of 
developing new fields and disciplines, such as hybrids, interdisciplines, IDS programmes, 
or even pluralistic models of interdisciplinarity as holistic new categories themselves.99 As 
these new categories each represent a more nuanced level of classification over and above 
established disciplinarity, the justification becomes easier to articulate for the individual or 
group who creates it. But it also becomes more necessary due to the lower likelihood of 
consensus the more dissimilar or distal from existing categories the new ones are. In terms 
of expertise this suggests that a number of new interdisciplinary fields (particularly highly 
technical or specialised ones) may only be identifiable or justifiable to quite high-level 
experts who can recognise the distinctions, and may not be sensible to others. Drawing 
again on the ‘tree study’, the more nuanced and distal these categories become from the 
base category the less ‘optimal’ they become; they become the folk-taxonomies of those 
who make them, which will then not be sensible to others who have their own unrelated 
folk-taxonomies. 
 
This is perhaps the simplest and most compelling argument against pluralism in 
interdisciplinarity. While it is relatively easy and may seem, therefore, productive to create 
more and more categories and interrelated structures of interdisciplinarity, these will 
become increasingly difficult for others to learn and use effectively. When there are also 
many conflicting models with no clear empirical means to determine the relative value of 
each the justification for pluralistic interdisciplinarity becomes increasingly untenable.100  
 
As such some new fields, such as Women’s Studies or Medieval Studies, may not seem 
justified to academics who are not engaged with the study itself, even when their own field 
allegedly forms part of the new field, because only those with trained expertise in the new 
field may have the level of expertise to understand either the justification of the differences 
or the utility of the new field. This appeared several times in my interviews with 
medievalists when they were asked whether Medieval Studies should be considered a new 
                                                 
99
 Each of these create new categories of some kind. 
100
 It should be noted, however, that if a well evidenced and high-consensus pluralistic model of 
interdisciplinarity were able to emerge from the pack the story might be different. Pluralism is not inherently 
problematic as a concept, but it is in convoluted and contested cases such as the current state of RoI. 
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discipline. Several were confused over why it would need to be, because students could 
already take joint-honours options if they wanted to. 
 
Pure and Applied Categories 
In the second experiment of the ‘tree study’, taxonomists had an expectedly very high rate 
of categorising the new trees by the scientific taxonomy. Interestingly though, the 
landscapers matched more of the new items to scientific categories at the genus level as 
well. The landscapers abandoned their previous goal-oriented folk-taxonomies and instead 
placed the new properties of different trees into the scientific taxonomy. Although the 
goal-oriented categories were effective for the landscapers in their working operations, 
either they were not seen as the most effective for categorising new data or there was 
another reason that the scientific system was used. Medin et al. suggest that the new 
properties did not match any utilitarian traits of the trees that the landscapers would 
normally form their categories from, so they defaulted to the most appropriate other model 
which was the common optimal genus category. Whatever the reason, it is clear that 
multiple categorisation models were operating simultaneously, and without apparent 
hindrance to each other. This suggests that the transient, goal-oriented collaborations that 
make up much interdisciplinary work can effectively have their own thematic or 
application based categorisation of their place within the disciplines without any need to 
supersede or contradict disciplinary structures.  
 
In terms of interdisciplinarity, the differences between tree experts is much like the debate 
in the RoI and disciplinarity literature over applied and pure fields: between real-world 
concerns and academic ones. Recall that this argument is typically proposed from a pro-
interdisciplinarity ‘real-world-problems’ perspective, which is normatively dismissive 
towards disciplinary ‘pure’ fields. By exclusion this suggests that these are not ‘real’ or ‘of 
the world’, the clear implication being that the traditional disciplines are less useful or 
desirable. In the ‘tree study’, taxonomists’ categories tended to ‘reflect’ nature (in as much 
as we support a realist view of trees), while landscapers’ categories tended to impose task 
related features onto nature. This could be misleading though (much as the pure/applied 
distinction itself may be misleading), because the task of a taxonomist is to ‘reflect’ nature.   
 
Medin et al.’s study demonstrates that normative posturing may not be necessary to resolve 
the effective differences between different applications of disciplinarity. There is expertise 
in each, but the purposes are distinct. Medin et al. in fact, caution against over-emphasis of 
goal-oriented categorisation as, “goals do not necessarily partition the full set of entities in 
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a domain” (Medin et al. 1997: 54). That is, there may be a more all-encompassing category 
or categorical structure which admits each goal-oriented model within it. A model of 
interdisciplinarity which allows for multiple goal-oriented valid approaches to disciplinary 
categorisation within a single coherent understanding of both disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity would be ideal. 
 
A Little Knowledge? 
Something else interesting occurred in the ‘tree study’ though, unlike landscapers, 
maintenance workers did not prefer the scientific taxonomy for new categories over their 
own folk-taxonomies. Maintenance workers more often chose their own folk-taxonomy for 
categorising new tree properties, even though their folk-taxonomies were closer to the 
scientific ones than the landscapers, which would seem to suggest that they should be more 
able to use the scientific taxonomy than the landscapers. Something which is not discussed 
by Medin et al., but expertise research suggests, is that the maintenance workers may have 
been overconfident or biased by personal experience in their expertise at categorising. 
They may have had the confidence of the partially-expert, or have been operating with 
personal epistemologies of the positivistic type (in terms of the scientific taxonomy), 
believing with some certainty that their own folk-taxonomies were actually the scientific 
ones, or that theirs were based on equally rigorous criteria. The landscapers, however, may 
have been sufficiently novice at scientific categorisation of trees to be aware of the folk 
nature of their usual categories. This is notably an extrapolation from limited data on the 
maintenance workers’ reasoning, and would need to be researched further. For example 
they may have preferred their own folk-taxonomies simply because they were aware that 
the scientific taxonomy was not as well suited to their work. But if there is truth to the 
partial-expertise notion, then it would provide very strong evidence against the competency 
models of interdisciplinarity, where the goal is to allegedly be able to effectively use the 
output of a fully-formed discipline, but with only minimal expertise in it (Thompson-Klein 
2005; Repko 2008).  
 
Summary 
Although we must categorise, being aware of this fact does not tell us how much or to what 
extent. In this chapter we have considered the state of research on the psychology of 
categorisation. The study of categorisation builds on a hierarchical network of principleles 
which extend from the most basic essential functions of human awareness: that we can 
discern that one thing is not another thing, through selective attention, unsupervised or 
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automatic ‘natural’ categorisation, to supervised or deliberate and practiced categorisation. 
The models for how we go about these build in complexity as well, each nested 
hierarchically or developmentally within each other. Initially there is basic simplicity and 
typicality, where we group things which are more alike. Next come exemplar, prototyping 
and causal categorising in order of complexity, speed and nuanced effectiveness. There 
may be a parallel between causal categorisation and deep structure matching in expert 
knowledge transfer, based on the use of causal connections between the deep structures to 
recognise categorical similarity and make the transfer. This further suggests that there may 
be an alternate path to a more expert and effective curriculum of interdisciplinarity than 
competency.  
 
Categorisation relates to interdisciplinarity in several other ways as well though. There is 
substantial evidence in the research to suggest that there are clear ‘natural’ or optimal 
categories, which I propose may be related to a basic human range of selective attention 
capacity not unlike Miller’s Law for chunking. In terms of interdisciplinarity it seems clear 
that the discipline is this optimal category. A number of studies revealed that creating 
many new categories is far easier for the creator than it is for others to learn. Further, the 
domain specificity of expertise suggests that nuanced categories created by experts, such as 
new hybrid or interdisciplines, will not be sensible to non-experts, and will thereby be 
ignored or unused. This suggests that pluralism is simply an ineffective approach to 
developing interdisciplinarity. By adding more levels of complexity, created by experts in 
interdisciplinary theory, these will be unintelligible and unhelpful to others. Added to this 
is the unregulated plethora of such models, with little to tell them apart. These imply that 
pluralism may be the least effective means to promote and develop effective 
interdisciplinarity in any broader sense.  
 
Similar problems occur when considering the categorisation of collaborative and solitary 
interdisciplinarity as the same category, especially considering the strong distinctions made 
in the previous chapter regarding TMSs.  
Categorisation research in general suggests that seeking a singular definition of 
interdisciplinarity, one that specifically places itself well in relation to the most optimal 
academic category which is disciplinarity, should be the most effective route to building a 
curriculum model likely to be understood by the most people. Considering as well the 
proposed basic unity of academic practice in the scientific method, there should not be 
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substantial epistemological barriers to a single concept of interdisciplinarity, as have been 
suggested in the past to support some pluralistic models.  
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Chapter 7: Medieval Studies in Practice 
 
Method of Analysis 
The best way to integrate the interview data into this thesis was a troublesome issue. 
Originally the intention was to conclude each chapter with an evaluation of the interview 
questions that related to that topic. It was this mapping of the themes to the questions 
which provided much of the overall structure of the initial research design. However in 
practice this method not only split the coverage of the interviews across the thesis so that 
there was little continuity in discussing medieval issues, but it also interrupted the 
continuity of the narrative across the chapter themes themselves. A similar structure was 
employed with some success in Lisa Lattuca’s 2001 Creating Interdisciplinarity: 
Interdisciplinary Research and Teaching among College and University Faculty, but there 
were two key differences. First, Lattuca was not focusing on addressing the nature of 
curriculum and disciplinarity in a specific field, as I am. Second, Lattuca considered the 
interview data to be of equivalent or even greater value for determining the nature of 
interdisciplinarity, whereas I consider it only marginally useful for this in any direct sense.  
 
Taking Social Practice Theory as inspiration, the analysis below attempts to balance 
between the narrative and deep subjective meaning found in discourse analysis, and the 
aggregate synthesis devoid of subjective meaning found in quantitative analysis. The focus 
is on the decentred comparative nature of the practices and views described, but with the 
understanding that making sense of these also these requires attention to the nuance and 
meaning of each narrative to make coherent comparisons. Neither narrative nor 
quantitative analysis alone is sufficient.  This should not be viewed as a ‘mixed method’ 
approach, which would include both quantitative and qualitative analysis separately, but 
then synthesised. This approach is intended to intrinsically display both some quantitative 
and some qualitative data in a single analytic pass. To help realise this goal, I have relied 
on visualisation of the results as the main method of analysis. 
 
Specifically, a mind-map visualisation approach has been taken to present the results. This 
appeared to be the best way to analyse and display comparisons among the interview 
responses and the patterns that emerge from these. Although visualisation of interview data 
is not entirely new, it is uncommon, and this is a new approach to qualitative analysis in 
this area of study. I believe it can reveal a great deal of patterns and trends which are 
invisible or occluded in more traditional narrative or statistical approaches. The benefits of 
 162 
 
this approach are that the full spectrum of responses can be viewed together, grouped into 
major trends and with cross correlations where these were notable. The maps have been 
structured to allow reading of them to be clear and consistent.  
 
Each map extends from the interview question. The first branch of nodes in each map is 
the collated patterns of results as I have coded them. This layer only represents actual 
responses if there are no additional branches attached. In most cases, however, this branch 
represents my interpretation of the actual responses into themes.  
 
The next branch in each map, extending from the collated themes, is the actual responses 
of the interviewees. These have been set as short quotes, paraphrases or single-word 
responses, rather than long quotes; the reasons for this are both abductive and practical. 
Abductively the patterns of the responses are clearer when individual quotations are 
normalised slightly to highlight the theme of the statements. Practically, long quotes would 
not fit onto the mind-maps effectively, and would present problems for the ethical 
requirements of anonymity of the participants in many cases. 
 
The final branch of the maps, which has far fewer entries, represents additional points that 
participants made about their primary responses. In each case these additional points are 
attached to the response they relate to. In some cases there have also been significant 
connection between responses across themes, and the mind-mapping software used for the 
analysis makes demonstrating these connections possible. It would be possible to draw 
links between nearly all responses to some extent across themes, such connections have 
been reserved for those which appeared most relevant only. 
 
Due to the  page real estate that the words interdisciplinary and disciplinary require, these 
have been replaced in the maps with the symbols Ѫ for interdisciplinary and ₯ for 
disciplinary. The exact form of each word should be clear in context, but has been 
indicated as well by adding characters after the symbols (e.g. Ѫty is interdisciplinarity, ₯s 
is disciplines). 
 
It will be clear that there are significantly more than seventeen responses in each map, the 
total number of interview participants. In most cases participants gave multiple responses 
to the questions. It was important for the comparative analysis of the results to look at all 
of the statements made, especially as some participants made almost contradictory 




The maps themselves represent the bulk of the analysis of the interview results. Narrative 
analysis was kept to a minimum of highlighting patterns that emerged, as it is the maps 
themselves which are intended to demonstrate these. Some nuances such as tone, hesitation, 
and comparative relationships between different questions were not able to be captured in 
the maps; these have been addressed in the discussions which follow each map. 
 
Also, there were a few questions which did not lend themselves as well to the visualisation 
approach, either because they were too complex for a single map to be readable on the 
page, or because a different method of analysis seemed more appropriate. These will be 
identified in the analysis itself below, and are addressed more narratively.  
 Interdisciplinarity







Figure 7.1 Interdisciplinarity 
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[N = 16] 
There are several important patterns that emerge here. The first is the very broad and often 
contradictory approaches to interdisciplinarity even among a reasonably localised group of 
scholars working in the same field, many of whom know of each other or have even 
worked together. Aside from the multi-tiered question on epistemology, this question 
generated by far the most wide ranging and complexly layered results. Unlike pluralistic 
models of interdisciplinarity, it is not at all clear that there was any functional pattern of 
situational or methodological differences between the different concepts, merely that there 
was no consensus or common understanding.  
 
It was also clear, however, that there were strong patterns in the answers at a deeper level 
than the surface of the definitions. These patterns focused on the essential elements of 
interdisciplinary actions and practice. The most obvious pattern was the notion that 
interdisciplinarity was simply normal practice, or that it was a necessary function of doing 
one’s work (these two notions not being quite equal). There was a significant counter-trend, 
however, suggesting that interdisciplinarity is rare, is often ‘bogus’, or is overstated. This 
again suggests a lack of consensus. Another substantial trend was that interdisciplinarity 
must be collaborative or that it must involve expertise in more than one field (again, these 
are related but not the same). This trend also had some opposition, but not as much. Lastly, 
a surprising number of participants initially indicated that they did not feel 
interdisciplinarity could be defined, that they could define it, or that it should be defined. 
 
What is also clear is that there was only one response which suggested anything like a 
competency approach (“dabbling boldly”). There was also a trend of tacit disciplinary 
essentialism present in most answers, in the form that only a few participants clearly 
attempted to consider the question from outside the focus of their own field and what other 
disciplines could bring to it. 
 
 
 Do you see interdisciplinarity as individual or collaborative, either or both?
 
[N = 16] 
There were a few clear trends in answers to this question. In one capacity or another, the 
majority of answers favoured collaboration as either the only way to do interdisciplinarity, 
or the preferred way. There was, non
individual interdisciplinarity, at least on the surface of the answers. This is consisten
the background of the humanities more generally, where collaborative projects are not the 
norm yet, though this appears to be changing.
 
Answers in favour of individual interdisciplinarity were consistent in specifying that this 
required considerably more time to achieve, because substantial expertise would be needed 
in each subject. In several of the answers it was stated or implied that this meant that 
individual interdisciplinarity was rare in practice, or as one participant called it ‘bogus’.
These answers are consistent with other accounts of interdisciplinarity in Medieval Studies. 
In a published 2006 conference on interdisciplinarity between chiefly Archaeology and 
History two separate presenters focused substantially on the problems with insuf
expertise or excessive time commitments for solitary interdisciplinarity









 (more below). 




Another theme that was consistent with whether participants favoured collaborative or 
individual approaches was that expertise in one’s own discipline was essential to any 
attempt. Further, awareness of the state of other disciplines was necessary. Each of these is 
consistent with the answers given later for ‘what makes a good interdisciplinary 
researcher?’, showing a stable pattern across the questions. 
 
Epistemology 
Can you discuss what you think of the terms ‘truth’, ‘validity’ or ‘evidence’ in 
Medieval Studies? 
[N = 16] 
Because this question was effectively three separate but interrelated questions, a visual 
map of the responses would be far too large and interconnected for the space available. 
There were very strong patterns in the responses though, as well as a few notable outliers. 
 
The single largest trend was that no participant suggested that there was such a thing as 
objective ‘truth’, all were very clear about this. Most expanded this to suggest that there 
were definitely better or worse answers and definitely some that were simply wrong. Two 
participants did, however, suggest a more relativistic approach of equally valid multiple 
truths. It is important to note that each of these identified as literary scholars of some kind, 
and it was either explicit or implied that this relativism referred chiefly to truths of literary 
meaning.  
 
Approaches to evidence were also very consistent across all interviews. Responses such as 
“evidence is everything” or “yes, as much of it as you can get” were common. Many also 
noted the very wide range of types of evidence, and suggested that the need for expert skill 
at evaluating these was why interdisciplinary collaboration was important. All participants 
suggested either directly or indirectly that evidence is not ‘pure’, in that it is always 
affected by our own choices, prior knowledge, and interpretations.  
 
There was also wide agreement on defining validity, though a few participants expressed 
confusion at how this term was to be taken, such as whether it was meant to imply 
objective truth? Validity was seen as the essential link between evidence and the 
impossibility of truth. The majority (13) focused on validity as the building of a strong 
coherent argument from the evidence. Validity was also equated directly to ‘rigour’ by 
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several participants, as well as to being what most defines academic activity. Peer-review 
and making ‘good’ arguments were also commonly mentioned. The coherence of the 
responses is compelling support for the place of the scientific method as a core academic 
method, even in the humanities. 
 
An interesting change occurred though in answers to the follow-up question “Do you 
perceive that there is general agreement on these terms among medievalists...?” Regardless 
of the strong agreement across the disciplines which was demonstrated in the first question 
(which is also consistent with the wider literature), about half of the respondents indicated 
that there was only limited pragmatic or functional agreement across the disciplines on the 
approach to truth, evidence and validity, and that there was with substantial debate and 
disagreement beneath this. Specifically this was regarded as a generational issue more even 
than a disciplinary one, though some participants did specify discipline based differences. 
A few also suggested that disagreement on this matter was good, even essential to 
academic debate and progress.  
  
 Disciplinarity 








Figure 7.3 Disciplinarity 
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[N = 16] 
Responses here fell into several quite clear themes, none of which were unexpected, except 
for the again quite high number of participants who initially declined or felt they could not 
or should not try to define a discipline. This was seen as well in the responses to defining 
interdisciplinarity. What the maps do not show, however, is that it was in most cases 
participants who were willing to define one who were then hesitant or unwilling to define 
the other. 
 
Strong themes of social construction (even in the form of institutional construction) 
dominated the responses. Only a few responses suggested anything approaching a subject-
matter based objective definition of a discipline. The nature of these responses is not 
surprising for a humanities field. The same question asked of academics in an 
‘interdisciplinary’ STEM field would be interesting to compare with these. Most 
interviews on interdisciplinarity and RoIR studies have not asked this question though. 
 
 Expertise 









[N = 15] 
What is most notable here is that the responses were highly uniform and that they conform 
quite closely to the skills desired of interdisciplinary researchers and team members in 
STEM disciplines from the RoIR literature:  
 
• Curiosity about, and willingness to learn from other disciplines 
• Flexibility and adaptability 
• An open mind to ideas coming from other disciplines and experiences 
• Creativity 
• Good communication and listening skills 
• Ability to absorb information and its implications rapidly 
• A good team worker (Bruce et al. 2004: 464). 
 
This suggests there may not be much difference between the ‘two cultures’ when it comes 
to interdisciplinarity and how to facilitate it. It further suggests that there may be room for 
a generic structure of interdisciplinary curricula, likely embedded in disciplinary or field 
contexts, which could be applied across the domains from arts and humanities to STEM, 
and even the creative arts. 
 
Also present was a strong, usually explicit, undercurrent of collaborative necessity either in 
the form of communication skills or understanding one’s own limits and seeking external 
expertise, though the latter could include an individual reading external sources rather than 
direct collaboration.101 This was true even of several participants who had previously said 
that interdisciplinarity was or could be a solitary endeavour.  
 
Notably, it was the same participants that identified interdisciplinarity as rare or difficult 
who also suggested that the necessary skills for interdisciplinary work were hard to come 
by.  
 
                                                 
101
 There was an undercurrent in some interviews which suggested that consulting the published work of 
other fields, especially monographs, was a form of collaboration: this is a debatable perspective but one 
which is slightly beyond the scope of this project. 
 Do you think this [Being a Good Interdisciplinary Researcher] can be learned 
or taught?  
 
[N = 14] 
No participant suggested that being a good interdisci
Most participants suggested that any student could be taught to be interdisciplinary, though 
several did suggest instead that it was a proclivity, talent or intrinsic interest in the student 
which needed to be develo
It was clear, however
reasonably optimistic 
implemented in theory. It was also clear
the current curricular or administrative structures were a hindrance to this, or that there 
were key elements which might be difficult to achieve. 
plinary researcher could not be taught. 
ped if it was present. One likened it to ‘leading a horse to water’. 
, from the tones of the responses that most participants were 
that a curriculum of interdisciplinary development 











The order in which learning needed to take place was mentioned by several participants, 
most suggesting interdisciplinarity needed to be taught early. This suggests a tacit (or 
explicit) awareness of the problems of cognitive entrenchment, though when this is 
coupled with the strong need for disciplinary expertise that most participants also 
considered essential to interdisciplinarity, the previously mentioned ‘paradox of 
interdisciplinary curricula’ is clear in practice as well as theory. This suggests a more 
delicate balance needs to be struck. 
 
 








Figure 7.6 Medieval Skills 
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[N = 16] 
The results here appear to fall very well into a few simple categories, which would indicate 
a possible core skill/knowledge base for Medieval Studies, something that might imply 
burgeoning disciplinary identity. But the details are a bit more questionable. The 
‘languages’ core skill for example was mentioned in some way by nearly all participants, 
with Latin being a clear leader as a necessary skill. However, there were almost as many 
responses suggesting that Latin was not a required skill for a medievalist, especially if one 
was focused on visual and material culture in some way.  
 
On the one hand this suggests an implicit disciplinary essentialism in presuming a textual 
hegemony over the study of the period, and on the other it suggests essentialism in reverse 
by presuming that students could be studying only archaeology or art history and would 
not need languages. One would expect a fully integrated Medieval Studies not to include 
either situation. 
 
There do, however, appear to be several core skills that might suggest a base for a 
disciplinary approach to Medieval Studies: a generalised understanding of historiography 
and source criticism (being the skills of interpreting historical sources of any kind), a 
knowledge base of the culture of the period (particularly church culture was mentioned), 
languages of some kind, and an awareness of what the various specialisations of the field 
entail (archaeology, history, literature, art history, religious studies, etc.). 
 
 Categorisation 




 Figure 7.7 Define Medieval 
 178 
 
[N = 17] 
The only question which actually asked participants to actively categorise, to a limited 
extent, was how they would define or differentiate the medieval period. This question 
produced a wide range of results, but in fairly uniform groupings. Some had a quick and 
easy start and end point in mind, others felt there was no suitable way to demarcate the 
period, and a third substantial group felt it was context dependant (either by discipline or 
by geographic region of study in most cases). There was some indication of discipline 
specific leanings, but the sample size is too small in each to reliably draw conclusions. 
 
What is only somewhat clear in the map is that even though more than half of the 
participants gave the fall of Rome to the Reformation as a date range for the period, there 
was a strong general resistance to the reality of a period-based categorisation as anything 
but pragmatic at a surface level. Most described at some length how or why the period has 
been traditionally demarcated, is merely professionally or pedagogically expedient, or 
should not be demarcated at all. No participant offered dates for the period without 
substantial caveats. That the identification of the same general period was contingent on 
specifically which culture or geographic region was the focus of study was frequently 
stated. This is consistent with Chazelle and Lifshtiz’s assessment as well. There was also 
clear acknowledgement that periodisation was contingent on which discipline was asked, 
as the features of the period which were important to each appeared and disappeared at 
different times in different places. A considerable amount of the responses could be viewed 
as describing a range of measures of selective attention suggesting that the Middle Ages is 
too broad for maintaining attentional focus on as a single unit.   
 
Many participants were clear that the periodisation of the Middle Ages was a received 
value that merely had to be worked with pragmatically in order to be understood outside of 
the expert circles of their own research. There was some sense in a few interviews that the 
discipline of History held some hegemony over the others in terms of periodisation, but 
more responses placed the source of the periodisation on the establishment of the 
disciplines in the 19th century, or on the scholars of the renaissance who sought to create an 
‘us versus them’ self-identity as better than the ‘dark ages’ and more like the enlightened 
classical period before it.102  
  
                                                 
102
 The similarity of this notion to the arguments for interdisciplinary ‘betterness’ have not gone unnoticed. 
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Nature of Medieval Studies  
This table shows the answers given to two different questions about how to perceive 
Medieval Studies side by side: ‘Is Medieval Studies interdisciplinary’ [N=9] and ‘Could or 
should Medieval Studies be considered a discipline in its own right’ [N=16]. 
Is Medieval Studies Interdisciplinary? Could or Should Medieval Studies be Considered a Discipline? 
Hard question. Maybe not interdisciplinary 
enough? College system limits interdisciplinarity 
and collaboration 
Yes, it could. Seems best at postgraduate level 
"If you put two medievalists in a room they will 
have formed an institute in about 30 seconds." Yes, 
because it pushes against institutional structure 
No. No matter what anyone says, primary academic 
disposition is formed by the home discipline. Medieval 
Studies can't be a home discipline itself, the subject is 
too big and is negatively defined 
Contingent on context. Very different from 
institution to institution, from UK to US, early 
medieval to late - and that's okay. Early medieval 
has to be interdisciplinary, late not so much. 
It can be, in some places it should, some it shouldn't. 
Good to have horizontal and vertical colleagues both. 
Ideal if both systems running in same place. 
It is certainly interdisciplinary, it has people with 
different expertise’s working together 
Hard question. It could become a discipline, but would 
it lose its connection to the disciplines? 
By definition it is interdisciplinary, it is a concept 
lifted out by people realising one discipline can't 
look at Middle Ages 
Not a problem, it already is. Don't need to justify it. It's 
an interdisciplinary discipline 
Depends on individual perspective and training, 
difficult to label Don't know, no view on it. 
It is inherently interdisciplinary, always was where 
I learned it 
No, not necessary. Works as is with people in own 
subjects, better chance of encountering new ideas. 
Might get isolated if made a discipline 
Yes, that makes sense. I would be able to know 
what fits.  
Would be hard for UG, but could work in America. 
Intellectually not a problem, structurally and 
organisationally difficult. York tried but let it go. 
Needs to create its own environment. Early and late 
medieval need to be separate 
Yes, it really has to be to do it well 
Not sure, it's an artificial boundary already which is 
already covered by many disciplines and connects to 
before and after. Regional sympathies seem to override 
periodicity 
  
No “I suppose the comparison would be things like 
Regional Studies or National Studies, Cultural 
Studies...Cultural Studies is still so problematic. Area 
studies isn’t a discipline is it?” 
  “Not thinking much but no.” 
  
No “if you were going to train up a medievalist from 
the age of 18 as an undergraduate they would have to 
be doing courses in five or six different subjects”. It 
would be great if the right options did exist.  
  
Maybe, because disciplines are fuzzy anyway. But 
then it includes other fuzzy disciplines, maybe and 
'interdiscipline'? 
  Yes, certainly, only reason it isn't is tradition 
  
Yes and no. Only problem is not having time to learn, 
it would be superficial. Could do a base and then 
specialise. 1st and 2nd year general Medieval Studies 
core concepts/methods 
  It should be…but how? Split early and late medieval 
makes sense. But how to sustain something like 
'generic research methods for humanities'? 
 Figure 7.8 Medieval Disciplinarity 
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The first question was asked very early in the interviews. The second question was asked at 
the very end. Not all participants addressed the first question directly, usually because they 
had already implied an answer while responding to an earlier question. Each row of the 
table represents the responses from the same participant for comparison. 
 
The clear trends here are that Medieval Studies was consistently seen as interdisciplinary, 
usually inherently so, without much debate or dissension. The potential disciplinarity of the 
field, however, met with a much wider range of responses, and the general sense was that it 
might be possible, but would not be desirable or institutionally feasible. Notably though, a 
few participants were strongly in favour of the idea. 
 
  
 Medieval Studies Undergraduate
“Hypothetically, if Medieval Studies we
how do you think this would fit with the existing disciplines which commonly make up the 
field?” 
 
[N = 14] 
Regardless of the positive or negative answers to the previous question about whether 
Medieval Studies could or should be a discipline, participants were asked at the end of the 
interviews to imagine how an undergraduate Medieval Studies programme might look
there were one. In most interviews I specified that this could be viewed as a discipline or a
an interdisciplinary programme, so as not to collide with the previous question. 
 
Three substantial patterns emerged. Several participants focused on how unlikely this 
would be for staffing or institutional reasons, though at least one suggested that it
possible if it was administratively driven. 
developing such a programme would be feasible, perhaps even easy, by dual
 
re to be offered as an undergraduate programme 








 was quite 
suggested that 
-coding or 
.9 Medieval Undergraduate 
 182 
 
‘piggy-backing’ onto the existing medieval course offering of the cognate disciplines, and 
adding a capstone and introductory course. Finally a few participants were somewhat 
incredulous about why there would be any need or desire to do such a thing, because 
students were already able to take a range of medieval modules if they wish in the first two 
years in the Scottish higher education system, and further could choose joint-honours if 
they desired to be interdisciplinary.  
 
Undergraduate teaching experience 
“In undergraduate teaching, have you ever taught in an interdisciplinary manner, such as 
team teaching, switching between different areas of your own expertise, or including 
evidence or material from another discipline in a course?” 
 
One of the areas of interdisciplinary curricula that this thesis has intentionally not focused 
on is module by module pedagogy, preferring to look towards a broader notion of 
pedagogic reform. I did question medievalists about their own experiences with 
interdisciplinary teaching, however, and some of the insights are worth noting, even if 
much of the discussion was more particulate than the broader focus. Five participants said 
they have never engaged in interdisciplinary teaching in their practice. This left [N=12] 
who indicated some self-identified interdisciplinary teaching experience. 
 
Interdisciplinary teaching was in every case discussed as something that occurred in some 
modules and not in others, though a few participants implied that this could/should be 
more common or normal. Most participants referred to team-teaching on large survey 
courses and specialist honours courses, or guest lecturing in courses in other disciplines. 
There was no consistent view on how well this worked, how integrated the knowledge was, 
or whether interdisciplinarity should be made explicit to students or not.  
 
Some preferred to discuss the transfer of ideas across source types with students, but 
without mentioning disciplines. Others were explicit about all features of interdisciplinarity. 
Still others felt that this only caused students to believe the task was difficult and therefore 
likely to fail, while if they weren’t informed they performed well and without fear (‘look, 
you’ve done it’). None of the participants discussed actual development of the skills that 
they had mentioned when asked about what makes a good interdisciplinary researcher. It 
was implied, though not entirely clearly, that these were presumed to be a natural result of 
interdisciplinary coursework and teaching, much like Newell’s assertion that such skills are 





Some strong patterns emerged from the interviews as a whole. Many of these correspond 
well to the research in the previous chapters. In many cases this was clear at the surface, 
though in a few cases the patterns had to be extrapolated at levels beneath the surface 
statements, such as the definition of interdisciplinarity itself. The integration of the 
interview data with the rest of the evidence to form conclusions is the focus of the next 
chapter, however, a few connections and trends are worth mentioning here briefly. 
  
It was clear that defining interdisciplinarity and identifying what is required to do 
interdisciplinary work are approached very differently. The former question elicited a wide 
range of responses and reactions, and a substantial amount of resistance to even supplying 
an answer from several participants. The latter question, however, produced none of the 
same trepidation or hesitation. Although the answers to the second were in a general sense 
consistent with the trends found in answers to the first, in the second question these trends 
were much clearer and more focused. What these suggest together is that describing 
interdisciplinarity as ‘thing’ does not make much sense in the realm of actual practice. Not 
only were answers relatively focused, clear, and consistent when participants were asked 
about the active practice of interdisciplinarity, but the answers to the being asked to simply 
define interdisciplinarity fell into similar patterns anyway, though more haphazardly and 
amidst contradictions and doubt.     
 
A similar comparison can be made between descriptions of disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity. While disciplinarity was consistently defined in terms of boundary 
conditions of some kind (tradition, administrative value, subject properties, method, etc.), 
interdisciplinarity was consistently defined as a practice. The manner in which the 
questions were asked undoubtedly had some effect on this (define a discipline, define 
interdisciplinarity), but the fact that disciplines were almost never defined in terms of 
practice may be significant.  
 
Another interesting finding here, which is not clear from the map, is that several 
participants who were quicker and more articulate with definitions of interdisciplinarity 
then struggled or declined to define disciplinarity. The same was true in reverse, with those 
who were able to offer definitions of a discipline quickly often being those who declined to 
define interdisciplinarity. This could imply a number of things, or may even be merely 
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coincidence, but one possibility which coincides in a general sense with other research is 
that by defining one, many conventional definitions of the other become difficult to 
maintain. This is an extension of the essentialism problem. By clearly defining 
interdisciplinarity, it appears that this may not leave room for a credible definition a 
discipline, or the reverse. Another possibility is that the concepts of either disciplinarity or 
interdisciplinarity simply do not make practical sense to some people, at least in terms of 
their own practice. The alternative which I find most compelling though is that the two are 
simply not the same type of ‘thing’ at all, but the names suggests they should be, and this 
confuses many attempts to define them. This is why I approached asking about 
interdisciplinarity in several ways. 
 
Another important trend which is not visible in the maps appeared in the question on 
epistemology. Several of the self-identified literary scholars suggested that knowledge was 
constructed and uncertain in their own field, but that historians in particular were 
positivists/objectivists. All of the historians interviewed, however, expressed the same 
constructed and uncertain nature of knowledge as literary scholars, and further suggested 
this was the common approach in their field. Recent literature on theory of history suggests 
the same (Coloma 2011; Korostelina 2008; Kleinberg 2007).  This perceptual disconnect 
corresponds to the narrow domain specificity of high levels of expertise. This suggests 
misperceptions of other disciplines as being inherently less nuanced than one’s own, which 
may again be tied to the increase in within domain nuance that expertise engenders. 
Further, this trend may indicate a degree of highly specialised ‘folk-taxonomy’ such as 
positivistic history. This categorisation, if consistent, could have an impact on the 
prospects of interdisciplinary communication. 
 
In 2006 a conference was held in York with the title Approaching Interdisciplinarity: 
Archaeology, History and the Study of Early Medieval Britain, c.400-1100. The articles 
published from this conference in 2009 address many issues of expertise and disciplinarity 
quite succinctly in regards to medieval studies. The comments of several of the authors 
illuminate a clear recognition of the loss of depth that interdisciplinarity creates which is 
consistent with the interviews above. Of particular concern for several presenters were the 
problems with attempting solitary interdisciplinarity:  
 
“However, all too often the use of evidence from other disciplines will 
consist of using select examples of material culture as illustrative...or visa 
versa by a historical parallel analysis which does not consider fully the 




“No interdisciplinary study can approach source material with the in-depth 
approach of a specialist. It is therefore tempting to accept without question 
the interpretation of specialist reports...However, much more value can be 
gained from specialist reports by acquiring enough expertise to understand 
the primary data...” (Holas-Clark 2009: 25). 
 
Holas-Clark additionally noted that doing an interdisciplinary project itself required 
narrowing the potential scope of the project significantly to make allowance for this extra 
training (Holas-Clark 2009: 25). This loss of depth can be seen in terms of expertise as an 
effect of domain specificity.  
 
The most consistent assault on competency interdisciplinarity was that each paper 
addressed concerns of actual experiences of misuse of their own field by those from other 
fields claiming interdisciplinarity. For example, Morn Capper cited a statement concerning 
Clifford Geertz, “...that historians made the cardinal sin of following an anthropologist, not 
anthropologists, and certainly not anthropology” (Goodman 1997: 784-9 cited in Capper 




Chapter 8: Discussion 
Disciplinarity 
A definition of interdisciplinarity must rest on knowing how to define a discipline (or so it 
appears).That the formation, functioning and perpetuation of disciplines are largely social 
events is not controversial. Regardless of the details, the evidence for this as a basic 
pragmatic fact is almost incontrovertible; we can trust this like we trust gravity. But is 
social construction a prime mover, or is it an emergent property of other factors such as the 
psychology of expertise and categorisation? The approach here has been to view these 
practices as arising within demonstrable conditions of possible practice. Piaget suggested 
that no discipline exists that does not emerge from a splitting or combining of previous 
ones, and this could be taken to imply a purely constructivist origin, but we must ask 
whether there are external stimuli or constraints for such changes which constitute non-
social causal factors or limitations (Piaget 1972). Social Practice Theory sees the 
construction of disciplinary cultures arising from the demonstrable practices of participants. 
Expanding on this, I have asked whether there may be conditions in which these practices 
can or cannot arise. The evidence for some of these conditions has been examined in the 
previous chapters, now it remains only to bring these together and to see how they might 
help form a complete concept of disciplinarity. 
 
When defining disciplinarity it is important to recall Karl Popper’s insistence that theories 
must not be subjected to excessive ad hoc expansions and exceptions, lest they rapidly 
become non-falsifiable and therefore not theories at all (Popper 1992: 81). The approach to 
disciplinarity is a theory, and while it is desirable to find the simplest definition which has 
the greatest explanatory ability, there must always be an eye towards ensuring that the 
definition remains something which can be validated or shown false, and that it has not 
become too broad to adequately define. A suitably complex and yet falsifiable definition of 
disciplinarity should ideally absorb or prohibit many of the existing approaches to 
interdisciplinarity which have been demonstrated as problematic in the preceding chapters. 
But because interdisciplinarity does appear to exist in practice in some way, there must still 
be sufficient room left around our definition of disciplinarity to define that as well. In fact 
this should count as a test of the falsifiability of the definition of disciplinarity: that we can 





Expertise & Expert Language 
A number of neo-Foucaultian accounts of disciplinarity have suggested that disciplinary 
languages are exclusionary, and are chiefly tools of power and control in a negative sense 
(Messer-Davidow et al. 1993; Thompson-Klein 1996, 2010b; Bernstein 2000). One 
important outcome of the research on expertise though, is that disciplinary language 
structures should not be seen as merely or primarily power arrangements meant to keep the 
uninitiated in the dark. Chunking and expert categorisation have long been associated with 
semiotics (Lakoff 1987). In order for greater chunking operations to take place, and for 
faster more accurate memory and recall to happen, more comprehensive terms are required, 
terms which encompass far more concepts than simpler, more commonly understood terms.  
 
It is not disputed here that elite language can become a tool to leverage and sustain power. 
Rather, the evidence in the previous chapters suggests that this is an opportunistic or 
reactionary emergent property of a necessary aspect of expertise development, rather than 
being an accidental or intentional result of power dynamics as a prime mover. 
Unfortunately, this necessary facet of expertise development is also easy to subvert for 
subjugation, control and exclusionary practices, and this has been the focus of much study 
on language in disciplinarity in the recent years. The social power issues with expert and 
disciplinary languages become particularly clear when making expert knowledge explicit 
or transparent potentially threatens job security or professional prestige (Becher 1989; 
Hyland and Bondi 2006; McArthur 2010; Huutoniemi 2012). The application of expertise 
research to this equation suggests that efforts should not be focused on interdisciplinary or 
even transdisciplinary resistance to the strong presence of the disciplines, but on isolating 
and removing bad practice and bad internal perceptions of the position of disciplinary 
expertise and language from within. As McArthur (2010: 308) has noted, disciplinarity is 
useful, it is only bad practice that we need to contest as non-emancipatory. 
 
The consideration of agency in enculturating disciplinary Ways of Thinking and Practicing 
(WTP) encompasses the notion of expert languages as part of the process. The work of 
Adele Nye et al. (Nye et al. 2011) is a follow up of WTP in History in order to expand the 
scope and reliability of the data in relation specifically to agency. As Nye et al. define it, 
'historical thinking' means thinking about “historical significance, evidence, continuity and 
change, historical perspectives” (Seixas 2006: 1-2 cited in Nye et al. 2011: 764). But this is 
not a natural state, it is a learned one, which is why the requirement of agency is important 
(Anderson and Day 2005: 331). Nye et al. define agency as, “conscious and informed 
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action for which one takes responsibility and accepts ownership” (Bandura 2001: 6-8 cited 
in Nye et al.: 764).103 Put together these become, ‘conscious, informed and responsible 
ownership of considering historical significance, evidence, continuity and change and 
historical perspectives’. What is not explored in either study (Nye et al. or Anderson and 
Day), is that replacing the name of any field for ‘historical’ should not alter the veracity or 
applicability of the statement, therefore ‘disciplinary thinking’.  
 
For example, a historian does not employ the same specific method for analysing the 
political ramifications of a 12th century Latin charter as they do for considering what a 19th 
century romantic poem says about the lives of women, but in both cases they would 
employ these methods in a ‘historical’ manner, as opposed to a ‘literary critical’ manner, 
and further still each employs a wider humanities ‘critical theory’ approach, and finally the 
broadly academic principles of the scientific method above this. Just the same, a physicist 
considering refractions of light through a lens will not use the same specific process as 
they would to consider radioactive decay of unstable particles, but both actions will be 
informed by an underlying base of ‘physics thinking’ which make how they approach these 
studies different from how a chemist would, followed by a wider scientific approach to 
experimental design, and finally again the broad academic principles of the scientific 
method (Voss et al. 1983; Schunn and Anderson 1999). At each level a more specialised 
expert language is required to carry more precise chunks of meaning to fellow experts 
(Ericsson 2006). 
 
But while a fundamental need for specialised language is clearly a boon to understanding 
disciplinarity, such that more comprehensive and nuanced knowledge can be transmitted in 
more efficient and more discriminant chunks, it also presents a clear hindrance to 
interdisciplinarity because this language is incomprehensible to the non-expert, and further 
because experts often lack the skills to make their meaning clear (it is tacit knowledge to 
them) (Chi 2006: 26). Many interdisciplinary researchers have addressed the language 
issue, often referring to the development of a new meta-language for collaborative work in 
terms of creoles, pidgins or trade cants (Thompson-Klein, 2004; Nikitina, 2005).104 
Problems with communication across disciplines have also been among the most 
consistently reported issues on interdisciplinary research teams (Bruce et al. 2004; Griffin 
                                                 
103
 The link here to expertise research and deliberate practice in order to form more complex chunks of 
historical understanding is clear. 
104 Ironically these terms have very specific meanings to the expert linguists who coined them, which are not 
clearly the definitions used in the interdisciplinary literature, possibly demonstrating a need for more 
disciplinary expertise in the application of them to interdisciplinarity.   
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et al. 2006), and also on interdisciplinary funding councils (Huutonemi 2012). I propose 
that not only is the presence of a specialist language to facilitate expert communication a 
foundational property of disciplinarity, but that by extension coping with this is a 
definitional property of interdisciplinarity.  
 
Subject Matter 
That disciplines are somehow defined by subject matter is nothing new. Subject matter has 
been one of the primary defining factors in nearly every definition of disciplines offered. It 
was stated as the root of Biglan's classifications, from which Becher built his ethnography 
as well (Biglan 1973a: 195). These have, however, failed to regard the subject matter in its 
own right, but instead as something perceived through the disciplines as socially 
constructive entities themselves. Biglan's model, for example, said nothing about the 
qualities of the subjects covered by the disciplines, in fact these were not much mentioned. 
He focused instead on the relative perceptions of the disciplines by existing practitioners 
(Biglan 1973a: 201). Trowler as well, in his resistance to epistemological essentialism in 
the definition of disciplines, regards this essentialism from the standpoint of the Biglan-
Kolb-Becher combined models of social, paradigm, and application based categorisations 
(Trowler 2012b).  
 
Karl Popper has suggested that it is not actually ‘subject-matter’ that we study though, 
“We are not students of some subject matter, but students of problems. And problems may 
cut right across borders of any subject matter or discipline” (Popper cited in Greaves and 
Grant 2010: 1). There are problems with such a view though, which get to the pedagogic 
heart of many of the problems around interdisciplinarity. When Popper says students it is 
clear that he means researchers. Students on the other hand need to develop expertise in a 
qualified and reliable subject in order to be useful and effective for researching problems. 
This process could be forgone, but it would undermine the development of WTP which 
lead to enhanced critical thinking and skill in a subject area, and to the expertise that 
allows problem solving to be done faster and more effectively (Anderson and Day 2005; 
Chi 2006).  
 
When Rowland and others refer to ‘what is considered evidence’ as a defining factor of 
disciplinarity, they should more accurately be referring to ‘subject matter’ and focus of 
study (Rowland 2006: 93). Defining a discipline by what evidence is to the practitioners 
focuses on the nature of evidence itself as pluralistic, which leads to relativistic problems. 
Defining a discipline by the subject matter (subdivided as needed by focus of inquiry) is 
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very similar to the ‘approach to evidence’ concept, but the subtle difference is a critical one, 
much like the subtle essentialism inherent in the borrowing metaphor of interdisciplinarity. 
‘What is evidence’ is dependent on the focus of questions the discipline asks. But subject 
matter is relatively fixed and forms the primary identity core of the discipline, the focus is 
socially determined and is the secondary identity aspect of the discipline; the identity 
which separates it from other fields looking at the same subject matter. Rowland views the 
difference in ‘evidence’ between Health Studies and History as a matter of 
incommensurability, but I prefer to look to the superordinate matrix of categorical 
similarity which makes these both translatable into the same core methodologies of 
academic knowledge: the scientific method (Rowland 2006: 93-95).  
 
The meaning of ‘evidence’ in the disciplines then is not first socially constructed, but is a 
relatively stable understanding of the inherent qualities of the subject matter which 
generate the conditions which arise as a socially constructed consensus using whatever 
means are deemed most appropriate to do this. The evidence forms a ‘relatively privileged’ 
or optimal categorisation. Certain objects of disciplinary focus are only capable of 
providing certain types of answers. For example, no matter how much we may try, we will 
never be able to make a rhododendron yield secrets about the power of the Carolingian 
dynasty, and conversely a Carolingian court document is not actually capable of telling us 
about plant photosynthesis.105 By this interpretation, the intrinsic epistemological qualities 
of the subject matter lead to particular ways of thinking and practicing about the evidence, 
its value and context, the methods needed to derive knowledge from it, how it can 
reasonably be interpreted, and in relation to what. This is a pragmatic approach, rather than 
a positivistic one. Whether the subject matter is actually real or constructed as real is 
unimportant in this case, beside the degree to which consensus is reachable about its 
existence, function, and utility.106 The ‘four foils’ of pragmatism help steer clear of both 
positivism and determinism. 
 
I propose, therefore, that part of the definition of disciplinarity should regard the 
disciplines as effects of the nature of the subject matter they study, rather than the subject 
matter being a social construction made within the discipline. The latter would suggest that 
a social cohesion without a subject of focus could occur first, and then within this 
subjectless social unit, a purpose is selected. Although such an origin is theoretically 
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 A dendrochronologist might make a case against this, but it is unlikely. 
106
 I am at this stage presenting a Realist milieu. It is important to hold the sceptical and relativistic foils in 
mind when doing so, Realism being only a high-consensus short-hand.  
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possible, it seems wholly unreasonable, and there is simply no evidence of this having been 
the case (even a single clear example would be sufficient to refute a subject-centred theory). 
Which subject matters are most important and how they are categorised is another matter. 
The non-emergence of such a strong subject-matter-centred model recently though is 
perhaps understandable. It carries the unmistakable ring of positivism or determinism. The 
concern that such a position might open the door to determinism and isolationism between 
the disciplines is undoubtedly a consideration, though ironically, it is entirely to make a 
case against disciplinary isolationism that I propose such a model.  
 
An awareness that the core of a discipline is a relatively unsupervised categorisation of 
optimal or ‘natural’ perceptions of subject-matter, rather than an agential constructivist 
choice made by the discipline as a social unit, may help remove the sense of protective 
ownership of the subject-matter that the latter can engender. 
 
There is a caveat to this programme of disciplinary definition, however. It is not 
automatically clear that there should be a line drawn between the epistemic qualities of 
subject matter and the socially constructed aspects of disciplinarity at all. It cannot be 
stressed enough that the distinction is neither essential nor is it arbitrary, but instead it is 
empirical and useful. Epistemic qualities of subject matter appear to offer the most stable 
approach. This distinction, however, is not essential. 
 
Recontextualising Fields 
The disciplines are effectively the point where the uncategorised world gets converted into 
a human-understandable range of focused concerns/interests, and more importantly where 
this becomes teachable in effective units. It is a process of categorisation and translation: a 
‘recontextualistation’. To help define the functional implementation of disciplinarity, I will 
be employing the perceptual framework of Recontextualising Fields (RF) as developed by 
Basil Bernstein.107 Bernstein refers to recontextualising fields as the space in which the 
undifferentiated external world becomes translated by pedagogic agents into a teachable 
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 I should be clear, however, that I do so because the concept of recontextualisation is compelling as an 
explanatory analogy, not because there is sufficient, or really any, empirical evidence to validate the model 
more broadly: it remains highly underdetermined. Bernstein’s model could and should be tested in much 
more well-formed experiments than it previously has been (Bernstein, 2000). For example there are 
substantial problems with recontextualising fields as Bernstein depicts them because he sees these as spaces 
apart from application or doing. This obviously presents problems for work-placements or professional 
involvement in the curriculum (which Bernstein is at least up front with his disdain for), but also for more 
integrated practices such as research-teaching linkages and SoTL, both of which show considerable success 
as curriculum designs. 
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and learnable format. This is clearly an act of agential and supervised categorisation, and 
one based specifically on the expertise of the academics involved.  
 
All of the social factors and societal needs/desires should inform the focus of what the 
discipline hopes to discover/create (the set of questions it hopes to answer), while the 
epistemic qualities of the subject matter should indicate a range of possible specific 
methods which might be effective for achieving that goal, as well as limiting what 
questions can be asked. In Trowler's words, “Artefacts, objects, things or tools - the 
language differs according to theoretical strain - can configure human behaviours, scripting 
them, but at the same time recurrent practices shape the way artefacts are deployed” 
(Trowler 2012b: 31). The two elements cannot produce disciplinary meaning in isolation, 
but rather must rely on a self-referential loop to constantly redefine the discipline each time 
either the social factors or the understanding of the qualities of the subject matter change; a 
process which is not only frequent, but which also has local, regional and international 
levels of operations to consider.  
 
A discipline can be referred to as a Disciplinary Recontextualising Field (DRF) between 
the epistemic qualities of the subject-matter and the complex network of socially 
constructed aspects of disciplinarity.108 The recontextualising concept represents a level of 
abstraction from both the subject matter and social networks both internal and external to 
the discipline in order to create a distinct definition of the discipline between these. By this 
abstraction, the definition can speak about the process of constant reconfiguration of these 
two elements in relation to each other in terms of a unified whole (the discipline) defined 
by this interaction, but importantly without subsuming either into the other holistically. 
The recontextualising field allows an insulating layer of understanding which permits 
reductive separation of the elements: an essential feature in order to contest ownership and 
essentialism in disciplinarity.  
 
The subject matter plus the constructed focus as convergent soures of recontextualisation 
seems the most effective way to consistently clarify distinctions that separate disciplines, 
but interdisciplinarity, especially as filtered through categorisation theory, indicates that 
there is more to be said because different valid categorisations can cut right across each 
other.  
                                                 
108
 This is to be distinct from the Pedagogic Recontextualising Field (PRF) and Official Recontextualising 
Field (ORF) which Bernstein proposed. The PRF is similar, but it concerns a much broader concept of the 




Categorisation of Disciplinarity 
In the interviews with medievalists, the largest overall trend about the nature of 
disciplinarity was that a discipline is an inherently vague, historically situated, constantly 
shifting instrumental social construction. These traits suggest that a discipline is chiefly an 
optimal or ‘natural’ pragmatic level of categorisation, the ideal balance of utility and 
simplicity that suits the most people in practice.109 But because expertise substantially 
increases an expert’s capacity for meaningful categories in the same domain, how much 
breadth or nuance this optimal category encompasses will surely be different between 
internal experts and external observers.  
 
Laymen/novices will therefore see disciplines as simplistic, composed of surface features, 
mutually exclusive, and objective. Experts, however, can see their own and related 
disciplines as highly nuanced, open to debate, constantly in flux and with no genuine 
discernable core that is not related to other fields (ideally). In the middle fall the bulk of 
non-expert/non-novices that disciplinary experts will regularly encounter and who hold 
sway over disciplinary matters, such as university administrations, funding councils, and 
interdisciplinary team members from other fields. Based on Schunn and Anderson’s (1999) 
research on hierarchies of expertise and much of the work on categorisation, these 
individuals should display some general understanding of the nuanced, permeable, non-
objective nature and overlap between disciplines, but not as much as domain experts. The 
accounts of the medievalists I interviewed uphold this view well, demonstrating a sense of 
general uncertainty and constructiveness about all disciplines, but still retaining some 
notably objectivist stereotypes about other fields than their own, such as the views of 
several literary scholars towards History.  
 
Some approaches to the categorisation of disciplines may be unjustifiably underdetermined; 
not all categories or definitions are equal. The on-going discussion of the disciplinarity or 
non-disciplinarity of various interdisciplines, hybrid disciplines, fields and studies such as 
Social and Economic History, Women’s Studies, Area Studies, Medieval Studies, Classics, 
Biotechnology are all examples of this issue. These can appear intrinsically 
interdisciplinary when viewed through the lens of a fairly linear and uni-directional 
concept of disciplinarity based on the essentialist nature of mostly pre-1970 disciplines. 
However, these fields can just as clearly appear disciplinary when viewed from other 
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perspectives, particularly any perspective which does not categorise disciplines as 
essentialist, mutually exclusive or uni-directional.  
 
Which viewpoint should be preferred, and should these fields be considered 
interdisciplinary? Probably not, given evidence for the inherently interdisciplinary nature 
most ‘traditional’ disciplines from Classics to Physics, depending on which categorical 
perspective one chooses to look through (Piaget 1972; Thompson-Klein 1996; Moran 
2010). Piaget on interdisciplinarity is important to recall here, that it is the idea of a truly 
‘new’ and isolated discipline that is the chimera: no such thing has ever existed (Piaget 
1972). Thompson-Klein and others have consistently agreed with this notion when 
discussing disciplinarity, but not later when discussing interdisciplinary (Thompson-Klein 
1990, 1996; Bromme 2000; Moran 2010). What these new creations are instead is 
something that functions as a discipline, is regarded as a discipline, and yet is also 
inherently tied in nomine to the disciplines from which it arose, without being beholden to 
them. This does not seem like a good justification for a new type of disciplinary 
categorisation, but rather a more nuanced perspective disciplinarity which removes the 
criteria of uni-directionality and mutual exclusion from the properties typical of the 
category.  
 
It is important to note here that the social influences of disciplinary tradition and external 
demands are not considered fundamental in this sense, as these should be simply 
recursively re-evaluating this basic process, and in each iteration either reinforcing or 
weakening a disciplinary category based on similarity or difference to a perceived 
prototype. This does mean, however, that disciplinarity is based on intersubjective 
consensus forming the prototype; each individual’s ideal notion of the discipline combined 
to create a socially constructed ideal form.  
 
Ownership or Stewardship 
In practice no discipline uses only one method, one theory, one process, or one tool, which 
would allow it to be defined solely by the focus of that element towards the subject matter. 
Further, no discipline ‘owns’ a method, theory, process, or tool. Some originate them 
though, and more often than not these disciplines become ‘custodians’ or ‘stewards’ of the 
these elements (often many of these), a ‘best fit’ for the place to look for the latest news on 
the subject or where to go if you want to learn it; the disciplines effectively become the 




An analogy can be made to journalism. A particular journal or news source does not 
actually own the event or subject matters that they report on, but those which are more 
specialised in a particular area will invariably be the best place to turn for the most up to 
date stories or the most in depth coverage on that subject. Several of the medievalists I 
interviewed mentioned this as a key element of good interdisciplinarity, awareness of the 
practices of other disciplines and knowing where to look or which discipline to ask about 
certain things. There was little, if any, implication of ownership involved in actual practice. 
This concept of ownership seems to appear in theory only, typically as a backdrop for 
developing a justification for interdisciplinarity.  
 
For example, Gadamer suggested that historians do something more than literary scholars 
by looking at non-fictional sources for the meaning of the period and the situation around 
the text (Gadamer 2006: 331-2). This sort of ‘ownership’ of methods is the problem 
leading to pluralistic and essentialist interdisciplinary models. Historical research of the 
period and the author’s situation and background is not ‘literary scholars using history’ it is 
a fundamental aspect of researching a literary work. It is indeed the same task that 
historians do, but it does not belong to historians to rent and sell. Historians merely 
develop the core of their group identity around specific approaches to certain types of 
historical objects as an optimal subject matter/focus category called a discipline. Historians 
are thereby identified as the foremost experts on the use of this category and all it entails, 
as well as stewards/validators of new knowledge and innovations in this area: they are the 
best people to ask whether your use of certain historical sources is good, but they do not 
own historical research practice.  
 
Thompson-Klein in fact noted the same situation (that disciplines don’t really own 
anything), but the solution was irresponsible and unnecessary. Ownership was to be 
removed to make way for interdisciplinarity, but no one was clearly left with the task of 
maintaining quality and reliability (Thompson-Klein 2010a: 7). The disciplines do house 
important communities of similarly trained experts who by virtue of the demonstrably 
more effective and reliable judgement of expertise can maintain stewardship over 
benchmarks, qualifications and standards for certain theories, methods and knowledge. 
This notion of disciplines as stewardship, rather than essentialist ownership or 
pluralistic/relativistic negligence, maintains a locus of responsibility for standards with 
those most qualified to set them. This represents a pragmatic and explicit weakening of 
borders without removing them, superseding them or making them inadvertently more 
rigid than before.This is where most IDS programmes and interdisciplinary curriculum 
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restructuring have fallen short, by releasing ownership, but with it also the responsibility to 
maintain qualified and recognised standards.  
 
An important point in the approach to this issue is that Gibbons et al.’s concept of mode 2 
knowledge was at least partially correct. We do appear to be moving towards a state of 
more holistic knowledge and understanding which expands beyond the old disciplinary 
knowledge-based model. Where I strongly differ is how to perceive this change in terms of 
curriculum. Mode 2 knowledge suggests we move beyond disciplinarity, and into a broader 
interdisciplinarity and trans-academic approach to knowledge with ties not only between 
disciplines but also with professional organisations. These are all good goals in themselves, 
but there is no clear reason why these require an abandonment of the structure that 
disciplinarity provides, instead of a more practical broadening of the practice and scope of 
the disciplines to replace ownership with stewardship.  
 
By removing ownership from disciplinarity for one thing, we open up the allegedly 
cordoned off topics of ethics, writing skills, etc. to be a standard aspect of any and all 
disciplines, either embedded as graduate attributes, or generically taught. But by retaining 
stewardship we ensure that these topics remain the focus of locatable expertise and 
qualifications. It appears only to add unnecessary complication and identity struggles to 
suggest that every subject with a professional or ‘applied’ element must negotiate 
interdisciplinary relations with philosophy and creative writing in order to meet these 
goals. This denigrates each of these fields to little more than a supplier of employment 
skills training. But Philosophy and Literature should not suffer in any way from the 
removal of ‘their’ foci by allowing other disciplines to embed such features into the core 
learning objectives of their programmes. These things are not the disciplines themselves, 
but only something they specialise in. They remain the core stewards of excellence in 
these, and maintain the standards and benchmarks by which the teaching in other 
programmes should be measured, and that is all.  
 
The second reason not to succumb to mode 2 considerations is that work-based learning is 
already a prominent feature of many programmes, and is becoming more so, even in the 
humanities, but this does not for any reason require removing the essential foundations of 
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quality standards and expertise development that the structured pedagogic system is 
designed for.110  
 
Ultimately, a discipline or disciplinarity does not appear to be best served by a single short 
definition. This would leave too many important aspects open to confusion. Instead I offer 
the following elements of a complete picture of a discipline: 
 
• A discipline is a space wherein the combination of epistemic qualities of subject 
matter and the focus of inquiry about these become translated into teachable and 
learnable format. 
 
• A discipline is a structure around which expertise can be developed, by means of 
which expertise can be located, and through which stewardship of trustworthy 
standards can be maintained.  
 
• The same discipline serves different purposes and has different apparent properties 
based on level of subject expertise and the relative perspective of the observer. 
 
• A discipline need not be mutually exclusive of other disciplines, and can intersect 




“We should at least be open to the possibility that some aspects of 
interdisciplinary research look a lot like disciplinary research” (Szostak 
2002: 104). 
 
A large amount of what many call interdisciplinary is an unnecessary or unhelpful 
distinction because it fails to cross any discernible threshold into a new type of structure 
that would justify a different name or consideration; interdisciplinarity instead is what 
happens when a threshold of some kind is crossed (Land 2012). I propose that this 
threshold is reached when the individual ceases to be able to hold or develop sufficient 
expertise in all theories, methods or knowledge presumed to be needed to answer a 
problem (applied or theoretical) to provide the depth of answer desired within the time 
                                                 
110
 To be quite fair to Gibbons et al. though, their assessment of mode 2 knowledge appeared in 1994. The 
ubiquity now of what they discussed then could be a result of the very discussion they began. 
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allotted. This makes interdisciplinarity not really a matter of disciplinarity at all, but a 
matter of professional collaboration and teamwork. Scholarship on interdisciplinarity has 
consistently demonstrated that loose definitions, fuzzy borders and extensive theory, 
knowledge and method ‘borrowing’ have long been basic aspects of disciplinarity, but 
without appearing to substantially undermine the disciplinary structure or divisions 
(Lattuca et al. 2004; Thompson-Klein 1996).  
 
Competency Models and Development of Expertise 
Competency models of interdisciplinarity, be they IDS programmes or new thematic 
restructuring of universities, fail to deliver useful and trustworthy levels of expertise in 
students. This is not to say that there cannot be a standard qualification for IDS 
programmes, or that thematic universities could not develop an approved standard which is 
recognised beyond their own walls, but in neither case has this happened.111  Without this, 
such programmes produce graduates with no consistently recognisable qualifications 
beyond the surface concept of the programme as interdisciplinary. As such, the students 
cannot be reliably located as stewards of more than an inconsistent concept of broad 
learning. A deeper and more troubling problem with such programmes is that they cater to 
the overconfidence aspect of expertise by instructing students to have confidence in a level 
of expertise at discipline-specific skills and knowledge, which they do not possess 
(Feltovich et al. 2006: 58).  
 
This appears to be an aspect of the dichotomy of experts being better at self-monitoring, 
but also overconfident and biased. The problem is rooted in the perceptions of self, social 
responsibility and the nature of knowledge that the expert has been trained to have. If the 
expert has been trained to believe that being an expert means dealing with uncertainty and 
knowing the limits of one’s abilities, then it is the increased self-monitoring that we can 
expect to see develop. If, as in competency models, they have been trained to believe that 
being an expert means having the answers, then overconfidence and bias is more likely to 
be the result (Schommer-Aikens 2004). Moreover, as Chi has noted that experts are biased 
and context based even within their already narrow range of expertise, it becomes apparent 
that both traits can be present in any expert, depending on the specific nature of a problem. 
The same doctor may consider a social situation involving other doctors to be open to 
uncertainty, but a diagnosis within their own specialty to be absolute (Chi 2006: 26).  
 
                                                 
111
 There has been some call for standards and textbooks of IDS programmes, but this has not produced much 
of a result so far (Repko 2006b). 
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At the University of Melbourne one response to the criticisms of the lack of recognised 
qualification for undergraduate students was that enculturation into a field or discipline did 
not begin until the postgraduate level (Davis 2011). It could be argued that the premise of 
enculturating students to a discipline if they do not intended to continue with study is 
actually not in tune with the practical working world or the novice level of skill expected 
from undergraduates upon completion, and this is reasonable considering that most 
graduates do not continue to further academic study. The promises of distributed expertise 
in interdisciplinarity fail, however, to address several critical elements of the research on 
expertise, and instead offer a form of false economy which may be suitable for some few 
special cases, but is not what it is advertised to be. There is more to the completion of a 
novice level of expertise in a field than only enculturation, although this alone can have 
profound implications for the later application of the skills learned, especially if the 
process is incomplete. The notions of ‘minimal understanding’, ‘adequacy’ and a lack of 
development of primary source research or evaluation skills that competency 
interdisciplinarity fosters leave even novice graduates of such programmes insufficient in 
most broadly recognised basic skills of other graduates of the same level: the models fails 
students.112 
 
The ambiguous term ‘interdisciplinarian’, often used to describe IDS graduates, should be 
reserved then for an expert in interdisciplinary research team leadership: an academic 
project manager. “Researchers who develop a career working on such projects build up 
expertise on the integration of disciplines in a range of contexts and the management of 
other researchers from different disciplines working together” (Bruce et al. 2004: 460). 
 
Polymathery and Transactive Memory 
Interdisciplinarity is not knowledge and problems which exceed the grasp of a single 
discipline; as we have seen, the notion of a single discipline is simply not concrete enough 
on which to ever base such a notion. Rather interdisciplinarity occurs when the capacity of 
a single person is exceeded.  
 
“The implication is that the path to interdisciplinarity can be found not in 
arguing about theoretical balance and who sets the research agenda, and not 
in finding a methodology that lies somewhere between the two disciplines 
[history and archaeology], but in admitting the limits of individual 
knowledge and actively creating opportunities for exchanging ideas and 
sharing developments between different specialists” (Devlin 2009: 73). 
                                                 
112





This is where a controversial but highly necessary distinction between polymaths and 
interdisciplinarity needs to be made. The question is one of the levels of expertise required 
or expected. A polymath will not have the same degree of expertise in all fields with which 
they are familiar as a team of equivalently trained experts in each of those fields will. More 
importantly, the polymath can only study one subject/problem at a time. Often a polymath 
will be highly trained in several fields, but may not have engaged with one or several of 
them for some time, sometimes years. A team of experts, however, will each be more 
current in their understanding of their separate fields.   
 
If someone does ‘interdisciplinary’ work by themselves it can only be one of two things, 
work done without the degree of expertise typically expected of work done at the same 
level in a single field in the same timeframe, or work done by someone who has put in 
substantial extra time to become expert in all relevant fields. In the first case we would 
expect a skilled researcher to make a note of the limits of their knowledge in areas outside 
of their expertise areas, rather than allowing us to presume that they are an expert or have 
collaborated with one. To do otherwise is simply poor scholarship and unethical. Good 
peer-review is intended to uncover this, though in interdisciplinary situations this can be 
problematic (Huutoniemi 2010: 2012). In the second case, it would be true in one sense to 
say that a process of interdisciplinary integration is taking place within this researcher’s 
mind, but this is not similar to the process of collaborative interdisciplinary work or a TMS. 
In the former the expertise in question is contained within only one person’s prior 
knowledge and epistemological viewpoint; we lose the additional input of more viewpoints 
from which to negotiate an intersubjective consensus. Further, this work can only extend to 
fields this person has expertise in; collaborative interdisciplinarity is not limited in such a 
way. 
 
Both the nature and benefits of TMSs compared to solitary work (and less structured 
collaborations) suggest that these cannot credibly be seen as the same thing in terms of 
interdisciplinarity. The development and functional processes of, as well as what we can 
expect from, interdisciplinary collaboration are qualitatively different from what we can 
expect from an individual attempting the same things. In fact it is unreasonable, especially 
in terms of policy and curriculum design, to refer to these as the same thing at all. Teams 
are more flexible in that they can expand to cover more fields by adding new experts, and 
can replace a less than effective member if need be. Teams also benefit from consistently 
upgraded disciplinary expertise, presuming they are developed from current experts in each 
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field required. Further, teaching interdisciplinarity would be an entirely different construct 
for developing a single practitioner who must be trained in several disciplines, versus 
developing collaborative skills alongside expertise in a single field to facilitate 
collaborative interdisciplinarity. Via transactive memory systems, interdisciplinarity can 
create a level and type of expertise not possible in a single person. Further, since 
knowledge transfer is an issue of encoding (chunking) and memory, and TMS has been 
demonstrated to increase these in a collaborative setting, then collaborative 
interdisciplinarity may stand to increase group and individual knowledge transfer at once. 
 
Thompson-Klein illustrates the difference between a collaborative approach to 
interdisciplinary flexibility and the long road of the polymath in her account of solitary 
interdisciplinary researchers (Thompson-Klein 1990: 184). The researchers she consulted 
specified the importance of relying on consultation with others, developing an 
interdisciplinary portfolio over 10-30 years of study and practice, intentionally narrowing 
the field of consideration in some disciplines, and taking regular leave from disciplinary 
activity to renew/gain other expertise as needed. Several of the medievalists I interviewed 
had similar stories of having slowly developed expertise in more than one discipline over 
long years of effort. Further, several stated that this was the only way a single person could 
be interdisciplinary, and that this continued to be limited in scope.   
 
Referring to these paths by the same term creates a single category, which is measured 
(ideally) by its output but which has two distinct valid output types, which are not 
comparable. It is not incorrect so much as confusing in terms of peer-review and 
expectations; it is poor categorisation. We already have a functional term for solitary 
interdisciplinarity, polymath. I propose that it is essential to teaching and developing real 
and effective interdisciplinary solutions for the next generation and beyond that we use 
both terms in the right places, and stop muddying the waters.  
 
[put this bit into the methodology] 
Transience and New Disciplines 
Much of my early research for this thesis was spent attempting to rationalise a multi-tiered 
model of disciplines, specialisations, hybrids, interdisciplines, studies, and domains. It was 
only through repeated failures to be able to find a description of the differences which 
could prove both useful and consistent that I eventually moved away from this notion to 
adopt the stand that interdisciplinarity is transient, and is not well defined as anything that 
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endures in a new or unique form for long (although there can be prolonged cases as we will 
see when considering Medieval Studies below). 
 
This is not to say that there are no ‘real’ interdisciplinary activities, situations or structures. 
Rather I am suggesting that these are temporary. We can therefore speak of an 
interdisciplinary project or an interdisciplinary field/study temporally situated, but not of 
these as being interdisciplinarity itself. In categorical terms, interdisciplinarity is a 
prototype which itself does not have a ‘real’ existence outside of the unification of the 
defining properties of all exemplars.  
 
If a social demand for the integration of the skills of several disciplines appears, and is 
sustained, a new expertise begins to develop, a new discipline emerges. One frequently 
cited analysis of this phenomenon is that of Joe Moran, who looked at the history of the 
development of Cultural Studies and several other disciplines (Moran 2010). His 
conclusion was that interdisciplinarity leads to new disciplines. Brack et al.’s account of 
Biotechnology pointed towards the same conclusion, though not according to the authors 
(Brack et al. 2010). Karin Widerberg discusses the disciplining of Women’s Studies in 
Norway as a several decades long process of applied social pressure now culminated in a 
recognised disciplinarity at the national level, one which successfully stands alone while 
also interfacing with several other disciplines (Widerberg 2006). Thompson-Klein and 
others have consistently failed to present a definition or example of an interdisciplinary 
field which was not either recently formed, already effectively a discipline, or has since 
dissolved.  
 
“If...we understand disciplines to have their own legitimating structures, 
then the only approach to resolving the issue is with reference to some 
further, superordinate set of legitimating structures to which both parties 
would consent. But this would amount to an appeal to, or the creation of, a 
new discipline rather than a case of interdisciplinarity: (Rowland 2006:.90).   
 
Interdisciplinarity as a standalone model forestalls the development of new disciplines 
which should be forming, and by doing so blocks the development of expertise, innovation 
and stewardship in those fields. 
 
Transience, Disciplinarity and the Perfect (Medieval) Storm 




Although I have made a case for the inherent impermanence of interdisciplinarity in higher 
education, evidence from my interviews and study of Medieval Studies does indicate that 
there can be cases where interdisciplinarity may be sustained for long periods without 
either dissolving or developing into a new discipline. Medieval Studies seems to be a sort 
of ‘perfect storm’ of sustained interdisciplinarity, at least for now. This same state of 
affairs does not seem to be evident in the literature around other fields, such as Women’s 
Studies, Environmental Studies, Cultural Studies, or Biotechnology. This suggests that the 
concept of interdisciplinarity as transient is not strongly refuted by Medieval Studies, but 
that we cannot view it as a law, merely a pattern of praxis which has limitations and 
outlying cases of an otherwise central tendency of transience. If more detailed study of 
several other fields does appear to show the same results though, then my model must be 
rescinded or at least substantially re-worked. 
 
In the case of Medieval Studies there is sustained academic concern for the topic as an 
integrated practice, but it has been argued in my interviews that the skills and knowledge 
base is too vast or inconsistent to be regarded as sufficient to create a separate discipline. 
That it could form a large discipline with specialisations by area and sub-set of periodicity 
was mentioned in a few interviews, but not explored in any depth; although existing 
disciplines and interdisciplinary specialisations such as Celtic Studies or Scandinavian 
Studies already appear to represent such cases in practice. Apparent in the subtext of the 
interviews as well was that much of the interdisciplinary work in the field is actually 
multidisciplinary or is related itself to specific projects, which are themselves transient.  
 
There was a sense that, at the elite level of research work, the interdisciplinary connections 
were to be worked out personally. When presentation of interdisciplinary work to a larger 
audience was mentioned, the need to develop skills of integration became clear. 
Collaboration was distinctly seen as essential and commonplace by most participants, but 
some were not convinced that it happened as much or as well as it should. None suggested 
it was unnecessary or undesirable though. A few participants noted that it is feasible that in 
another generation or so postgraduates of today will consider themselves medievalists first, 
and not consider that there was a divided origin. At that time the field may start to more 
resemble a discipline.  
 
Explicitly collaborative projects, particularly funded ones, are not yet a norm for Medieval 
Studies. This is less true of Archaeology in general though, and also appears to be 
changing recently across the rest of the disciplines as external funding requirements change 
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to mandate larger and more collaborative efforts even in the humanities (Bildhauer and 
Jones 2013). Only time will tell if this becomes a new norm, in which case we may yet see 
Medieval Studies develop a substantial disciplinary identity. 
 
The Medieval Studies subject matter/focus range is far too vast for the kind of cohesion 
usually seen from a discipline at the undergraduate level. Categorization and expertise 
research both lead to this conclusion, and several statements from the interviews expressed 
the same view. The concept of ‘natural’ categories is important in this, because this 
suggests that there is indeed an optimal range of relative size and complexity of categories. 
In this case a discipline is the optimal size and complexity for the main category of 
academic classification, and a Medieval Studies discipline which successfully covers all of 
the geographical regions, the full time period, and each of the disciplinary approaches does 
not appear to match the size and complexity of other disciplines: it is bigger than the rest 
and therefore is atypical of the category.  
 
Classics offers a good parallel to compare Medieval Studies against. Classics also covers a 
broad timeframe, but unlike Medieval Studies, the subject matter/focus matrix covers only 
two specific and related cultures (Greek and Roman), mostly one geographical region 
(Mediterranean), and two languages (Greek and Latin). Obviously this is a simplification, 
but I believe this does accurately address the core of the field. A similar arrangement exists 
for Celtic Studies, Scandinavian Studies, and Anglo-Saxon Studies. 
 
In practice it is often the ability to enculturate new recruits that marks out a new discipline. 
Medieval Studies students are not granted several extra years in which to learn the same 
level of expertise expected of students in other fields, but in a broader range of subjects. 
This is another critical failing of competency models of interdisciplinarity, and the problem 
of too much surface learning was expressed repeatedly in the interviews as well as several 
other accounts of interdisciplinary activities in the Medieval Studies (Capper 2009; Devlin 
2009; Holas-Clark 2009). Strong subject expertise was considered essential to 
interdisciplinary work by many of the participants. If three or four years of regular training 
can only produce a medievalist with a small range of the expected qualifications, then 
disciplinarity seems highly questionable.  
 
Although the field may indeed still be simply too large to count as a discipline, it may be 
able to function effectively as an umbrella field not unlike history or archaeology, as an 
element of a hierarchy of expertise/practice. I would agree with Chazelle and Lifshitz, as 
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well as comments from some of my interviews, that there should at least be a recognition 
of a skill-based/source-based split between early and late medieval studies (Chazelle and 
Lifshitz 2007). As with all other periodicity issues though, this is a vastly troubling point to 
demarcate, and once set it will only end up producing crossovers in short order. The 
presumption here is that ‘Middle Ages’ is the unified subject matter, but in practice this 
turns out to be too broad/vague a categorisation. Separating the specialisation in early or 
late medieval, however, does not invalidate Medieval Studies as a blanket for both. This 
may not be a problem for the future of a Medieval Studies undergraduate though, because 
the most common statement about periodicity in the interviews was that the ‘Middle Ages’ 
are a received category, and most participants were not comfortable with it in general. It is 
very reasonable that the period/region could be apportioned out in more optimal 
categorical chunks for undergraduate study. This has already occurred in fact in many of 
the aforementioned cases, often of regional or institutional interest (Celtic Studies at 
Glasgow, Scandinavian Studies at Aberdeen).  
 
There remains a call for Medieval Studies at the postgraduate level, but at this level there is 
a new feature involved; the participants can be expected to have a higher level of initial 
expertise, in terms of subject knowledge, but also more complex chunking capabilities and 
intrinsic interest.  
 
Finally, Medieval Studies appears to have a relatively low sense of urgency about the 
subject matter in a broader social context. In contrast, such fields as Environmental Studies, 
Area Studies, Cultural Studies and Gender Studies have since their beginnings been 
charged with periodically renewed senses of social and political urgency. A lack of 
substantial presence for Medieval Studies in non-elite, non-research intensive universities 
can be seen as some evidence of this. This external force can help push a field towards 
greater degrees of selective attention and integration, effectively trimming off non-
essential aspects of cognate disciplines until an optimal subject matter/focus can be 
reached to meet the demand for graduates as Widerberg demonstrated for Women’s 
Studies in Norway (Bernstein 2000; Widerberg 2006).  
 
Interdisciplinary Is... 
Interdisciplinary practice described as inherently transient means it can no longer be 
effectively defined as a stand-alone academic entity/identity. This narrows the options for 
how to define it. Thompson-Klein and some others have suggested that interdisciplinarity 
is best seen as a process (Thompson-Klein 1990; Newell 2001; Szostak 2002; Repko 2008). 
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This is compelling in terms of interdisciplinarity as a research or project-based activity, 
and it is consistent with most descriptions of interdisciplinarity in practice, including the 
medievalists interviewed here. There are problems with defining interdisciplinarity as a 
process, however, which are similar to defining a discipline as ‘approach to evidence’: 
each is correct and effective to a certain degree, but each is insufficient to ground a 
definition or curriculum model on except in a pluralistic or case by case basis. Further, the 
process models offered by William Newell and Rick Szostak have been criticised for being 
both incoherent and effectively impossible for all but the most dedicated and elite 
polymaths, especially considering that each model is meant to be performed by a solitary 
researcher (Bailis 2001; Carp 2001): 
 
  
“A. Drawing on disciplinary perspectives: 
• defining the problem (question, topic, issue); 
• determining relevant disciplines (interdisciplines, schools of thought); 
• developing working command of relevant concepts, theories, methods of 
each discipline; 
• gathering all current disciplinary knowledge and searching for new 
information; 
• studying the problem from the perspective of each discipline; and 
• generating disciplinary insights into the problem. 
B. Integrating their insights through construction of a more comprehensive 
perspective: 
• identifying conflicts in insights by using disciplines to illuminate each 
other’s assumptions, or by looking for different terms with common 
meanings, or terms with different meanings; 
• evaluating assumptions and terminology in the context of the specific 
problem; 
• resolving conflicts by working towards a common vocabulary and set of 
assumptions; 
• creating common ground; 
• constructing a new understanding of the problem; 
• producing a model (metaphor, theme) that captures the new understanding; 
and  




1. “Start with an interdisciplinary question. 
2. Identify the key phenomena involved, but also subsidiary phenomena. 
3. Ascertain what theories and methods are partially relevant to the question 
at hand. As with phenomena, be careful not to casually ignore theories that 
may shed some lesser light on the question. 
4. Perform a detailed literature survey. 
5. Identify relevant disciplines and disciplinary perspectives. 
6. If some relevant phenomena (or links among these), theories or methods 
identified in (2) and (3) have received little or no attention in the literature, 
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the researcher should try to perform or encourage the performance of such 
research. 
7. Evaluate the results of previous research. 
8. Compare the results of previous disciplinary or interdisciplinary research.  
Develop a more comprehensive/integrative analysis.” (Szostak 2002) 
 
Further, these models have been either derived from or have led directly to other process 
models by Julie Thompson-Klein (1990: 193) and Allen Repko (2008: 142) which have 
been described by these authors as iterative, able to be entered from any point, and able to 
be followed in any direction. This raises the question of how these qualify as processes at 
all, rather than merely checklists of things not to overlook.  
 
Still, the notion of interdisciplinarity as a process is intuitively compelling. It would be 
better to say it is likely there is an optimal interdisciplinary process (or processes) in the 
sense that TMS research suggests there are optimal ways to develop effective collaborative 
structures. This would suggest, however, that the process is only part of what 
interdisciplinarity actually is, that the process is emergent from an understanding of the 
nature of interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity in terms of something that can be developed 
up to a point where a process could be applied must be something else. I offer the 
following:  
 
Interdisciplinarity is a domain-general set of basic skills for collaborative work across 
differentiated individual expertises. 
 
What such a definition offers is a clear statement of all features which are essential to the 
nature of interdisciplinarity, while not constraining important but nonetheless emergent or 
non-essential features such as methods and pedagogies. These non-essential aspects which 
would be needed to develop practical curriculum are descriptive rather than definitive, and 
are therefore free to change over time as research on pedagogic practice and curriculum 
design develops. That is, the definition is simple, clear, and powerful enough to define 
what aspects of interdisciplinarity are essential, and to exclude most if not all concepts of 
interdisciplinarity which have not been supported by the evidence in this thesis. But it is 
also flexible enough to allow substantial pedagogic change over time. There is no 
requirement in this definition for disciplinarity to be an aspect of interdisciplinarity at all 
(raising the question of whether a different term might be preferred). Rather it is based on 
recognising the limits and differentiations of personal expertise. As we have seen, however, 
the disciplines represent the ‘optimal’ category of academic expertise classification, so 
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typically personal expertise will be in line with disciplinarity. As such, the term 
interdisciplinary should still be usable and effective as it is, so long as it is not taken too 
literally. 
 
Interdisciplinarity is required by this definition to be collaborative, and as such most IDS 
and competency models are excluded from it. Because interdisciplinarity is defined here as 
a skill set it cannot be also defined as an entity with either permanence or identity. A 
person with training in interdisciplinary skills could identify as such, but only in relation to 
some type of personal (usually disciplinary) expertise which the definition also requires 
(e.g. chemist with interdisciplinary skills, environmentalist with interdisciplinary skills). 
Finally interdisciplinarity requires differentiated expertises by this definition, drawing 
directly from the research on transactive memory systems. It is the interdisciplinary skills, 
the accompanying perspectives on disciplinarity and the flexible application of these which 
are the core and sustained presence of interdisciplinarity. 
 
 
This definition also strongly implies that interdisciplinarity could be a sub-set of graduate 
attributes. This was the intention, though this connection should not be mistaken for an 
essential one. It was compelling to include graduate attributes based pedagogic elements 
into the definition, such as that interdisciplinarity must be developed as embedded within 
the disciplines but also facilitated across them, as the research on cognitive entrenchment 
and knowledge transfer together suggest. This would, however, limit the definition to what 
appears to be the most effective and well supported pedagogic model at this time, and a 
newer a better model may appear at any point. The definition as it stands is free to meet 
this change. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence from expertise research, transfer 
research, graduate attribute research, and other research on the critical thinking debate 
which suggests that a skill set which must be originated and situated in the disciplines to 
have context and deep meaning, but which then can be explicitly built-up as meta-
cognitive, may be an effective solution. This was, for example, the approach to pedagogy 
of knowledge transfer that Lobato as well as Chi and VanLehn proposed; layering 
flexibility into developing entrenched expertise.  
 
The actual skills which best comprise interdisciplinarity, and how best to implement them 





Interdisciplinarity in the Curriculum 
 
Just as interdisciplinarity is not about integrating disciplinary knowledge but personal 
expertise, interdisciplinary curriculum designs are not about ‘getting the disciplines to 
work together’ but about producing new scholars who don’t see this as work. With this as 
a goal, a curriculum for interdisciplinarity should aim to produce disciplinary qualified 
experts who can also engage in interdisciplinary activities without regarding this as an 
extra step of a hardship.  
 
Failings of the competency approach to interdisciplinary curricula have been considered 
much in the previous chapters. Briefly, there are some other approaches to getting 
interdisciplinarity into the curriculum worth looking at. MacKinnon et al. (2010: 50) 
suggested that only those involved in a particular interdisciplinary project can make the 
determination about the success or context of interdisciplinarity, and that it is essentially 
impossible to make policy for interdisciplinarity because it is such a fluid concept. This 
ignores the intrinsic fluidity of disciplinarity, such that no two disciplinary projects are 
likely to be much alike as well, while this appears not to hinder policy. The authors resolve 
this by suggesting that specialisations are also a realm of interdisciplinary activity within 
the disciplines, and that policy cannot be made for these either (this likely derived from 
similar statements by Becher (1989)). This is a doubly essentialist approach in that it 
isolates the reliable and stable core of disciplinarity to an even smaller essential unit, while 
also creating a new essentialist microcosm for each interdisciplinary or specialised project 
undertaken. There is something to take from this account, however, which is that because 
interdisciplinarity is transient and project-based Mackinnon et al. are at least partially 
correct in saying that there are no benchmarks or quality standards for such work. 
Developing interdisciplinary curricula must look elsewhere than structuring 
interdisciplinary activity around qualifications which cannot be validated. 
 
Alternatively, Thompson-Klein, reviewing the work of Veronica Boix-Mansilla and the 
Harvard ‘Ground Zero’ project on interdisciplinarity, has made some compelling and 
emancipatory statements about interdisciplinarity:  
 
New conceptual models and explanatory power provide feedback to and 
outcomes in multiple disciplines and fields. New integrative frameworks, 
methodological and empirical analysis, and research hypothesis enhance the 
study of particular problems. The scope and conceptualisation of research 
topics also broaden, and levels of analysis are bridged. Individuals’ 
capabilities expand as they develop new expertise and research methods, 
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work in more than one discipline or field, and collaborate in ID projects and 
programmes (Thompson-Klein 2010b: 142–3). 
 
Thompson-Klein here is not referring to studentsor the curriculum though, but to the 
administrative and research activities of a select, already interdisciplinary, subset of late-
career senior academics. This regards interdisciplinarity in a post hoc manner, as 
something to be administratively sanctioned for the practice of the elite among the elite, 
rather than something to be taught and practiced in the wider academic and working world. 
What appears rhetorically expansive and emancipatory is in fact anything but. This is not 
to suggest that either Thompson-Klein or ‘Project Zero’ are not interested in developing 
interdisciplinary teaching and learning, merely that the approach above has very little to do 
with students and learning theory, and more to do with developing secondary identities for 
existing staff. 
 
In the models above interdisciplinarity is seen as only approachable by individual experts 
or teams on a case by case basis, such that no clear curriculum could be made to approach 
the development of interdisciplinarity in a more domain-general way. This is in contrast to 
the competency approach which generalises interdisciplinary curricula without considering 
the problems of qualifications or fit within existing staff workloads that the models above 
highlight. There is a ‘middle-way’ to approach the issue, though, via the naturalised 
pragmatic view on the epistemology of the disciplines with unifying elements such as the 
scientific method, hierarchies of expertise and shared knowledge. This approach looks to 
identify the problems of the other models and balance awareness but not acceptance of 
conflicting factors of each. Educational philosophers such as Ronald Barnett and Stephen 
Rowland have urged a similar approach, suggesting that the way to fostering a truly 
expansive, emancipatory, and useful higher education system is for each academic to 
embrace interdisciplinarity and complexity in education, to balance the paradoxes 
internally, and to constantly renew this effort (Gibbons et al. 1994; Barnett 2000; Rowland 
2006). A compelling criticism of these accounts, however, is that this is not a practically 
feasible approach because it places more unregulated responsibility on a single staff 
member than could reasonably be met. Thompson-Klein’s approach to administrative and 
staffing related resolutions to interdisciplinarity is not dissimilar. This is also the same 
criticism made of Newell and Szostak’s process models of interdisciplinarity, which place 




A way to address interdisciplinary curricula is needed which is generalisable while also 
recognising the need for standards and benchmarks, and which is structured and 
implementable in a reasonable manner by both staff and students in a practical setting. In 
the previous section I proposed that interdisciplinarity was a set of domain-general skills, 
and that in the current state of educational research the graduate attributes approach may be 
best suited to implement these skills. The development of graduate attributes in the 
curriculum has already encountered and developed some solutions to several of the same 
problems of quality assurance and evaluation as well as staff and/or student overload. 
These solutions are notably far from universal, complete or perfect though, especially in 
terms of implementation (Sumsion and Goodfellow 2004; O’Neill 2010; Barrie 2012). 
Simon Barrie has recently found that the problem of a plurality of approaches to graduate 
attributes may rest with the personal epistemologies (he did not use this term) of teachers 
and staff, who do not come to the process with the same understanding or beliefs in 
generalisable or flexible learning objectives, or who perceive development of these as 
someone else’s job (Barrie 2012). Adding interdisciplinarity to this model may be the best 




The notion of ‘interdisciplinary skills’ has been present in the discourse of each RoI 
tradition since the beginning. It was present in the 1972 OECD/CERI report, it was present 
in William Newell’s 1982 analysis of interdisciplinarity, it was strongly emphasised at the 
end of Thompson-Klein’s 1996 work and many others (Rowland 2006; Devlin et al. 2009; 
MacKinnon et al. 2010). More recently it has been the conclusive outcome of Spelt et al.’s 
evaluation of the empirical work across the RoI field (2009). What has not manifested 
from any of this though, either in theory or practice, is a clear focus on how this concept 
relates to an actual pedagogic approach to interdisciplinarity, though Spelt and some others 
have recently been leaning towards this, I believe. The following are proposed domain-
general interdisciplinary skills based on the evidence of RoIR studies, my own interviews, 
and the empirical work on expertise, transfer, and collaboration. These descriptions are not 
intended to suggest specific practices, which would need to be developed on a contextual 
basis by individual instructors or subjects 
 
• Stewardship & Mutual Respect: Bruce et al. listed being a ‘good team worker’ as 
one of the key skills of interdisciplinary work (Bruce et al. 2004: 464). This 
requires developing the understanding that other fields can approach the same 
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problems and subjects from a different direction validly and with no less academic 
rigour or value. This also involves decentring the home discipline of the student, 
and making the notion of disciplinarity as stewardship more explicit by instructing 
students in the importance and responsibility of experts to maintain standards and 
develop new knowledge, while acknowledging the lack of ownership or control of 
this knowledge in an exclusionary way. Discussion of practical measures for 
conflict resolution could be part of this skill as well. This was specifically noted as 
essential for interdisciplinary project leaders in much of the RoIR research. As such, 
it may not be essential to more general interdisciplinary skills training, but this 
could be good knowledge for any student to have nonetheless. 
 
• Interdependence (interdisciplinary awareness): A very strong trend across the 
RoIR studies and my own interviews was the need to be at least somewhat aware of 
which other fields exist and what they were about. In terms of interdisciplinarity as 
collaborative, this needs to be addressed as interdependence. It is this approach that 
can facilitate the shared goals and mutual responsibility that was considered 
essential for effective TMSs to develop. At least two medievalists specifically 
mentioned the American general education approach as superior in this regard. This 
may or may not be the best method, as it does not explicitly address 
interdependence. 
 
• Self-Monitoring (flexible personal epistemology): Students must also learn an 
entirely new skill, the ability to recognise when they have the expertise to usefully 
integrate something themselves, and when they do not. This places the expert 
ability to self-monitor and be aware of one’s own limitations as a key skill to be 
developed in undergraduates. In terms of the curriculum, this is a matter of 
developing/promoting a flexible and explicitly understood meta-cognitive personal 
epistemology, as Hofer suggests (Hofer 2004a). This was the most commonly cited 
skill needed for good interdisciplinary work in my interviews, and appears strongly 
in the RoIR studies by Griffin et al. and Bruce et al. William Perry regarded this as 
quite an advanced level of intellectual development, one which many 
undergraduates do not reach (Perry 1999). This would imply, if Perry is correct, 
that interdisciplinarity is not something undergraduates are consistently ready for, 
but Schommer-Aikens and Hofer’s work on personal epistemologies suggests a 
belief rather than developmental base for this, and as such this should be a skill 
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which can be developed.  
 
• Common Academic Language: This skill would need to focus on how to translate 
the ideas of one’s own field, or any field, into a common dialect of academic 
understanding. Following from Schunn and Anderson’s study, this would involve 
different specific knowledge in different cases, as some interdisciplinary 
communication could occur by stepping back to a less expert mutual domain level 
of training, but other cases would require translating back to the core principles of 
the scientific method as a common tongue. As expert language within a discipline 
is being developed, simultaneously attention should be paid to developing 
understanding of how this expert language can translate to understandable terms for 
non-experts, and how similar translation of expert language can be elicited from 
experts in other fields. This would include explicit development of the ability to 
recognise causal categorisation links or deep level interactions to other disciplinary 
concepts from deeper knowledge of one’s own discipline, as Lobato as well as Chi 
and VanLehn have suggested to facilitate knowledge transfer while retaining 
expertise. Notably this does not mean developing a sense of translating from other 
disciplines oneself, this is a chief fault of competency and solitary interdisciplinary 
models. Because collaboration and shared goals are assumed in the definition of 
interdisciplinarity, it is how to translate one’s own expert language to a more shared 
level of understanding for others that is key.113  
  
The Interdisciplinary Curriculum in Concept 
The next step in creating an interdisciplinary curriculum is to consider how such skills can 
be added to the curriculum. There are two stages to this: conceiving of how 
interdisciplinary skills fit into the curriculum as an abstracted notion, and considering how 
this can be applied to practice. A common presumption of much of the HTRoI literature, 
and especially transdisciplinary literature such as Mode 2, is that the goal of education is 
moving towards becoming more interdisciplinary, and that a uni-directional progression 
towards this is the ideal. This notion is also tacitly present in some of the educational 
literature, such as Barnett and Rowland’s accounts of the changing university. A 
unidirectional shift from disciplinary focus to interdisciplinary focus (figure 7.1) is only a 
                                                 
113
 A similar-seeming notion has been proposed by Allen Repko as finding ‘common ground’, but the 
evidence and recommendations are misleading. Repko’s analysis hinges on a fabricated dichotomy in the 
interdisciplinary literature and a surface ‘folk-psychology’ understanding of the principle of ‘common 




partial understanding of what the additional evidence reviewed here suggest as the more 
complete perception.  
 
Here the perspective is meant to shift from single-discipline contextual learning to 
interdisciplinary decontextualised or broadly contextualised learning. Clearly though, 
several of the skills in each are comparable and interrelated, such as ‘ethically aware / 
global citizens’ and ‘stewardship’ or ‘interdependence’. These appear to be simply 
different ways to state or approach a very similar core skill. The real difference between 
the two sets is not the nature of practice but whether skills in a broad context, or 
knowledge in a narrow context is the focus. Categorically, the degree of knowledge and 
expert language required in all fields available during an undergraduate degree far exceeds 
what a single category can cover for a single student, however, a small set of applied skills 

































Figure 8.1 Partial Pedagogic Model 
Interdisciplinary Core Skills 
 
• Stewardship & Mutual Respect 
• Interdependence 
o (interdisciplinary awareness) 
• Self-Monitoring 
o (flexible personal 
epistemology) 
• Common Academic Language 














Additionally, IDS, Mode 2, and many other approaches to interdisciplinarity have set it 
aside from disciplinarity by virtue of its more applied focus, the disciplines being ‘pure’. 
But we have seen that there is substantial reason to doubt that such a dichotomy makes 
sense in a broader context. The notion is refuted by expertise research, such that the 
concept of ‘pure’ research means only that its application is less clear to non-experts, and 
also by knowledge transfer research, such that it is unclear in any case whether ‘pure’ 
knowledge is ‘transferred’ or all knowledge is simply ‘applied’ differently. Requirements 
for impact statements in research, as well as problem-based learning and work-placements 
becoming increasingly commonplace even in the humanities suggests the same lack of any 
real applied/pure dichotomy from an educational practice perspective. 
 
Recalling that transactive memory systems appear to accurately and effectively describe 
interdisciplinarity, but that TMSs also describe effective collaborative work within the 
disciplines (page 125), a different way to look at both disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity 
in pedagogic terms is as two perspectives on similar meta-skills of meaning making and 
practice (figure 7.2). This suggests that it is not a progression from disciplinarity towards 
interdisciplinarity that should be the focus, but a medial point where both approaches 
converge on a more complete understanding of knowledge construction and each student’s 
individual and interdependent place within this. The two approaches more correctly 
represent a balance of necessary curriculum/perspectives to reach a functional individual 
and collaborative practice, the central point being the construction of a TMS framework.  
 
Notably, this approach requires a potentially controversial approach to individual academic 
work: that there is really no such thing in actual practice.114 There is considerable support 
for this notion, however, in both the nature of the scientific method, such that it prohibits 
individual assessment of one’s own work and requires replication and peer-review, as well 
as from categorisation research in that there is little to no possibility for actual 
unsupervised categorisation after quite an early stage of development: our categories and 
approaches to knowledge are intersubjectively developed and confirmed. In more 
educationally focused terms this notion is clear in the historian’s notion of ‘collaborating 
with the dead’, the idea that the researcher engages in a dialog with the sources and with 
                                                 
114
 It is of course still feasible and perhaps useful to distinguish active and passive collaboration, the latter 
encompassing the ‘solitary’ work of academics. The application of interdisciplinary skills should not be 
effected by such a distinction though, and are still essential for a more complete approach to knowledge 
production in either case. 
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past research (Gadamer 2006; Gunn 2014). Indeed, several of my interviews also raised the 
notion that ‘collaboration’ included working from the published work of others, or that it 
could. This concept is also present in the notion of science as a progression of cumulative 
knowledge. Although Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of paradigms disrupted the notion of a 
genuinely cumulative development across all science, it was still clear that each paradigm 
was itself cumulative and inherently collaborative (Kuhn 1996). The distinction in 
pedagogic terms then is not that interdisciplinarity is collaborative and disciplinarity is not, 
this should be clear in the common disciplinary graduate attributes of ‘collaboration’ and 
‘communication’. The difference, which forms part of the definition of interdisciplinarity 
above, is that one involves a skill-based perspective for working with problems that exceed 
personal expertise, and the other involves a skill-based perspective for working with 
problems which do not. There is clearly still considerable grey area even in this notion, 
which is another reason that an explicit convergence of disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
focused skills and teaching should be preferable to preserving another false dichotomy like 
hard/soft and pure/applied. 
 
The two perspectives on the skill sets to develop are differentiable in practice by the focus 
of the curriculum, i.e. what aspect is foregrounded. On the disciplinary side of the equation 
the focus is on specialised (though not totally isolated) disciplinary contextualisation. The 
immediate knowledge context, disciplinary ways of thinking and practicing, and 
development of nuanced chunking and expertise within this are the foregrounded goals. 
The approach to abstract skills is therefore broad and implicit as a background to this focus, 
and meaning making is content and knowledge driven. Conversely, interdisciplinarity is a 
generalised (though not entirely generic) abstraction of knowledge across disciplines, using 
interdisciplinary skills to translate deep structures into coherent interconnections through 
collaboration. The broad context allows the focus to shift to a narrow and explicit 
concentration on meta-cognitive and abstract skills, and meaning making becomes method 
and practice driven. A complete curriculum model of undergraduate learning must include 




The Interdisciplinary Curriculum in Practice 
The focus of this thesis has been on developing a definition of interdisciplinarity and the 
broad pedagogic and curriculum model above. An in-depth approach to specific curriculum 
recommendations would require substantially more research into the empirical pros and 
cons of various curriculum models, as well as considerable attention to the administration 
and assessment of interdisciplinarity at the undergraduate level. These have not been the 
focus here, as this would easily be a thesis unto itself (and likely should be). This does not 
mean, however, that there has been no consideration of or evidence for curriculum 
recommendations throughout this research. For example, one question in the medievalist 
interviews specifically addressed curriculum models for interdisciplinarity. But this was 
only within one field, and responses clearly related only to a particular type of 
interdisciplinary implementation (an ‘amalgamated’ field wherein there are existing 
courses and staff that could be co-opted). As such this cannot credibly be generalised 
without much more study.  
 
This section offers some more specific curriculum recommendations which are based on 
substantial evidence from the research above, but not yet the degree of evidence that we 
should feel comfortable to generalise policy on. The recommendations are abductive, in 
that they establish hypotheses of curriculum models to be tested, a roadmap for future 
research. It is the testing of these recommendations in practice across a wide range of 
subjects and environments, as Bamber’s triangulation model suggests, that would be 
needed next. 
 
When considering a practical curriculum, the time, will, and ability of those involved are 
the key issues, and playing to the central tendency is what is needed to develop reliably 
effective educational policy. While we can acknowledge the happy existence of truly gifted 
students, or of people willing to be in training for a decade before working, it is the 
average level of commitment, ability and time that the majority of university students have 
to offer that is what policy and theories must be based around. This has not gone entirely 
unnoticed in the RoI literature, “The importance of time repeats. It takes time to gain new 
knowledge and skills, develop relationships with colleagues in other disciplines, and learn 
their language, cultures, knowledge, and evaluation methods” (Thompson-Klein 2010a: 
146). Thompson-Klein’s solutions though, as we have seen, focus on administrative 
offerings for dual-purposing of staff. I do not see this as feasible, in fact it is likely a 
significant factor in the steady demise of IDS programmes. Thompson-Klein and others 
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have identified neo-liberalism and administrative disinterest instead for the failure of IDS 
programmes, but there is little evidence offered.  
 
It is the incoming generation of students who have relative time and opportunities to 
develop interdisciplinary capacities, not the already overstretched existing staff and 
departments. This does require taking the long view of interdisciplinarity as something we 
foster now so that it may become the norm tomorrow. It is not a quick fix, it is a fix that is 
intended to last and be self-sustaining. As the new generation moves into the academic and 
professional world the new perspectives and skills they have developed will, with time, 
disseminate outward through example. Certainly some existing staff will hold out and 
never change, something Kuhn made clear is an inevitable aspect of any paradigm shift, 
and which Barrie has shown evidence of in dealing with graduate attributes as well. Some 
experts will be those who are entrenched, inflexible, overconfident and uncritical. But 
others will undoubtedly be those who are keenly aware of their limits and will welcome 
integrating new insights. 
 
The following are recommendations for curriculum approaches to implementing and 
fostering interdisciplinarity skills at the undergraduate level. They are intended as domain-
general; that is, they should work for any field. Further, although the Scottish higher 
education system has been my model, these should be applicable to any Anglo-American 
system, and likely beyond. Different possible options are presented in order to create an 
interdisciplinary curriculum ‘policy toolkit’ to allow the best option suited to a particular 
institution to be applied. No single recommendation is likely to produce a complete 
development of interdisciplinary skills alone, rather they should work best in concert as the 
situation allows. The recommendations are based on the centrally focused abstracted model 
of interdisciplinary curricula above, but with consideration of the problems of time, will 




Fully Embedded Skills 10% Honours Requirement 
In this model, the interdisciplinary skills are 
integrated fully alongside an institution’s 
existing graduate attributes, becoming part of 
the same. As graduate attributes more broadly 
are embedded within the subjects, this allows 
for the skills to be placed within a subject 
expertise context at all points. In terms of 
entrenchment and knowledge transfer, this 
allows simultaneous cumulative development of 
flexible thinking and connective breadth as well 
as more narrow and nuanced subject knowledge. 
This process could allow the skill of translating 
understanding into a common academic 
language to be developed as expertise develops, 
which may be the only reasonable way to do so. 
 
Adding yet more domain-general skills to the 
often already overloaded learning objectives of 
each module could make an implementation of 
this model difficult. This model is also 
substantially staff dependent, something that 
was already noted as a problem with other 
models such as the similar approach to 
interdisciplinarity by Rowland. Staff 
development would be necessary. Although not 
every skill would need to be developed in every 
module, the flexibility of student pathways often 
makes addressing the skills at a particular point 
that all students will encounter also problematic. 
Combining of this model with a required 
interdisciplinary module (see right panel) may 
aid in this. Also a process known as curriculum 
mapping and assessment blueprinting (CMAB) 
may provide some solutions (see below). 
 
Pros:  
• Builds maximum flexibility within 
entrenchment throughout degree 
• Teaching focus stays within subjects 
 
Cons:  
• May overload learning objectives 
• Highly staff dependent  
 
This model aims to address the learning 
objective and course load burden of full 
embedding, by providing a focal point of 
practice in the form of a required 
interdisciplinary component to all honours 
degrees. By requiring that 10-20% (1-2 
modules) of each student’s honours course load 
to be explicitly interdisciplinary, this would 
create a context in which to focus on 
interdisciplinary skills. Another benefit to this 
model is that each subject can make connections 
and design the courses as suits them, keeping 
the control of the curriculum largely at home (or 
shared between chosen coordinators at least). 
This could not be done without some oversight, 
however, in the form of periodic reviews and 
the requirements that the interdisciplinary skills 
be made explicit in the module.  
 
There is a likelihood that some subjects would 
take the ‘easy way’ and coordinate with very 
‘near’ fields, thereby limiting the degree of 
useful interdisciplinary skill development. 
Incentives or even a requirement to coordinate 
outside of the same college or school could 
mitigate this without removing too much subject 
autonomy (Thompson-Klein 2010a). This model 
also does not itself provide any cumulative 
development of interdisciplinary skills 
throughout the degree. For this reason this 
model is best considered as an addition to the 




• Most control remains within subjects 




• No progressive/cumulative skill 
development 
• May allow too much entrenchment 






Subject Internal Module University Centralised Module 
This model recommends a specialised module 
or optional personal development session 
focusing on the interdisciplinary skills and 
taught exclusively within the subject (Chanock 
2010). The subject centred focus clearly 
presents problems for interdisciplinary skill 
development in a broader sense as it does not 
directly involve other subjects. This model is 
not recommended as a stand-alone option unless 
other options are not available. That said, it does 
offer the benefits of keeping control of the 
curriculum almost entirely within the subject, 
and with providing the maximum subject-
specific context for interdisciplinary skills. 
 
It is anticipated that such a module or optional 
session would be available early in the 
undergraduate career, but this is not required. It 
is also expected that this would be approached 
as a one time offering, but it could conceivably 
be a cumulative extracurricular process, such as 
a personal development portfolio which has 
been suggested as one means to implement 
graduate attributes as well. 
 
If this model were approached as an early one 
time module it could coordinate well with the 
honours requirement model above. If offered as 
a cumulative portfolio or series of sessions, it 
could be seen as an implementation of the fully 
embedded skills model instead. All three models 
together could offer a substantial development 
of interdisciplinary skills without sacrificing 
disciplinary expertise, but the staff and 
curriculum load to create such a combination 
may be prohibitive. 
 
Pros:  
• Can be very embedded/content specific 
• Can be early, before entrenchment 
 
Cons:  
• Lacks actual interdisciplinary contact 
• If early, precedes expertise 
• Inconsistent quality standards 
Another approach to developing 
interdisciplinary skills would be a centralised 
and non-disciplinary module or session. This 
option would develop a one-off module or series 
of generic interdisciplinary learning modules at 
the institution, most likely to be run by a 
centralised student development or skills 
learning unit. Not all institutions have such 
centralised capacity, something similar could be 
offered at the college or school level though. 
This would likely be an optional course, but 
could be required. 
 
William Newell’s IDS programme implemented 
a course specifically teaching a process of 
‘integration’ which was met with considerable 
student approval. Newell’s study noted that 
students took well to the course, but that they 
suggested that it needed to be offered at the start 
of the degree, rather than at the end of final 
year, as was the case originally (Newell 2006: 
93).115 
 
In general, evidence regarding generic 
instruction does not support this as the best 
option, but it may be one where other options 
are not available (Moore, T. 2004; 2011; 
Sumsion and Goodfellow 2004; Barrie 2006; 
Davies, W. M. 2006). There may be some 
benefits to a such an approach as well, if 
coordinated with other models. A centralised 
session could allow an eclectic and random mix 
of subjects to develop skills of working 
together, which could provide a more ‘real-
world’ example of the interdisciplinary skills. 
Such a configuration could also lead to creative 
and unforeseen solutions. 
 
Pros:  
• Centralised quality control 
• Easy to make actually interdisciplinary 
• May elicit random/creative combinations 
 
Cons:  
• Minimal subject context 
• Short duration limits development 
 
In all of the models proposed, qualification standards for interdisciplinary development 
would need to be explicitly addressed, especially for the subject internal and university 
centralised models. This will allow the reliability and credibility of such programmes to be 
understood outside of the institution itself, and is a key element to developing a sustainable 
                                                 
115
 This programme has since closed, but this aspect appears to have been well received at least. 
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and useful approach to interdisciplinary development. This is best done at the national 
level so as to develop some credibility and mobility of the programmes across institutions. 
Possibly the simplest way to acknowledge interdisciplinary skills development is with a 
standardised badged degree title (e.g. ‘History with Interdisciplinarity’). Such a standard 
would need to be benchmarked by an agency such as the QAA.  
 
Alternatively, interdisciplinary qualifications could be facilitated at the national framework 
level and by an agency such as the SCQF. This would involve developing interdisciplinary 
framework descriptors to coincide with the undergraduate levels of study (levels 7-10). 
The QAA and the SCQF working together (or the equivalent agencies in other countries) 
could develop a broadly acknowledged standard for interdisciplinary skills to be developed, 
both as a framework requirement of all graduates and as an additional focus of some 
degree programmes. Notably, there has been no attempt to do something similar at the 
national level for graduate attributes, however, the SCQF descriptors map well onto the 
graduate attributes already, which may explain this. 
 
Interdisciplinary Studies Repurposed 
Two other recommendations offer some chance to ‘repurpose’ Interdisciplinary Studies or 
thematic competency based programmes. These recommendations are aimed at resolving 














Postgraduate as Undergraduate IDS as ‘Interdisciplinary Project 
Management’ 
Something which may be reasonable to consider 
in some situations is reserving subject-specific 
expertise development until the postgraduate 
level. Interdisciplinary Studies programmes 
could then be seen as an introduction to 
interdisciplinary skills and graduate attributes 
with a light grounding in a range of chosen 
disciplines, a grasp of the types of problems 
these can resolve, and how they can interact. 
 
This would mandate postgraduate study. 
Without this addition the programme is merely 
an IDS programme as any other.  Effectively, 
this is the programme that the University of 
Melbourne has proposed (Davis 2011). 
Although this is not likely feasible in most 
cases, and has already failed in several as we 
have seen, it is conceivable that some very elite 
institutions or specialised fields could adopt 
such a programme if it were explicit and if 
effective qualifications were made transparent.  
 
Pros:  
• May be feasible for very elite institutions 
or specialised fields 
• Can allow intense focus on skills 
 
Cons: 
• Must take five or more years 
• In practice has often failed 
• Graduates who do not continue study have 
no qualifications 
 
The learning objectives and stated aims of the 
IDS model in general could be adjusted to 
explicitly train students in coordinating, 
facilitating and leading interdisciplinary project 
teams, teams made of experts in other fields. 
This could turn a string of failures into a new 
field to fill a much-lamented gap in the 
professional world, both in academia and 
beyond (Bruce et al. 2004: 460; Griffin et al. 
2006; Lyall et al. 2011: 36).  
 
The existing IDS approach to breadth without 
depth could be retained, but teaching would 
need to lead explicitly away from 
overconfidence in one’s own interdisciplinary 
problem solving and towards negotiating the 
interdisciplinary problem solving of a team of 
other experts.  
 
This is not likely to be a popular 
recommendation among supporters of IDS 
programmes such as the AIS. 
 
Pros: 
• Likely ahighly employable as a stand-
alone profession 
• Allows very explicit coverage of skills 
 
Cons:  
• Does not confer subject-based 
interdisciplinarity itself 
• May be resisted by IDS proponents 




Implementation through Curriculum Mapping  
A separate movement in curriculum studies that has been running concurrently and 
seemingly oppositional to interdisciplinarity is that of curriculum mapping and assessment 
blueprinting (CMAB). CMAB seeks to create more efficient and effective teaching, 
learning objectives and assessment by mapping what is being taught in a programme over 
the full duration of a degree (Knight 2000; Gunn and Talbot 2012). The mapping ideally 
prevents overlapping or redundant teaching and assessment, while also making certain 
nothing is missed out; the goal is reducing both staff and student overload. The process 
typically relies on a siloed disciplinary approach in order to efficiently execute reviews and 
evaluations, often tied to Key Information Sets (KIS) and National Student Survey (NSS) 




The disciplinary focus of CMAB and the concept of rigid mapping within this framework 
may appear to limit the possibility of developing interdisciplinarity, as this would 
presumably involve connections outside of the disciplinary map. But the interdisciplinary 
curriculum recommendations above are designed to develop interdisciplinarity without the 
need to substantially disrupt disciplinary approaches to learning and teaching. As such 
CMAB may have potential to aid in the implementation of interdisciplinary skills as well. I 
have been involved recently in attempts to remove this barrier to mapping processes so as 
to make a possible connection between the benefits of mapping and interdisciplinarity. If a 
CMAB implementation were to include interdisciplinary skills as something to be mapped, 
and also included in each subject either an honours interdisciplinary requirement, subject 
internal module, or centralised module as described above, then concerns for overloading 
the curriculum with interdisciplinarity, and thereby leaving nothing left for a qualified 
subject-based degree, might be mitigated or even eliminated. Mapping to this degree is an 
involved process, however, and would be best done with substantial subject buy-in first 
(Galvin et al. 2013).  
 
Limitations and Further Research 
As was mentioned in the methodology, the interviews for this thesis were originally 
designed to be substantial enough to be a primary data source for an entire thesis. The 
relative weighting and analytic approach to them, however, changed dramatically when the 
thesis became more about interdisciplinarity and less about Medieval Studies specifically. 
As such, there is a great deal more that can be made of the interview data with regards to 
learning and teaching in Medieval Studies, as well as in the humanities more generally that 
was beyond the scope of this work. It is my intention to take up this task, after obtaining 
permission from the participants. The interviews as a primary focus contain a wealth of 
information about disciplinary identities in practice in the humanities, and specifically in 
research intensive HEIs. Further, with a notion of interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity now 
more firmly worked out, it is possible for me to use the interview data to peruse the 
original goal of this thesis: developing a practical interdisciplinary approach to 
undergraduate Medieval Studies (or suggesting that we should not do so). 
 
Beyond the interviews, more rigorous and less self-identified historical assessment of 
interdisciplinarity and the disciplines would likely yield considerable insights to a richer 
understanding of interdisciplinarity in practice as well. The historical emergence of 
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disciplines in particular could be very useful research, especially comparing 19th century 
disciplinary development to post-WWII massification development and more recent post-
modern developments.  
 
If any form of new undergraduate curriculum of interdisciplinary teaching is implemented, 
it is clear that there will need to be a means to assess both the success of each student and 
the success of the programme. Assessment of interdisciplinarity was beyond the scope of 
this thesis as well, but it is an essential next stop for development of interdisciplinarity. 
Research on assessment within RoI literature is severely under-represented, and what little 
exists is not typically compelling (Ivanitskaya and Clark 2002; Boix Mansilla 2004; Klein 
et al. 2005; Repko 2006a). It is as though this is a subject that everyone is afraid to touch, 
perhaps with good cause. Because the stated aim of interdisciplinary work is to explore 
new integrated outcomes between developed and qualified disciplines or expertise, there 
are no clear experts or benchmarks to compare any results to. There is considerable work 
to be done in the field of assessment of interdisciplinarity. 
 
Final Thoughts 
This thesis has worked through several disparate fields of expert research, delved into the 
dark heart of epistemology, and challenged a number of popular and commonly held views 
about interdisciplinarity. This has been for no more profound a purpose than to develop a 
more coherent core model of interdisciplinary curricula for undergraduate study than has 
been presented thus far. When a field such as research of interdisciplinarity has so many 
conflicting and/or cross-combining theories and models, all of which seem to fit the 
evidence presented equally well, then it becomes necessary to find new evidence which 
can hopefully end the stalemate and confusion.  
 
By referring to more empirical research on educational theory and disciplinarity, more 
historically solid foundations of epistemology and academic understanding, and several 
fields of psychological research on the capacities and methods of human reasoning, it has 
been possible to shed new light on some old ideas. Ideas such as pluralistic 
‘interdisciplinarities’, essentialist ‘ownership’ models of both disciplinarity and 
interdisciplinarity, and notions of promoting interdisciplinarity in undergraduates via 
adequacy and minimal understanding, have all been found lacking in light of these new 
sources of evidence. At the same time, existing interdisciplinary models promoting 
interdisciplinarity as interpersonal academic skills, interdisciplinarity as a transient feature 
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of academic work, and the need for full disciplinary expertise, have been more empirically 
supported than before. Not only has this approach allowed for a more solidly framed 
definition of interdisciplinarity, but it has allowed also for a more solid definition of a 
discipline as well, one which retains its core nature at the optimal academic category 
without conflicting with the nature of interdisciplinarity. 
 
With the curriculum models proposed here we may yet see the barriers of disciplinarity 
dissolve into an interdisciplinary future, as many transdisciplinary proponents suggests, but 
this may come to pass by making a form of disciplinarity without barriers stronger, not 










Subject Specialists Understand and respect the values, principles methods and limitations 
of their discipline(s) 
 
Effective Communicators Articulate complex ideas with respect to the needs and abilities of 
diverse audiences 
 
Reflective Learners Use feedback productively to reflect on their work, achievements and 
self-identity 
 
Experienced Collaborators Engage with the scholarly community and respect others’ views and 
perspectives 
 
Investigative Are intellectually curious and engage in the pursuit of new knowledge 
and understanding 
 
Adaptable Experience multi-disciplinary and/or inter-disciplinary learning in an 
internationally  renowned institution 
Confident Defend their ideas in dialogue with peers and challenge disciplinary 
assumptions 
 
Resourceful and Responsible Are experienced in self-directed learning and authentic research-led 
enquiry 
Ethically and Socially Aware Consider and act upon the ethical, social and global responsibilities of 
their actions 
 
Independent and Critical 
Thinkers 











University of Aberdeen: Graduate Attributes 
<Aberdeen http://www.abdn.ac.uk/graduateattributes/> 
Academic excellence Critical thinking and effective communication 
• In-depth and extensive knowledge, 
understanding and skills at internationally-
recognised levels in their chosen discipline(s);  
• A breadth of knowledge, understanding and 
skills beyond their chosen discipline(s);  
• An ability to participate in the creation of new 
knowledge and understanding through research 
and inquiry;  
• A contextual understanding of past and present 
knowledge and ideas;  
• An intellectual curiosity and a willingness to 
question accepted wisdom and to be open to 
new ideas  
• A capacity for independent, conceptual and 
creative thinking;  
• A capacity for problem identification, the 
collection of evidence, synthesis and 
dispassionate analysis;  
• A capacity for attentive exchange, informed 
argument and reasoning;  
• An ability to communicate effectively for 
different purposes and in different contexts;  
• An ability to work independently and as part of 
a team;  
• A diverse set of transferable and generic skills  
Learning and personal development Active citizenship 
• An openness to, and an interest in, life-long 
learning through directed and self-directed 
study;  
• An awareness of personal strengths and 
weaknesses,  
• A capacity for self reflection, self discovery 
and personal development  
• An awareness and appreciation of ethical and 
moral issues;  
• An awareness and appreciation of social and 
cultural diversity;  
• An understanding of social and civic 
responsibilities, and of the rights of individuals 
and groups;  
• An appreciation of the concepts of enterprise 
and leadership in all aspects of life;  






Edinburgh Napier University English subject group: Graduate Attributes  
<http://www.napier.ac.uk/oldcontent/standoutfromthecrowd/Pages/SchoolSubjectGraduateAttributes.aspx> 
 
Intellectual curiosity and autonomy 
An English graduate will be able to demonstrate: 
• Discernment in their sourcing of knowledge and developing their critical thinking and research 
skills. 
• An ability to combine intellectual curiosity with creativity and innovation 
• An ability to engage in critical thinking (i.e., skills in reasoning, analysis, and evaluation);  
• An ability to undertake self-directed and managed research and scholarship 
• A comprehensive and well-founded knowledge of the English discipline  
• An understanding of how other disciplines relate to the English discipline  
Intra- and entrepreneurship 
An English graduate will: 
• Have the ability to interact effectively with others in order to work towards a common outcome  
• Have excellent communication skills that will benefit them in the world outside university as they 
encounter different communities and societies 
• Cope effectively with uncertainty and have the ability to move between a wide variety of learning 
situations in terms of work, social responsibility and personal matters 
• Be able to undertake effective teamwork and collaboration in a culturally diverse environment 
• Be able to manage individual contribution to teams and to engage others in complex and demanding 
tasks 
Ethical, social and professional understanding 
An English graduate will have: 
• An appreciation of the philosophical and social contexts of the English discipline  
• A knowledge and respect of ethics and ethical standards in relation to their study of English 
• A personal commitment to professional standards 
• Ability to appreciate and adapt to different cultural environments 
• An understanding of social and civic responsibility and a commitment to issues of social justice 
Personal effectiveness and self efficacy 
English graduates will be: 
• Adept at time management and personal responsibility 
• Highly skilled, reflective individuals who can generate ideas, apply knowledge into practical 
outcomes and adapt innovatively to a variety of environments within the workplace and beyond 



















SCQF Level 7 
CHARACTERISTIC 1: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 
Demonstrate and/or work with: 
• An overall appreciation of the body of knowledge that constitutes a 
subject/discipline/sector. 
• Knowledge that is embedded in the main theories, concepts and principles of the 
subject/discipline/sector. 
• An awareness of the dynamic nature of knowledge and understanding. 
• An understanding of the difference between explanations based on evidence and/or 
research and other sources, and of the importance of this difference. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 2: PRACTICE: APPLIED KNOWLEDGEERSTANDING 
Apply knowledge, skills and understanding: 
• In practical contexts. 
• In using some of the basic and routine professional skills, techniques, practices 
and/or materials associated with the subject/discipline/sector. 
• To practise these in both routine and non-routine contexts. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 3: GENERIC COGNITIVE SKILLS 
• Present and evaluate arguments, information and ideas that are routine to a 
subject/discipline/sector. 
• Use a range of approaches to address defined and/or routine problems and issues 
within familiar contexts. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 4: COMMUNICATION, ICT AND NUMERACY SKILLS 
Use a wide range of routine skills and some advanced skills associated with a 
subject/discipline/sector, for example: 
• Convey complex ideas in well-structured and coherent form. 
• Use a range of forms of communication effectively in both familiar and unfamiliar 
contexts. 
• Select and use standard ICT applications to process and obtain a variety of 
information and data. 
• Use a range of numerical and graphical skills in combination. 
• Use numerical and graphical data to measure progress and achieve goals/targets. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 5: AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND WORKING 
WITH OTHERS 
• Exercise some initiative and independence in carrying out defined activities at a 
professional level in practice or in a subject/discipline/sector. 
• Accept supervision in less familiar areas of work. 
• Exercise some managerial or supervisory responsibility for the work of others 
within a defined and supervised structure. 
• Manage limited resources within defined areas of work. 
• Take the lead in implementing agreed plans in familiar or defined contexts. 
• Take account of own and others’ roles and responsibilities when carrying out and 
evaluating tasks. 





SCQF Level 8 
CHARACTERISTIC 1: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 
Demonstrate and/or work with: 
• A knowledge of the scope, defining features, and main areas of the 
subject/discipline/sector. 
• Specialist knowledge in some areas. 
• A discerning understanding of a defined range of core theories, concepts, principles 
and terminology. 
• Awareness and understanding of some major current issues and specialisms. 
• Awareness and understanding of research and equivalent scholarly/academic 
processes. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 2: PRACTICE: APPLIED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
Apply knowledge, skills and understanding: 
• In using a range of professional skills, techniques, practices and/or materials 
associated with the subject/discipline/sector, a few of which are advanced and/or 
complex. 
• In carrying out routine lines of enquiry, development or investigation into 
professional level problems and issues. 
• To adapt routine practices within accepted standards. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 3: GENERIC COGNITIVE SKILLS 
• Undertake critical analysis, evaluation and/or synthesis of ideas, concepts, 
information and issues that are within the common understandings in a subject/ 
discipline/sector. 
• Use a range of approaches to formulate and critically evaluate evidence-based 
solutions/responses to defined and/or routine problems and issues. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 4: COMMUNICATION, ICT AND NUMERACY SKILLS 
Use a wide range of routine skills and some advanced and specialised skills associated 
with a subject/discipline/sector, for example: 
• Convey complex information to a range of audiences and for a range of purposes. 
• Use a range of standard ICT applications to process and obtain data. 
• Use and evaluate numerical and graphical data to measure progress and achieve 
goals/targets. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 5: AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND WORKING 
WITH OTHERS 
• Exercise autonomy and initiative in some activities at a professional level in 
practice or in a subject/discipline/sector. 
• Exercise managerial responsibility for the work of others within a defined structure. 
• Manage resources within defined areas of work. 
• Take the lead on planning in familiar or defined contexts. 
• Practise in ways that show awareness of own and others’ roles, responsibilities and 
contributions when carrying out and evaluating tasks. 
• Work, under guidance, with others to acquire an understanding of current 
professional practice. 
• Manage, under guidance, ethical and professional issues in accordance with current 




SCQF Level 9 
CHARACTERISTIC 1: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 
Demonstrate and/or work with: 
• An understanding of the scope and defining features of a subject/discipline/sector, 
and an integrated knowledge of its main areas and boundaries. 
• A critical understanding of a range of the principles, principle theories, concepts 
and terminology of the subject/discipline/sector. 
• Knowledge of one or more specialisms that is informed by forefront developments. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 2: PRACTICE: APPLIED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
Apply knowledge, skills and understanding: 
• In using a range of the principle professional skills, techniques, practices and/or 
materials associated with the subject/discipline/sector. 
• In using a few skills, techniques, practices and/or materials that are specialised 
and/or advanced. 
• In practising routine methods of enquiry and/or research. 
• To practise in a range of professional level contexts that include a degree of 
unpredictability. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 3: GENERIC COGNITIVE SKILLS 
• Undertake critical analysis, evaluation and/or synthesis of ideas, concepts, 
information and issues in a subject/discipline/sector. 
• Identify and analyse routine professional problems and issues. 
• Draw on a range of sources in making judgements. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 4: COMMUNICATION, ICT AND NUMERACY SKILLS 
Use a wide range of routine skills and some advanced and specialised skills in support 
of established practices in a subject/discipline/sector, for example: 
• Present or convey, formally and informally, information on standard/mainstream 
topics in the subject/discipline/sector to a range of audiences. 
• Use a range of ICT applications to support and enhance work. 
• Interpret, use and evaluate numerical and graphical data to achieve goals/targets. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 5: AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND WORKING 
WITH OTHERS 
• Exercise autonomy and initiative in some activities at a professional level in 
practice or in a subject/discipline/sector. 
• Exercise managerial responsibility for the work of others and for a range of 
resources. 
• Practise in ways that show awareness of own and others’ roles and responsibilities. 
• Work, under guidance, with specialist practitioners. 
• Seeking guidance where appropriate, manage ethical and professional issues in 
accordance with current professional and/or ethical codes or practices 
 
SCQF Level 10 
CHARACTERISTIC 1: KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING 
Demonstrate and/or work with: 
• Knowledge that covers and integrates most of the principle areas, features, 
boundaries, terminology and conventions of a subject/discipline/sector. 
• A critical understanding of the principle theories, concepts and principles. 
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• Detailed knowledge and understanding in one or more specialisms, some of which 
is informed by, or at the forefront of, a subject/discipline/sector. 
• Knowledge and understanding of the ways in which the subject/discipline/sector is 
developed, including a range of established techniques of enquiry or research 
methodologies. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 2: PRACTICE: APPLIED KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND 
UNDERSTANDING 
Apply knowledge, skills and understanding: 
• In using a wide range of the principle professional skills, techniques, practices 
and/or materials associated with the subject/discipline/sector. 
• In using a few skills, techniques, practices and/or materials that are specialised, 
advanced and/or at the forefront of a subject/discipline/sector. 
• In executing a defined project of research, development or investigation and in 
identifying and implementing relevant outcomes. 
• To practise in a range of professional level contexts that include a degree of 
unpredictability and/or specialism. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 3: GENERIC COGNITIVE SKILLS 
• Critically identify, define, conceptualise and analyse complex/professional 
problems and issues. 
• Offer professional insights, interpretations and solutions to problems and issues. 
• Demonstrate some originality and creativity in dealing with professional issues. 
• Critically review and consolidate knowledge, skills, practices and thinking in a 
subject/discipline/sector. 
• Make judgements where data/information is limited or comes from a range of 
sources. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 4: COMMUNICATION, ICT AND NUMERACY SKILLS 
Use a wide range of routine skills and some advanced and specialised skills in support 
of established practices in a subject/discipline/sector, for example: 
• Present or convey, formally and informally, information about specialised topics to 
informed audiences. 
• Communicate with peers, senior colleagues and specialists on a professional level. 
• Use a range of ICT applications to support and enhance work at this level and 
adjust features to suit purpose. 
• Interpret, use and evaluate a wide range of numerical and graphical data to set and 
achieve goals/targets. 
 
CHARACTERISTIC 5: AUTONOMY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND WORKING 
WITH OTHERS 
• Exercise autonomy and initiative in professional/equivalent activities. 
• Exercise significant managerial responsibility for the work of others and for a range 
of resources. 
• Practise in ways that show awareness of own and others’ roles and responsibilities. 
• Work, under guidance, in a peer relationship with specialist practitioners. 
• Work with others to bring about change, development and/or new thinking. 
• Manage complex ethical and professional issues in accordance with current 
professional and/or ethical codes or practices. 






Set 1 – Nature of Disciplinarity 
 
1. How would you define yourself academically? 
 - What criteria do you use to distinguish yourself in this way, other than by title of 
degree? 
 
2. How would you define interdisciplinarity? 
 - In what ways would you say that Medieval Studies does or does not qualify as 
interdisciplinary in terms of research or teaching? 
 - Do you see interdisciplinarity as individual or collaborative, or either or both? 
 
3. What, in your view, makes a good interdisciplinary researcher? 
 - Do you think this can be learned or taught?  
 
4. How would you define a discipline? 
 
5. Are there particular skills or knowledge which you feel every medievalist should know? 
 
6. Can you discuss what you think of the terms ‘truth’, ‘validity’ or ‘evidence’ in Medieval 
Studies? 
 - Do you perceive that there is general agreement or disagreement on these notions 
 among medievalists, or do you think the matter is more complex such as agreement at  
 some levels but debate at others (please elaborate)? 
 
7. Have you experienced or witnessed questionable, surface or misunderstood use of your 
'home' discipline in the name of interdisciplinarity?  
 - If so, do you feel this could be prevented, or should be, and if so how? 
 
Set 2 – Nature and History of Medieval Studies 
 
1. How would you define or differentiate the ‘medieval’ period?  
 - Are there ways in which this is problematic? 





2. Do you recall when you first encountered Medieval Studies by that name? 
 - How was the field different or the same then as now? 
 - Do you feel that disciplinary identities/boundaries have become more important, less 
important, or remained mostly the same over time? 
 
3. In an undergraduate teaching context, have ever taught in an interdisciplinary manner, 
such as team teaching, switching between different areas of your own expertise, or 
including evidence or material from another discipline in a course? (If not have you 
had a chance to witness other attempting this?) 
 - How successful do you think this was? 
 - Were the links between different ‘disciplinary’ inputs and sources made explicit to 
students, that is, where they instructed on how to relate the disciplines? 
 - Would you do it again, if so what sort of changes might you make? 
 
4. Do you think that Medieval Studies could or should be considered a discipline in its own 
right?  
 
5. Hypothetically, if Medieval Studies were to be offered as an undergraduate programme, 
how do you think this would fit with the existing disciplines which commonly make up 
the field (please discuss any aspect)? 
 - How would you imagine assessing student work in a Medieval Studies programme, 
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“Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity in Undergraduate Higher Education: Analysis and the 
Case of Medieval Studies” 
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2. Invitation paragraph 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask 
us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to 
decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this.  
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The goal of the study is to create a working definition of interdisciplinarity, and to consider 
if and how this might fit into undergraduate learning and teaching. My previous 
postgraduate work in Medieval Studies is was what gave me the idea to look at this topic. 
A case study of the interdisciplinary field of Medieval Studies is meant to create a 'real 
world' example to test the theory. 
 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
 
You have been approached because the needs for the case study are particular. I am 
interested to know the views on interdisciplinarity and Medieval Studies from lecturers in 
Scottish universities who teach undergraduate students in one of the cognate disciplines 
of Medieval Studies (History, Art History, Archaeology, Literature, Religious Studies) and 
are also active in Medieval Studies more broadly.  
 
5. Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  
 




Your participation would be for two forty-five minute interviews, preferably face to face. 
You are not required to travel, I will be happy to conduct the interview where you prefer. 
The interview will be recorded on audio only, and later transcribed. The interview will 
feature questions about your experiences with Medieval Studies, your views on 
interdisciplinarity, and your experience or ideas about undergraduate learning and 
teaching. You will not be asked to do anything further once the interview is completed.  
 
7. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
I recognise that the Medieval Studies field in Scotland is a close grouping, and that even 
general statements might be identifiable to colleagues. All information, which is collected 
during the course of the research will be kept strictly confidential. Your name will not be 
used, nor will any quotes which could in any way identify yourself, or any course, 
programme, centre or institution you are associated with. The data will be used to find 
general trends, not to look at specific examples. When the project is completed the 
interview itself will be deleted. 
 
8. What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The study will be submitted as my PhD thesis, and may also inform article submissions or 
future publication.  
 
9. Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
This research is organised through the College of Social Sciences, School of Education of 
the University of Glasgow. 
 
10. Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The project has been reviewed by the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Glasgow. 
 
11. Contact for further information 
 
In addition to a contact involved in the study, it is recommended that you give a statement 
that if participants have any concerns regarding the conduct of the research project that 
they can contact the College of Social Sciences Ethics Officer by contacting Dr Valentina 
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